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NOTHING BUT NET:
RENEWABLE ENERGY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, MIDAMERICAN LEGAL
FICTIONS, AND SUPREMACY DOCTRINE
STEVEN FERREY*
I.  OVERVIEW
With state governments at the barricades of federalism, an en-
ergy revolution has been launched. Perhaps usurping federal law,
thirty-eight states recently mounted a statutory and regulatory charge
to establish “net metering,” a regulatory innovation to implement de-
centralized renewable power. This innovation fundamentally shifts
the regulatory balance as well as the energy mix in America. Net me-
tering profoundly reshapes the energy landscape, providing the most
significant boost of any policy tool at any level of government—both
qualitatively and quantitatively—to decentralize and “green” Ameri-
can energy sources.
While only twelve states have passed statutory initiatives to im-
plement renewable energy system benefit charges and eight have
elected to implement renewable portfolio standards,1 thirty-six states
to date have implemented net metering.2 Net metering enables con-
sumers with small generating facilities, for example solar panels, fuel
cells, or wind turbine systems, to offset their electric bills with any ex-
* Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, spring 2003; Professor of Law, Suffolk
University Law School; B.A. Pomona College; M.A. Environmental Planning, University of
California at Berkeley; J.D. Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkley, post-
doctoral Fulbright Fellow, University of London. Professor Ferrey acknowledges the research
assistance on aspects of this article of Abigail Albee, Dan Hart, Mike Robbins, Patricia Shep-
pard, and Gina Takimori.
1. Steven Ferrey, Renewed Energy: Constitutional Impediments to State Action Crafting
America's Renewable Energy Future (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 65, on file with the
Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum).
2. Net metering provides an automatic credit to decentralized renewable power produc-
ers, while system benefit charges pay selective one-time payment benefits to decentralized
power producers, and renewable portfolio standards provide for a tradable "green" credit that
provides less of a price differential between centralized power utilities and decentralized renew-
able power producers than net metering.
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cess power produced at their facility, running the retail utility meter
backwards when the renewable energy generator funnels power to
the grid. Net billing, or net metering, is the cornerstone of state en-
ergy policies encouraging private investment in renewable energy
sources.3
Net metering can pay the eligible renewable energy source ap-
proximately four times more for this power than paid to any other in-
dependent generators and much more than the time-dependent value
of this power to the purchasing utility. A 400% price advantage over
the competition provides a nationwide platform in thirty-six states—
including all of the major states—to launch a revolution in renewable
and decentralized energy production.
3. See Seth M. Colton and James W. Brehl, Cogeneration - The Small Facility Perspective
in Minnesota, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 480-81 (1985) (citing MINN. STAT. § 216B.164(1)
(1982), a net metering provision "intended 'to give the maximum possible encouragement to
cogeneration and small power production consistent with protection of the ratepayers and the
public.'"). "Net metering" or "net billing" is a system that utilizes a single bi-directional meter
(or the mathematically netted result of two unidirectional meters) to measure and bill electric
energy purchased and sold by a customer. Brief for Respondent/Appellant Iowa Utilities Board
at 9, MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Iowa Util. Bd. (Aug. 18, 2000) (No. 99-1529). The single meter
connects a Qualifying Facility or small power producer directly to an electric utility. See Id. Net
metering allows consumers with small generating facilities (usually photovoltaic solar panels, a
fuel cell, or a wind turbine system) to use a single reversible meter to measure the difference
between the total electric generation exported to the grid and their total consumption of elec-
tricity from the grid. Net metering enables consumers with on-site generation systems to employ
any excess electricity that they generate to offset their electric bills. As the consumer's genera-
tion system produces electricity, the kilowatts are first used for on-site (sometimes called "sta-
tion power") needs. Then, if the consumer creates more electricity than he/she needs, the excess
generation is fed back into the utility grid and sold back to the utility. Typically, the small pro-
ducer produces power primarily for his own needs, but when an excess is generated it is sold to
the utility and the meter turns backwards. Id. Likewise, if the small producer consumes addi-
tional power, it may be obtained from the utility through the same meter, turning the meter
forward. Id. Finally, at the end of the billing cycle, the meter is read and the small producer pays
the utility, at the retail rate, for any electricity the utility has supplied to the customer-generator
during the billing cycle. Id. at 13. Similarly, in many states, the utility will pay or credit the cus-
tomer-generator for any power the customer-generator has generated in excess of its needs
during that billing cycle. Id. Why use a single meter to track both inflow and outflow of energy?
Most existing meters are bi-directional. If the existing meters were not utilized, the customer-
generator would have to purchase and install new dual, unidirectional meters. Brief of Amici
Curiae Renewable Energy Advocates at 7, MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Iowa Util. Bd. (U.S.
Aug. 18, 2000) (No. 99-1529). Typically, these meters cost between $200 and $1,000. Therefore,
meter replacement on a small residential system would add substantially to the total installation
cost. Id. Some jurisdictions such as Maine agree that meter replacement is an unnecessary bur-
den to impose upon such small energy producers. Id. The Maine Public Utilities Commission
held that "requiring two meters (one for purchase and one for sales) would be unnecessarily
costly for such small facilities." Talmage, Nos. 97-513 & 97-532, at 7 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n
Oct. 27, 1997) (order) (citing Chapter 36 Cogeneration and Power Production, No. 80269, at 18
(Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n May 7, 1981)).
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This article analyzes the key net metering decision, MidAmerican
Energy Co. v. Iowa Utilities Board, through its illogical “hairpin”
twists in federal and state courts.4 But that is the beginning, not the
resolution, of the tension between state and federal government
regulation of net metering. Not one of the precedents cited in the de-
cision support the propositions for which they are summoned. Analy-
sis of the precedential links in the jurisprudential chain erodes the
foundation of the holding. The constitutional constraints on state
regulation of the traditionally federally governed American energy
system are contested on the net metering battleground.
Section II, examines the unique role of electric energy, as well as
the emerging role played by decentralized and renewable energy
sources, in shaping American institutions and society. Electric energy
is fragile and unique; it cannot be preserved or stored and moves at
the speed of light, yet when centralized it is vulnerable to disruption.
It is protected and distributed under a stringent legal regulatory con-
struct. Section III introduces the mechanics of net metering. Section
IV examines and tracks the seminal MidAmerican case through the
state courts to an outcome that holds against the state, then to its ul-
timate reversal in federal court. Section V places a magnifying glass
on this federal decision and analyzes the primary precedent on which
it relies, and then proceeds to discuss the secondary precedent un-
derlying the decision. The decision rests on much less than meets the
eye. The precedent supports a holding contrary to that announced.
Section VI examines the commerce clause and supremacy clause con-
stitutional jurisprudence demarcating federal and state jurisdiction
over power. Last, this article will set forth the federal statutory and
regulatory framework for decentralized and renewable energy
sources and finally discuss the supremacy clause issues raised by net
metering.
The pending state/federal struggle over net metering replays sev-
enty years of federalism’s jurisdictional friction regarding electric
power development. This article concludes by suggesting how to con-
struct a more stable foundation for important net metering policy.
Net metering is a vital platform for restructuring the energy interface
in twenty-first century America. It is preferable to sanction net me-
tering practices at the state level through a federal rulemaking rather
4. MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. AA3173, 3195, 3196 (Iowa District
Court May 25, 1999). [hereinafter "MidAmerican"]
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than by jurisprudential “precedent” that does not support the propo-
sitions for which they are cited.
II.  MODERN SOCIETY AND THE FORCE OF ENERGY
Energy has always been important. Since humankind first cre-
ated the wheel and harnessed animals to do productive labor, energy
has been the means to organize production. Certain energy technolo-
gies—principally those associated with the critical modular portable
fuel role of petroleum products and the resultant formative impact of
the automobile in sculpting modern use of land and space—are the
stuff of folklore. These are specific examples in a long continuum of
the harnessing and application of energy by society.
A. Decentralization of Energy Supply
There are significant efficiency reasons to promote decentralized
on-site electricity supply. Decentralized electric production can trans-
form electric production efficiency from approximately 33% for cen-
tral station conventional steam cycle utility supply to approaching
80% for decentralized cogeneration.5 These decentralized electric
supply technologies, in addition to greater potential efficiency, and in
certain circumstances environmental benefits, tend to encourage the
deployment of renewable energy sources and applications.
Particularly in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade
Center, the security of the centralized electric supply and distribution
system in the United States has been subject to substantial scrutiny.
The security of large nuclear and fossil-fuel-fired power plants is not
assured. The security of the nation’s supply of renewable energy
sources is deemed by many to be more predictable, and more reliable
than that of conventional fossil fuels.6
5. See LEONARD S. HYMAN, AMERICA'S ELECTRIC UTILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE 27 (6th ed. 1997) ("In the production of electricity, roughly two-thirds of the caloric
content of the fuel is lost up the smokestack or into waterways in the form of waste heat.");
AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE 343 (1977) ("Using
fuel to raise steam to drive turbines to generate electricity inevitably loses about three-fifths or
more of the fuels energy in the form of warm water used to cool the steam condenser. But this
heat need not be wasted, as it normally is in U.S. power stations. Instead, it can be used to heat
buildings or greenhouses via a combined-heat-and-power station. Such an integrated "total-
energy system" can raise to 80% or more the efficiency with which useful work is extracted from
the fuel, saving money correspondingly. This can be done particularly well on a small scale be-
cause it is more difficult to transport low-temperature heat for long distances than electricity.").
6. See LOVINS, supra note 5, at 269 ("Fluctuations in renewable energy flows are in this
sense better understood and more predictable than those in the supply of conventional fuels and
power. The methods used to forecast the path of the sun, or even next weeks weather, are con-
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Because renewable energy sources are not under the control of
any nation or cartel, but are instead distributed across the earth, they
are not subject to embargo or manipulation.7 Because decentralized
renewable energy sources are developed in relatively small modules,
the reliability and resiliency of the system is promoted.8 Because de-
centralized energy resources are built close to their points of use, they
are less dependent on long transmission and distribution networks,
and they are less vulnerable to supply disruption from an overloaded
system line, storm, or intentional disruption.9
A move to greater reliance on either cogeneration or dispersed
renewable energy sources will decentralize the sources of power.
Smaller power sources are deployed in modular form, at small size,
close to the user of the electricity. Therefore, they rely much less on
an integrated transmission and distribution system, except for sup-
plemental and back-up supply.
In this way, decentralization breaks the dependency relationship
between major urban infrastructure suppliers and energy consumers.10
siderably more reliable than those which predict reactor accidents or Saudi politics."); id. at 268
("Renewable sources eliminate at a stroke two of the most fragile parts of today's energy sys-
tem—the special localities (foremost among them the Persian Gulf) where rich deposits of fuel
occur in the earth's crust; and the far flung links which carry raw fuels and deliver processed en-
ergy in copious but concentrated flows over long distances. In place of these power transporta-
tion systems, renewable sources rely on the automatic arrival of the natural energy flows, direct
and indirect, which are distributed freely, equitably, and daily over the entire surface of the
earth. This energy flow is not subject to embargoes, strikes, wars, sabotage, or other interfer-
ences, nor to depletion, scarcity, and exhaustion.").
7. See id. at 288-289 ("Being inexhaustible and relying only on domestic energy flows, re-
newable sources can never place this nation at the mercy of other countries which control dwin-
dling and scarce fuel resources.").
8. See id. at 264 ("A resilient energy supply system should consist of numerous, relatively
small modules with a low individual cost of failure. The philosophy of resilience, on the other
hand, accepts the inevitability of failure and seeks to limit the damage that failure can do.").
9. See id. at 265 ("A resilient supply system delivers energy to its users via short, robust
links. Energy that travels simply and directly from ones own rooftop, or down the street, or
across town, is more likely to arrive than energy that must travel hundreds or thousands of miles
and be processed and converted in complex devices along the way."); HYMAN, supra note 6, at
34 ("Electricity travels at close to the speed of light, and those running the network must make
decisions quickly, or have in place devices that make decisions automatically. A few seconds of
delay may turn a local perturbation into a multistate blackout. In an interconnected system, a
deviation from normal operations in one region affects all the connections, as well.").
10. JON VAN TIL, LIVING WITH ENERGY SHORTFALLS: A FUTURE FOR AMERICAN
TOWNS AND CITIES 107 (1982) ("Other statements have been made to the point that energy
shortfall contains within it a set of implications more conducive to decentralization than to re-
concentration. Peterson and Hempel have analyzed the decentralizing influence of solar, recy-
cling, and communications technologies and note that 'each of these technological develop-
ments offers an individual the opportunity to withdraw from traditional dependency
relationships which have been created by the basic urban institutions of our time: city govern-
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Decentralized energy sources encourage independent responsibility
in lieu of a more centralized dependency. This shift towards inde-
pendent responsibility has the potential to be a formative force on
spatial development, modern society and lifestyle, and institutional
evolution.
With demand for electricity increasing in both developed and
developing nations, whether new power supplies are developed in a
centralized or decentralized mode has profound implications. How
states encourage or discourage the creation of decentralized dispersed
energy sources through various regulatory, subsidy, and metering ini-
tiatives, will sculpt the electric energy future. Net metering is the
principal mechanism employed by the states to encourage decentral-
ized and renewable energy technologies. However, net metering must
survive legal scrutiny.
B. On-Site Efficiency
Both conventional electric generation technologies and industrial
process heat applications are inefficient. Conventional electric gener-
ating technologies typically exhaust as much as two-thirds of the heat
energy produced to power electric generators.11 Industry uses process
steam most often in applications below 400 degrees Fahrenheit. How-
ever, combustion of fossil fuels to produce that heat results in temp-
eratures of more than 3000 degrees Fahrenheit, much of which is
wasted.12 The next major leap in efficiency must come from recover-
ing and reusing waste heat. Machines that recover all waste heat and
produce electricity have the capability to achieve efficiencies from 50
ments, utility companies, major educational centers and the workplaces of corporate capital-
ism. . . .' There is increasing evidence that dispersed settlement patterns can be combined with
what we have previously considered 'urban' levels of quality of life.").
11. See generally I.C. BUPP ET AL., ENERGY FUTURE (Robert Stobaugh & Daniel Yergins
eds., 1979); LOVINS, supra note 5; BARRY COMMONER, THE POVERTY OF POWER (1976).
12. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, COGENERATION HANDBOOK (CEC P500-82-054)
1-1 (1982). When designing a total energy system, one typically designs around the usable quan-
tity of heat, and scales the electricity production relative to both the electricity demand and the
output characteristics of various technologies to produce an appropriate split of thermal and
electric energy. There is a myriad of promising cogeneration technologies available in the indus-
trial and commercial sectors. They all have the ability to simultaneously generate electricity and
heat for useful application. Typically, cogeneration technologies capture waste heat and harness
it for additional purposes, rather than exhausting it as a waste material. This use of otherwise
wasted energy is cogeneration's principal advantage over conventional electric generating tech-
nologies. Cogeneration technologies realize a "cascading" effect of capturing waste heat by-
product of an industrial or energy process, thereby realizing a double value use of the energy.
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to 90%, much better than the typical thirty-plus percent of the exist-
ing central station utility fossil fuel steam system.
Cogeneration technologies make use of the otherwise wasted
heat from the combustion process. Cogeneration technologies pro-
duce electricity and a second form of useful energy, heat. The use gets
two forms of useful energy for the effort and price of one. Thus, co-
generation facilities operate at overall thermal efficiencies as great as
250 to 300% higher than conventional electric generating technolog-
ies.13 The very best cogeneration technologies are more than twice as
efficient as new coal-fired power plants.14 As generating technologies
become more efficient, they diminish the residual heat energy wasted.
This, in turn, diminishes the by-product or cogeneration potential ap-
plication of heat energy.
The heat recovered from a cogenerating energy system, a system
generating heat and electricity, can be used for direct application
heat, for industrial process heat, or for pre-heating the combustion air
for a utility boiler.15 By capturing waste heat in the process of electric
generation, greater efficiency is achieved. This means that more use-
ful energy can be produced while generating a lower amount of envi-
ronmental pollutants and emissions. It also means that less transmis-
sion capability would be required if there is development of dispersed
electric and total energy systems, located close to load centers. Not
only will additional transmission capacity not be required in certain
areas, but capacity requirements of existing transmission grids will be
alleviated. One way to view this phenomenon is that if natural gas co-
13. Id. at 1-3 ("A cogeneration system operates at an overall thermal efficiency as much as
2½ to 3 times that of conventional utility electrical generating systems.").
14. Barney L. Capehart & Lynne C. Capehart, Efficiency in Industrial Cogeneration: The
Regulatory Role, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Mar. 15, 1990, at 17. Typical heat rates for
large, modern, coal-fired power plants are 10,500 British Thermal Units per Kilowatt-hour
(Btu/kWh) as compared to 4,500 Btu/kWh for efficient, steam-topping cogeneration power
plants. Id. at 17-18.
15. Many of these technologies are derivative from the aircraft turbine industry. With mass
production, smaller generators in the 1-5 MW range are likely to become even more cost-
effective. It is possible that the most cost-effective application could be in the 1-10 MW size, de-
pending on a variety of engineering factors and environmental requirements. With smaller fa-
cilities located on or near the site of consumption, the necessity for transmission facilities is
minimized, along with transmission losses and transmission-related outage problems. Once one
constructs a combined-cycle gas-fired facility in the 50 to 100 MW range, there are only a few
additional technological economies of scale from larger size, although there still may be fuel
procurement and arbitrage advantages at larger size. Units of this size are not inappropriate to
put near population centers, depending upon the land-use, siting, emissions, and engineering
factors involved. In fact, some of the most efficient gas turbine technology is realized at below
50 MW.
040704 FERREY.DOC 04/26/04  10:58 AM
8 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 14:1
generation or total energy systems replace centrally dispatched elec-
tricity, energy will be moved more in its primary form by natural gas
pipelines and less in its derived form as electricity.16
C. Environmental Benefits
Conventional production of electricity by electric utilities in the
United States is responsible for substantial shares of criteria pollutant
emissions17 including:
(1)  68% of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions;
(2)  33% of nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions; and
(3)  33% of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.
Environmental costs associated with power plants occur at each
of three stages of the energy process: at the point of extraction and
processing of energy sources,18 direct costs associated with the use of
energy sources,19 and back-end residual costs.20 There were 838 elec-
tric utilities that both generated and sold power in the United States
in 1998. The twenty largest of these electric utilities were accountable
for 50% of the utility emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and
16. See discussion infra Section II.
17. In 1985, electric utilities contributed 68% of the national SO2 emissions (16,204,000
tons of 23,699,000 tons emitted nationally), and 33% of the national NOx emissions (6,989,000
tons of 21,054,000 tons emitted nationally). 1 NAT'L ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM, INTERIM ASSESSMENT: THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF ACIDIC DEPOSITION 11
(1987). Electric utilities accounted for 57% of carbon dioxide emissions in the 1980s. E.P.A. Of-
fice of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, Policy, Draft Report To Congress, Options for Stabiliz-
ing Global Change, 4 (Mar. 1989) in Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate: Hearing Be-
fore the Senate Subcommittee on Environmental Protection, Committee on Environment and
Public Works, 101st Cong. 101-31 (1989). [hereinafter EPA Report]. Carbon dioxide accounts
for 80% of global warming because of its long duration in the atmosphere. Daniel A. Lashof &
Dilip R. Ahuja, Relative Contributions of Greenhouse Gas Emissions to Global Warming, 344
NATURE 529, 529 (Apr. 5, 1990). The remaining greenhouse gases, CH4, CFC 11 & 12, N2O, and
others, accounted for the gases contributing to the balance of global warming. EPA Report, su-
pra note 17, at 3.
18. Front-end costs include the costs of drilling, mining, or otherwise extracting raw fuel
sources, the processing, enrichment or concentration on these fuel sources, the manufacture of
equipment to effectively utilize these fuel sources, and transportation costs for fuel and equip-
ment.
19. These include the emission of a variety of pollutants, health impacts from these emis-
sions, impacts on the natural environment of such emissions, and human occupational exposure
or illness at the power plant work site. The primary effects on human populations are the in-
creased risk of mortality and morbidity, including chronic illness and increased risk of chronic
disease.
20. These include waste disposal costs for residual elements of fuel and the eventual costs
of decommissioning energy producing facilities.
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carbon dioxide. The 100 largest of these electric utilities were respon-
sible for 90% or more of each of these emissions.21
The primary impacts on human health from direct production of
electric energy are from emissions of the criteria pollutants sulfur di-
oxide,22 nitrogen oxide,23 carbon dioxide,24 ozone,25 particulates,26 and
acid deposition.27 Conventional power facilities exert environmental
impacts on health and the environment in the form of water pollu-
tion28 and impairment of land uses.29
The level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased
steadily during the last 100 years from approximately 270 parts per
million (ppm) to 340 ppm. A common prediction, found in many dis-
cussions of global change, states that if the carbon dioxide level con-
tinues to increase at the current rate, the concentration will be double
preindustrial levels by the year 2050 and the earth will experience an
average increase of between two degrees and eight degrees Fahren-
heit.30 To help put these statistics in perspective, a five degree Fahr-
21. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, BENCHMARKING AIR EMISSIONS OF
ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATORS IN THE UNITED STATES (July 1998).
22. Sulfur exerts a significant impact on human health directly, is also a precursor of aero-
sols that result in acid deposition, and is transformed into sulfates, which pose independent
problems. See id. at 44 (discussing the impacts of sulfur dioxides).
23. NOx is formed by the conversion of chemically bound nitrogen in the fuel or from
thermal fixation of atmospheric nitrogen in the combustion air. See id. at 40-43 (discussing the
effects of nitrogen oxides).
24. Carbon dioxide is caused principally by the burning of fossil fuels, and is a principal
greenhouse gas, responsible for global warming. See id. at 45 (discussing the effects of carbon
dioxides).
25. Ozone causes damage to human health, agriculture, and plant life. See id. at 40 (dis-
cussing the effects of ozone).
26. Particulates include solid particles and liquid matter, which range in size from one mi-
cron to more than 100 microns in diameter. They are responsible for major health impairment,
impairment of visibility by causing haze, and the creation of sulfate from SO2 emissions. See id.
at 44 (discussing sulfur dioxide emissions in relation to particulate matter).
27. Acid deposition causes damage to forests, wildlife, water quality, and aquatic species.
Id. at 44 fig. 2.5 (discussing the hazards caused by acid deposition).
28. This is primarily in the form of thermal discharge from fossil-fuel and nuclear power
facilities, water impacts from hydroelectric dams and spillways, and leachate contamination
from discharge ponds or landfills for contaminated facility water. See id. at 38-46 (discussing the
adverse effects of power plant pollution).
29. Large hydroelectric generating stations flood upstream land; solar and wind electric
production facilities create visual, aesthetic and, in some cases, television signal interference ex-
ternalities; large generating facilities, particularly nuclear facilities, may adversely impact prop-
erty values in the region where the facility is located.
30. Michael D. Lemonick, The Heat is On, TIME, Oct. 19, 1987, at 60.
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enheit decrease in temperature accompanied the last great ice age
12,000 years ago.31
The increased rate of combustion of fossil fuels in the last cen-
tury accounts for about 75% of the increase in anthropogenic carbon
in the atmosphere, while the reduction in organic matter in the bio-
sphere, which absorbs carbon in the atmosphere through assimilation,
resulting from deforestation accounts for approximately the remain-
ing 25%.32 Unassimilated carbon dioxide in the atmosphere lasts more
than 100 generations.
Carbon dioxide is the most important greenhouse gas.33 Carbon
dioxide, which is released by burning fossil fuels and deforestation, is
thought to account for about 50% of the global greenhouse effect.
The impacts of other greenhouse gases—methane,34 nitrogen oxide,
31. T.M. Georges, Climate Change and Public Policy (unpublished manuscript at 3, avail-
able at http://tgeorges.home.comcast.net/climate.html (1992)).
32. Many researchers suspect that deforestation contributes to global climate change to the
same degree as industrial emissions. Deforestation reduces the amount of plant matter available
to store carbon dioxide. The remaining bare land stores less carbon dioxide. Therefore, less wa-
ter is released to the atmosphere, reducing annual rainfall, which increases local temperature
significantly. In addition, stripped lands do not store heat as well as forested areas, which adds
to the increase in temperature in areas of deforestation. These factors upset climate balance. In
addition to attempting to regulate industrial emissions, the governments may have to control the
land use activities of farmers, loggers, and developers.
33. Carbon dioxide is relatively transparent to sun, but absorbs the longer infrared radia-
tion, trapping heat above the earth's surface.
34. Methane is different from other greenhouse gases due to its immediate impact on the
atmosphere and its short atmospheric lifetime. Methane has twenty to thirty times more green-
house capacity (the ability to trap infrared heat) per molecule than carbon dioxide. STEPHEN H.
SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING; ARE WE ENTERING THE GREENHOUSE CENTURY? 101
(1989). Or put another way, a gram of methane absorbs seventy times more infrared radiation
than a gram of carbon dioxide. Methane in the atmosphere also contributes to tropospheric
ozone formation, another greenhouse gas, and potentially stratospheric ozone depletion. These
characteristics make methane an extremely potent greenhouse gas, giving it 120 times more
power to cause global warming than carbon dioxide. This characteristic is called "high global
warming potential." "Global warming potential is defined as "the ratio of the warming caused
by the emission unit of a trace gas to that caused by the emission of carbon dioxide at current
concentration levels." U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, METHANE EMISSIONS
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONTROL 20-21 (1990) [hereinafter METHANE EMISSIONS]. Methane
is produced by bacteria that adapt to relatively oxygen-free environments including the intesti-
nal tracts of animals, bogs, marshes, rice paddies, arctic permafrost, and garbage dumps.
SCHNEIDER, supra note 34, at 101. Monitoring indicates that methane levels in the atmosphere
have increased by almost 100% since 1800. See id. at 21. This increase is mainly attributed to
population growth and human related activities, accounting for about 70% of total methane
emissions. Major anthropogenic sources of methane emissions, include rice cultivation, live-
stock, biomass burning, coal mining, gas systems leaks, and landfills. METHANE EMISSIONS, su-
pra note 34, at 7 (reporting the findings of two international workshops sponsored by the Inter-
national Panel on Climate Change which focused on current methane emissions and
opportunities to control these emissions). Although methane presents numerous problems when
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and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)—are believed to collectively ac-
count for the remaining 50%. Although these gases are only evident
in trace quantities, they are extremely efficient at absorbing radiation,
and any substantial change in their concentration is likely to affect the
atmosphere’s natural ability to regulate global temperatures. Nitro-
gen oxide, which accounts for about 5% of the greenhouse effect, is
generated by burning fuels.
It is projected that the electric power sector will account for 35%
of carbon dioxide emissions, industry 27%, transportation 25%, and
the domestic sector 14%.35 The choice of fuels, as well as the technol-
ogy for converting those fuels to electricity, has profound implications
for attaining carbon dioxide reduction targets to limit possible effects
of global warming.
1. Renewable Energy
What the renewable energy projects do have in common is that
they do not utilize combustion of fossil fuels to produce electricity.
They either create mechanical shaft power from the movement of
wind or water, tap naturally produced geothermal energy sources or
employ solar energy to induce direct current on a chemical surface.
Wind energy facilities create noise and land-use externalities.36 The
cost of these externalities are approximately 0.1 cents/kilowatt hour,
as illustrated in Table 1.
released directly into the earth's atmosphere, it presents significant benefits when utilized as an
energy source. Methane is a main component of natural gas. When compared with fossil fuels,
natural gas has significantly lower emissions of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide,
and particulates. When directly substituted for electricity generated by fossil fuels, significant
reductions of carbon dioxide emissions are achieved. METHANE EMISSIONS, supra note 34, at
20, 37. Methane in the atmosphere also contributes to tropospheric ozone formation, another
greenhouse gas, and potentially stratospheric ozone depletion. These characteristics make
methane an extremely potent greenhouse gas, giving it 120 times more power to cause global
warming than carbon dioxide. This characteristic is called "high global warming potential."
Global warming potential is defined as "the ratio of the warming caused by the emission unit of
a trace gas to that caused by the emission of carbon dioxide at current concentration levels."
METHANE EMISSIONS, supra note 34, at 20-21.
35. While use of coal in power plants is a major source of carbon dioxide, the fastest grow-
ing source of carbon dioxide emissions is vehicle exhaust.
36. See e.g., Oregon Dep't of Energy, Noise Regulation and Wind Energy Facilities at
http://www.energy.state.or.us/siting/noise.htm (January 7, 2004).
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TABLE 1
Summary of Environmental Costs for
Various Renewable Technologies37
Technology Type Cents/Kilowatt Hour
Solar 0 to 0.4
Wind 0 to 0.1
Biomass 0 to 0.7
Geothermal energy sources have minimal environmental impacts
that while limited, include air pollution and noise.38 Photovoltaic solar
energy systems exhibit limited negative environmental impacts be-
cause they necessitate manufacture of photovoltaic cells, use of large
land areas, and a negative aesthetic impact. On balance, these envi-
ronmental externalities range from 0 to 0.4 cents/kilowatt-hour
(kWh), as illustrated in Table 1. However, distributed energy systems
can be sited near load centers, thereby eliminating the need for power
lines and associated environmental impacts and line losses of power.
Biomass energy facilities, depending on the fuel source, emit a
variety of criteria air pollutants resulting from the combustion of or-
ganic materials. The environmental externalities of biomass power fa-
cilities range from 0 to 0.7 cents/kWh, as illustrated in Table 1. The
combustion of biomass has no net emission of carbon dioxide. The
carbon dioxide released during combustion is offset by an equal
amount of carbon dioxide absorbed during photosynthesis.
2. Cogeneration
Cogeneration facilities should cause fewer environmental im-
pacts than equivalent megawatts of conventional power production.
This is because cogeneration facilities simultaneously produce elec-
tricity and thermal energy by the same continuous process, thereby
recapturing and utilizing more efficiently energy that would otherwise
be wasted. This substitution of an integrated cogeneration technol-
ogy, in lieu of conventional separate electricity and thermal energy
production technologies, should save 15 to 25% of the energy input
otherwise consumed by separate energy production configurations.39
37. PACE UNIVERSITY, ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF ELECTRICITY 36 (1990).
38. Id. at 36.
39. A 15% reduction in fuel use should accompany a change from a separate steam electric
generator and separate low-pressure steam boiler to a steam electric cogeneration system. In-
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This can also be true of small power production Qualifying Facilities
(QFs) which, although they do not realize the efficiency inherent in
cogeneration technologies, combust waste or alternative energy.
These reductions in the amount of fuel burned by cogenerators
should translate into fewer criteria pollutants discharged as by-
products of the combustion process, and less residual waste product
of the facility. For example, various cogeneration technologies can
reduce the levels of sulfur dioxide,40 particulate matter,41 carbon di-
oxide,42 and nitrogen oxide43 per unit of useful energy output, al-
dustrial Cogeneration–What It Is, How It Works, Its Potential, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office, EMD-80-7, Apr. 29, 1980). Use of a diesel cogeneration system (as-
suming recovery of 75% of the usable heat) in lieu of a diesel electric generator plus an oil-fired
furnace, or use of a gas turbine cogeneration system in lieu of a gas turbine electric generator
plus separate furnace. Consolidated Edison, Environmental Assessment of Cogeneration in
New York City, Presentation to New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n. 13 (Mar. 17, 1980). Improve-
ments in combined cycle efficiencies, approaching 60% total electric efficiency, compared to
slightly more than half that efficiency for simple cycle gas turbines, counters that improved first
law efficiency of cogeneration.
40. A diesel cogeneration system using 0.2% sulfur No. 2 oil could save about 0.1 pounds
of SO2 for every 100 kWh of electricity generated by the facility. See U.S. OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL COGENERATION 286-87 (1983).
41. Particulates are solid or liquid substances in a wide range of sizes, produced primarily
by stationary fuel combustion and industrial processes. While some particulates or particulate
matter, as they are commonly referred to, are noncombustible material from the original waste
input, some are condensed gases from material vaporized during incineration but cooled into or
onto particles. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Andrew N. Davis, Regulating Municipal Solid Waste In-
cinerators Under the Clean Air Act: History, Technology and Risks, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 1, 21 (1993). Particulate matter is formed from non-combustible constituents in fuel or in
the combustion air, from products of incomplete combustion, or from formation of ammonium
sulfates after combustion. These typically are unburned hydrocarbons and sulfur. This can in-
clude unreacted ammonia slip from an SCR NOx reduction system. There are no federal stan-
dards regarding ammonia emission rates. Because ammonia is soluble in water, it does not re-
side long in the atmosphere. Ammonia slip is directly proportional to the stoichiometric ratio of
ammonia to NOx , and the uncontrolled NOx concentration. If one continuously monitors the
flow rates of NO2, NO, and NH3, ammonia slip can be minimized. In addition to control strate-
gies at the back end of the combustion process, the ash content of fuel inputs varies. Four types
of emission control devices are used to control particulate ash emissions: electrostatic precipita-
tion and filters, multitube cyclones, and wet scrubbers. Electrostatic precipitation and fabric fil-
ters remove 96% and more of particulates. Multitube cyclones are mechanical devices and are
less efficient.
42. Carbon dioxide, which is released by burning fossil fuels and deforestation, is thought
to account for about half of the greenhouse effect. About three-quarters of the anthropogenic
sources of carbon in the atmosphere is the result of the combustion of fossil fuels, while 25% is
the result of deforestation and the resultant inability of the biosphere to assimilate and reproc-
ess this chemical compound. Excess carbon dioxide in the atmosphere or ocean systems lasts
more than 100 generations. Carbon dioxide is absorbed by plants, soils, and oceans. These large
carbon dioxide "sinks" exist primarily in temperate latitudes in the northern hemisphere. S. Fan
et al., A Large Territorial Carbon Sink in North America Implied by Atmospheric and Oceanic
Carbon Dioxide Data and Models, 282 SCI. MAG., Oct. 16, 1998, at 442. The primary such sink is
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though certain technology configurations can also increase the dis-
charge of these critical emissions.44 A cogeneration system’s use of
lower carbon and lower sulfur fuels, thereby producing less carbon
dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and sulfur dioxide and incurring a lesser capi-
tal investment in sulfur dioxide emission containment technology, are
primary environmental advantages.45
In the shift to on-site distributed generation, QFs46 and self-
generation both have the potential to dramatically lessen the emission
of criteria pollutants. The continued deployment of both technologies
promises to limit the emission of pollutants and their attendant envi-
ronmental costs, as compared to conventional generation. First, more
than a quarter of QFs utilize renewable energy sources, which exhibit
minimal environmental externalities.47 Second, 75% of QFs and inde-
pendent power facilities constructed are cogeneration facilities. Co-
generation facilities produce more usable energy per unit of energy
input than comparably sized stand-alone conventional electric gener-
ating facilities.48 Thus, there is more usable and used energy output
per unit of pollution from the combustion. Third, the fuel of prefer-
ence for QFs and independent power projects is natural gas—a rela-
tively clean fossil fuel. Fifty percent of all QFs and independent
power facilities and most new self-generation powered by fossil fuels
use natural gas.49
in North America. The North American land surface appears to absorb 1-2 billion tons annually
of carbon dioxide. Id. at 444. This indicates that North America absorbs much of the carbon di-
oxide that it generates. However, a 2001 study indicates that the absorption is much less at .3-.58
billion tons annually indicating that the North American continent is producing much more car-
don dioxide than it absorbs. S.W. Pacala et al., Consistent Land- and Atmosphere-Based U.S.
Carbon Sink Estimates, 292 SCI. MAG., June 22, 2001, at 2316.
43. A gas turbine cogeneration system can reduce NOx emissions by about 0.3 lb. for every
100 kWh of electricity generated by the facility.
44. A shift in electricity generation from utility central-station conventional technologies to
either gas or diesel turbine cogeneration systems will actually increase NOx emissions, and the
latter technology will also increase carbon monoxide (CO) and particulate emissions. Id.;
NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, supra note 21.
45. The amount of SO2 produced is independent of the QF technology deployed. Essen-
tially, all sulfur in the fuel is converted to sulfur dioxide. Id.
46. See discussion infra at Section VI.
47. If solid waste is included, this percentage increases to 33%. RCG/Hagler, Bailly, Profile
of the Independent Power Market: 1991 Status and Trends, cited in McGraw-Hill, Independent
Power Report, (BNA) at 2-3 (Mar. 1, 1991) [hereinafter RCG/Hagler, Bailly].
48. Cogeneration can be about 20% more efficient than electricity-only plants. Many inde-
pendent power projects are of comparable size to smaller utility plants. J Morrison, Why We
Need Stand-by Rates for On-Site Generation, ELECTRICITY JOURNAL Oct. 2003, at n.15.
49. RCG/Hagler, Bailly, supra note 47, at n.49.
040704 FERREY.DOC 04/26/04  10:58 AM
2003] NOTHING BUT NET 15
These three factors result in fewer environmental emissions than
if conventional power facilities supplied all power resources. These
self-generation technologies may deploy renewable resources without
fossil fuel combustion, or may use the cogenerated output more effi-
ciently than conventional technologies.
III.  STATE NET METERING INITIATIVES:
SCOPE AND BASIS
A. Introduction
Electricity consumption is determined by a meter, which meas-
ures for the purpose of accounting and billing. The electric utility
company that provides the retail service typically reads the meter
several times a year or calculates estimates for each billing period.
Where the electric consumer generates its own electricity on-site, the
concept of net metering50 may be applicable.
Net metering is the process by which an electric utility meter is
designed and allowed by law to rotate either forward or backwards
depending on who the supplier of electricity is at a particular instant
as reflected in the net electricity flow.51 For example, if a customer
owns and operates a solar photovoltaic solar panel and is a generator
of electricity available for export when in surplus, the meter would
run backwards reflecting export of power to the electric utility pro-
vider during the day while the sun was providing the customer-
generator with surplus electricity. This excess electricity would com-
mingle on the grid with the electricity generated by the utility and be
sold to and consumed by someone else along the transmission line.
However, at night, the solar photovoltaic panel would cease to gener-
ate and the customer would purchase electricity from the generating
utility, causing the meter to run forward in the conventional direction
reflecting a sale to the customer.
50. The term "net metering" is the commonly accepted term for this concept, however,
states differ in how they describe the same concept. Various phrases used include "net meter-
ing," "net billing," "net energy metering," "net energy billing," "parallel billing," "reverse direc-
tion metering" and "distributed generation." For the purposes of this paper the phrase "net me-
tering" will include the various different references to the same concept.
51. State statutes and regulations generally define what net metering means in each par-
ticular state. For example, see New Hampshire's definition of net metering: "'[n]et energy me-
tering' means measuring the difference between the electricity supplied over the electric distri-
bution system and the electricity generated by an eligible customer-generator which is fed back
into the electric distribution system over a billing period."  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362-A:1-a
(III)(a) (Supp. 2002).
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This net metering process balances and nets these flows at the
end of the billing period. The net gain of electricity sold or a net loss
of electricity bought for the customer-generator at the end of the
billing period becomes an amount owed to or by the generator. If the
customer-generator produced less electricity than it consumed, the
electric utility would bill the customer for the difference. If the cus-
tomer-generator produced more than its required amount of electric-
ity, then each state’s net metering law would determine what would
happen to the customer-generator’s net gain.
This is a relatively straight-forward concept that has been
adopted in some form in thirty-eight U.S. states.52 As a result, each
state has adopted its own unique set of statutes and regulations. The
implementation of net metering evolved among the states in two
phases.53 Several states adopted net metering shortly after the enact-
ment of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978  (PURPA)
in the early 1980s. Other states adopted net metering more recently,
which coincided with the proliferation of deregulation in the electric
utility industry.54
B. The Federalism Model: Qualifying Facilities
There is a federalist model of independent electric power pro-
duction. It is embodied in the federal legislation establishing and
sanctioning QFs. QFs have been expressly sanctioned by federal law
for more than two decades. They are federally protected against state-
level discouragement, although the states play a significant role. This
federal preemption has been upheld by the Supreme Court.55
52. Arizona; Arkansas; California; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia;
Hawaii; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Minnesota;
Montana; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Jersey; New Mexico; New York; North Dakota; Ohio;
Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Washington;
Wisconsin; Wyoming. See The Green Power Network, Net Metering, at http://www.eere.energy.
gov/greenpower/netmetering (last modified Jan. 31, 2004).
53. See STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER:
DEVELOPMENT/COGENERATION UTILITY REGULATION § 4:25 (20th ed., 2003) (noting that
prior to 1993, QFs sold gross output to utilities, but since then, this practice has been challenged
by utilities who wish to limit the amount of electricity that they are required to purchase at
"avoided cost" rates to the QFs' net output).
54. Colton & Brehl, supra note 3, at 480.
55. See, e.g. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Am. Electric Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 403
(1983) (holding FERC appropriately made rules requiring utilities to pay QFs a rate equivalent
to the cost they would incur if they had generated the electricity themselves and made intercon-
nections to cogeneration facilities); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 744 (1982) (upholding §
210 of Title II of PURPA, which exempts QFs from conflicting state regulations).
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1. Legislative Purpose
In 1978, to respond to a perceived national electric energy crisis,
Congress enacted PURPA.56 The Congressional impetus for PURPA
Title II57—authorizing Qualifying Facilities (QFs)—was to encourage:
(1)  Conservation of energy,
(2)  Optimization of efficient use of electric utility facilities and re-
sources, and
(3)  Equitable electric rates to consumers.
Congress’ goal was to accomplish greater diversity in the supply
of electric power by providing incentives for development of small al-
ternative power and cogeneration resources. Congress perceived both
reluctance among electric utilities to transact business with alternative
power producers and a fear held by alternative power developers that
they would be regulated as “public utilities” if they sold power. One
of the impediments to self-generation projects was that electric utili-
ties could employ one of several methods to discourage such cus-
tomer generation.58 First, they could cut the retail rates that they
would otherwise offer such a customer to discourage self-generation.
Resulting lower retail revenues could be offset by shifting costs to
other consumers, thereby requiring consumers without the option to
self-generate to bear the subsidy used to discourage self-generation.
Second, utilities could impose discouraging rates, terms, and
conditions on stand-by and back-up power requirements for self-
generating entities. This could make it prohibitively expensive to self-
generate. With deregulation, a third tool presented itself: Exit fees
could be proposed to discourage exodus from the conventional sys-
tem.
PURPA Title II sought to remedy these perceived barriers to al-
ternative power development by permitting some alternative power
producers to operate in a relatively unregulated environment.59
PURPA section 210 breaks the utility monopoly on generation of
electric power specifically for certain types of power production. It
creates a privileged class of commercial entities known as QFs.60 To
56. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(c) (2000) (granting emergency powers).
57. See 18 C.F.R. § 292 (2003).
58. See generally Richard Hirsh , PURPA: The Spur to Competition and Utility Restructur-
ing, ELECTRICITY JOURNAL, Aug.-Sept. 1999, at 60 (arguing that the passage of PURPA un-
dermined the monopolistic qualities of the energy production industry, facilitating the emer-
gence of a competitive free-market in energy).
59. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.
60. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a).
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qualify as a QF, a project must meet certain facility-specific and spon-
sor-specific criteria. Title II also requires that electric utilities deal
with project sponsors in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Under PURPA, if power projects meet specific and exacting re-
quirements, they qualify to sell their power output to electric utilities.
The price for this sale is equal to what the utility itself would pay to
generate or purchase power. The price at which utilities must pur-
chase power from QFs is determined by the incremental cost of
power for the purchasing utility.61 PURPA imposes mandatory
equipment interconnection and purchase obligations on electric utili-
ties. These obligations reduce the monopoly power the utilities would
otherwise exercise as the exclusive outlet for sale of power produced
by an independent entity. In turn, PURPA required utilities to inter-
connect with QFs, to purchase their power, and to supply them with
supplemental or backup power.62 Moreover, QFs are exempt from
most state and federal laws regulating power generation.63
In 1980, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
promulgated regulations pursuant to Title II of PURPA.64 These
regulations are divided into two relevant parts: (1) Subpart B regula-
tions define the operating and efficiency standards that cogeneration
facilities must meet in order to qualify as QFs; 65 and (2) Subpart C
regulations define the benefits to which QFs are entitled.66
2. Federal Regulatory Exemptions Enjoyed by Qualifying
Facilities
QF cogenerators are federally exempt from regulatory-
established discouragement. Perhaps the single most important bene-
fit for QFs is that they are exempt from the Federal Power Act,67 the
Public Utility Holding Company Act,68 and, importantly, most state
61. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b); 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2).
62. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a); 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a)-(c).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1); 18 C.F.R. § 292.601(c).
64. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.
65. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.201-.211. The Commission's operating standard provides that the co-
generating facility's annual useful thermal energy output (i.e., the energy that is used for an in-
dustrial or commercial purpose) be at least 5% of the total energy output. 18 C.F.R. §
292.205(a)(1). The Commission's efficiency standard require that a cogenerating facility use fuel
efficiently and that fuel efficiency is calculated based on the facility's annual fossil fuel input, the
useful thermal energy output, and the total energy output. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(2)-(b).
66. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.301-.308.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 791a (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1); 18 C.F.R. § 292.601(c).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1); 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(b).
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regulations.69 Otherwise federal law would regulate QF conduct as if
QFs were public utilities and subject their financial structures, corpo-
rate organizations, and profits to regulatory scrutiny.
Pursuant to PURPA, in its original form, only small power pro-
ducers of 30 megawatts (MW) or less were exempt from provisions of
the Federal Power Act and the Holding Company Act; however,
small power facilities of up to 80 MW that employ geothermal re-
sources may be exempt from both Acts.70 In 1990, Congress removed
the 80 MW ceiling for small power producers that are fueled at least
in part by waste products or renewable energy.71 Such larger facilities
are also exempt from the Public Utility Holding Company Act.72 A
major advantage of these changes is that larger small power produc-
ers fueled by waste or renewable resources at a single site no longer
have to find a thermal application to retain their QF status at larger
than 80 MW capacity. Moreover, certain renewable energy technolo-
gies will become more cost-competitive when developed on a larger
scale. To the extent that a project loses QF status within its lifetime, it
is subject to plenary regulations as a public utility.73
These regulatory exemptions carve out a distinct role for QFs.
Under PURPA, QFs can sell power only to electric utilities under the
69. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1) (exempting QFs from provisions of the Federal Power Act, the
Public Utility Holding Company Act and State laws respecting rates or financial or organiza-
tional regulation); 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c) (exempting QFs from State laws respecting ratemak-
ing, financial, and organizational regulations).
70. 18 C.F.R. § 292.601(b). Wherever a small power QF between 30-80 MW is financed and
operated by a third party as a sale/leaseback transaction, FERC approval pursuant to Section
203 of the Federal Power Act is required. See Signal Shasta Energy Co., 41 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,347, at
63,877 (1987) (approving sale/leaseback of a 55 MW wood-fired small power facility).
71. Solar, Wind, Waste, and Geothermal Power Production Incentives Act of 1990, Pub. L.
101-575, 104 Stat. 2834 (1990). Those waste-fueled sources that can be larger than 80 MW are
those that are by-products of industrial processes, such as coal waste or waste tires. The 80 MW
cap still applies to biomass, including municipal solid waste, and to hydroelectric facilities. Proj-
ects have until the end of 1994 to apply for FERC certification, and until the end of 1999 to be-
gin construction or exercise reasonable diligence towards completion, to take advantage of this
larger size allowance. Solar, Wind, Waste, and Geothermal Power Production Incentives Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-575, 104 Stat. 2834 (1990). See In re Cambria Cogeneration Co., 53
F.E.R.C. ¶61,459, at 61,619 (1990) (certifying as a QF an 85 MW generating facility that uses
bituminous coal refuse as its primary energy source).
72. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1) (exempting QFs from provisions of the Federal Power
Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act and State laws respecting rates or financial or or-
ganizational regulation); 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c) .
73. Under PURPA, no QF is exempt from sections 1-18, 21-30, 202(c), 210-214, and 305(c)
of the Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(3); 18 C.F.R. § 292.601(c). These sections per-
tain to the requirement of interconnection with QFs, wheeling of power, and the enforcement of
these two provisions. These provisions, however, do not affect the fundamental economics of
QF power development.
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sanctions of state regulatory commissions.74 Nothing in PURPA, how-
ever, authorized a QF to make a power sale for any purpose other
than on a wholesale basis.75
a. “Utility-Type” Regulation
Exemption from “utility-type” regulation comes with QF status.76
The question remains “what is utility-type regulation?” Does it in-
clude exit fees? FERC’s regulations state that: “Any qualifying facil-
ity shall be exempted from state law [regulating]: (i) [t]he rates of
electric utilities; and (ii) the financial and organizational regulation of
electric utilities.”77
The litigation around utility-type regulation focuses on power
sale rates and contract terms, but not newly imposed state exit fees.
Utilities have attempted to circumvent the ability of a QF to receive a
fixed price through the life of a contract by the use of contractual
clauses allowing for rate revision at a future time.78 Courts have found
that these types of QF rate revision clauses constitute “utility type”
regulation and undermine the intent of Congress. In 1984, the Idaho
Supreme Court rejected a utility’s attempt to include a clause in the
QF contract that provided that the rates and terms in the contract
were subject to change in the event that the state found the new rates
“just, fair, reasonable, sufficient, non-preferential and non-
discriminatory.”79
74. QFs have suggested in several states that they would like to be able to directly sell
power to retail customers. As discussed infra Part 4.09[3], some states allow such practices.
75. See 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)(2) (stating that rules shall be promulgated requiring utilities
to purchase power from QFs); 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (requiring electric utilities to purchase energy
produced by QFs).
76. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Am. Electric Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 403 (1983).
77. 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c)(1).
78. See Smith Cogeneration Mgmt., Inc. v. Corp. Comm'n and Pub. Serv. Co., 863 P.2d
1227, 1237, 1241 (Okla. 1993) (voiding Oklahoma Commission's order requiring a notice provi-
sion allowing reconsideration of avoided costs to be placed into the contract). The court said
"[r]econsideration of long-term contracts with established estimated costs imposes utility-type
regulations over QFs." Id. at 1240. The court also states that PURPA and FERC seek to pre-
vent reconsideration of these contracts and that the legislative history shows that Congress did
not intend to impose traditional utility-type ratemaking concepts on sales from [QFs] to utili-
ties." Id. "Requiring QFs and utilities to include a notice provision allowing reconsideration of
established avoided costs conflicts with PURPA and FERC regulations." Id. at 1241. Therefore,
"Rule 58(H) [was] preempted by PURPA and FERC regulations." Id. See also Afton Energy,
Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 693 P.2d 427, 434 (Idaho 1984) (finding contractual language would
result in "utility-type" regulation over QF).
79. See Afton Energy., 693 P.2d at 432-34 (Idaho 1984) (declining to accept the utility's ar-
gument that the clause represented a stricter public interest standard ensuring that the utility
rates remain "just and reasonable" and "in the public interest"). The court found that this con-
040704 FERREY.DOC 04/26/04  10:58 AM
2003] NOTHING BUT NET 21
The Third Circuit found an attempt at QF rate reconsideration
after approval and implementation by the state utility regulatory
commission was preempted by federal law.80 The court found the state
utility regulatory commission’s attempt to modify or revoke approval
of the power purchase agreement constituted “utility-type” regula-
tion. The court noted Congress’ intention to exempt QFs from state
and federal utility rate regulation, and held the “regulatory out”
clause did not confer any continuing jurisdiction on the state utility
commission and did not reflect the QF’s agreement to surrender any
protection from state regulation it is entitled to under federal
PURPA. Because the QF was exempt from this type of rate regula-
tion, the attempt by the state regulatory board to revise the contract
was preempted by federal law.81
A Pennsylvania court affirmed the state Public Utility Commis-
sion’s decision to deny an electric utility’s request for rescission of
prior rate approval under power purchase agreements made with
QFs, because it found that they were not public utilities and revisiting
the rate issue was preempted by federal law.82 In 1998, a Michigan
federal district court noted that once a state has established the
tractual language constituted utility type regulation over QFs contrary to congressional intent
and PURPA. Allowing the state utility commission to have continuing jurisdiction over the
avoided cost rate would subject QFs to pervasive "utility-type regulation." The original contract
provided that the commission could only modify the terms of the contract if the modification
was necessary in the public interest. The court noted that this public interest standard represents
the standard to which "any rate contract may be superseded by later Commission orders." Id. at
432.
80. Freehold Cogeneration Assocs. v. Bd. of Regulatory Comm'rs of the State of N.J., 44
F.3d 1178, 1192 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that the utility sought to modify the power purchase
agreement it had made with Freehold in 1992. The state utility regulatory board directed Free-
hold and the utility to renegotiate the purchase price terms or alternatively negotiate a buy-out
of the contract. If the parties did not reach an agreement within 30 days, the Board of Regula-
tory Commissioners would commence a hearing to consider various courses of action. Freehold
rejected the utility's attempt at renegotiation. The utility claimed that the QF had voluntarily
agreed by contract to the state commission's continuing jurisdiction over the power purchase
agreement and the rates contained therein. This continuing jurisdiction would allow the com-
mission to modify the previously approved rates. Freehold contended that this is an action un-
der PURPA section 210(e) which grants cogenerators immunity from state utility-type regula-
tion and this court agrees. Because of this, it was an error for the District Court to dismiss
Freehold's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Board of Regulatory Commissioner’s order to
renegotiate or buy-out the contract is preempted by PURPA.).
81. Id. at 1194.
82. W. Penn Power Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 659 A.2d 1055, 1066 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995) (following the Third Circuit's decision in Freehold, the court found that PURPA preempts
the state utility regulatory commission from changing or reconsidering its prior approval of rates
established in QF contracts).
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avoided cost rate, it no longer has the authority to regulate the QF’s
rate.83
QFs are also exempt from state laws respecting “[t]he financial
and organizational regulation of electric utilities.”84 The FERC regu-
lations fail to define exactly what makes up “financial and organiza-
tion regulation.” Several courts—including the First Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit—have determined that certain activities by a state util-
ity commission do not fall under the financial regulation exemption
and therefore are not “utility type regulation.”85 FERC upheld a
83. N. Am. Natural Res., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 41 F. Supp. 2d 736, 742-43
(W.D. Mich. 1998) (allowing plaintiff QFs to seek declaration that orders issued by state com-
mission pursuant to deregulation would not disallow recovery of QF avoided cost rates).
84. 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c)(1)(ii).
85. Bristol Energy Corp. v. N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 13 F.3d 471, 475 (1st Cir. 1994)
(finding that the request for information to complete this study did not constitute state regula-
tion respecting the financial and organizational regulation of QFs. A group of QFs sought an
injunction to prevent the state utility commission from forcing the QF to disclose detailed finan-
cial information. This information included: financing agreements, retired debt, monthly volume
of electricity generated, identity of customers, and fuel use including price paid for fuel. The
financial information was requested by the state utility commission so that it could complete a
one-time study of wholesale power supplies pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The QFs
claimed that the exemption provided in the PURPA regulations precluded the state utility
commission from demanding this type of information. A limited inquiry for the purposes of
completing a federally mandated study did not constitute "utility type" regulation because the
state utility commission was not asserting full authority over QFs and had only requested infor-
mation related to the factors indicated in the Energy Policy Act of 1992.). In Indep. Energy
Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Utilities Comm'n, 36 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that
reasonable monitoring of QFs "falls with the state board's ratemaking authority"), the state
utility commission authorized utilities to monitor QFs to determine whether they met federal
standards. In addition to allowing the monitoring, the state commission allowed the utility to
suspend payment to the QF if the utility found that the QF did not comply with the federal
standards. The utility was authorized to substitute a lower, alternative rate in the event that it
determined that the QF did not comply. Forty-two non-utility power producing facilities asked
the court to determine whether PURPA authorizes utilities to enforce the federal operating and
efficiency standards as applied to QFs. In examining the program, the court noted that the un-
derlying motivation of the program was to lower the rates set in California "standard offer con-
tracts because they [were] higher than. . . current avoided costs." Id. at 858. The court found
that because the monitoring program authorized states to make QF status determinations, an
area over which FERC exercises exclusive authority, the program was preempted by federal
law. Although the court found that the program violated federal law by allowing utilities to
make QF status determinations, the court allowed the utilities to continue to monitor the QFs.
It found that the program's requirements that QFs submit operating data to the utilities was
reasonable under the state's broad ratemaking authority as long as the requirements did not
impose an undue burden on the facilities. Id. at 859. See also Indep. Power Producers of N.Y.,
Inc., 80 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,125, at 61,398 (1997). The New York state monitoring program was de-
signed to enable utilities to have sufficient data to determine whether the QF is in compliance
with federal standards. The QFs argued that the state commission's requirements to file data
with the utilities is inconsistent with PURPA's exemption for QFs from "financial and organiza-
tional" regulation of utilities. FERC found that the program does not represent "financial and
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monitoring program instituted by the New York Public Service
Commission.
Exit fees have aspects of both rate regulation and financial regu-
lation. Where the exit fee is embodied in a back-up power rate, as
with the Massachusetts exit fee for the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, it works as a disincentive rate. Where exit fees are im-
posed as a function of the self-generation decision, they are powerful
regulatory disincentives. It is yet unresolved whether they run afoul
of PURPA’s federal preemption.
3. Threading the Needle: Size and Efficiency Criteria
A proposed self-generation facility may qualify as a QF, as a co-
generation facility, or as a small power producer. As defined by fed-
eral law; both produce electric power for resale to regulated electric
utilities.86 Next, we describe those federal requirements for self-
generation to be certified as a Qualifying Facility so as to enjoy pro-
tection against state utility-type regulation.
a. Cogeneration
Cogeneration is the sequential use of energy to produce electric-
ity and either steam or some other useful thermal energy.87 The key
concept is that electricity production as a co-product of heat or non-
electric energy forms may be more resource-efficient than separate
production of electricity and other energy forms.88
The key federal qualifying issue for cogeneration is not size, but
efficiency.89 Cogeneration facilities qualify as QFs regardless of their
size or the fuel input used, as long as they satisfy operating and effi-
organizational" regulation of QFs contrary to the exemption. Because the program was de-
signed to collect data solely for the purpose of determining QF status, FERC found it was con-
sistent with the Ninth Circuit decision in Independent Energy and did not impose an undue bur-
den on QFs. See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 19 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (overturning a District Court's grant of summary judgment against Niagara Mohawk
Power Corporation, which, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, was seeking informa-
tion pertaining to the quantity of fuel consumed, and power generated by QFs).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1); 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.101(b)(1), 292.203.
87. Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 404 n. 1 (1987) ("The
statute defines a 'cogeneration facility' as a facility that produces both electric energy and steam
or some other form of useful energy, such as heat. 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)(A).").
88. Proposed Regulations Providing for Qualification of Small Power Production and Co-
generation Facilities under Section 201 of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 –
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,872, 38,875, FERC Statutes and Regulations,
Proposed Regulations 1977-1981, ¶ 32,028, at 32,328 (July 3, 1979).
89. 18 C.F.R. § 292.202(c). The two forms of energy output (electric and thermal) must be
produced through the sequential use of energy inputs.
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ciency standards.90 At least 5% of the total energy output of any co-
generation facility must be useful thermal energy.91
The regulations establish an operating standard and efficiency
standard to determine “qualifying cogeneration facilities.”92 Section
292.205 of the commission’s regulations establishes an operating
standard for topping-cycle cogeneration facilities.93 Under the oper-
ating standard, useful thermal energy output must be at least 5% of
total annual energy output.94
Both standards involve calculations of the electric and non-
electric energy produced in the cogeneration process.95 The regula-
tions define these by-products, or outputs, as “useful power output”
and “useful thermal energy output” respectively.96 The regulations de-
fine useful thermal energy as the “thermal energy made available for
use in any industrial or commercial process, or used in any heating or
cooling application.”97
1. Efficiency Standards and Sequential Use
Section 292.205 also establishes an efficiency standard for cogen-
eration facilities wholly or partly powered by oil, natural gas, or other
90. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.203(b), 292.205.
91. This output requirement applies only to topping cycles. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(1). Bot-
toming cycles will always meet the requirement. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1); 18 C.F.R. §
292.205(b)(1). Topping cycles are defined at 18 C.F.R. § 292.202(d). Useful thermal energy out-
put is energy made available in any commercial or industrial process, or used for heating or
cooling applications. 18 C.F.R. § 292.202(h).
92. The Commission's regulations define cogeneration facilities as "equipment used to
produce electric energy and forms of useful thermal energy (such as heat or steam), used for
industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling purposes, through the sequential use of energy." 18
C.F.R. § 292.202(c).
93. A topping-cycle cogeneration facility means a cogeneration facility which first uses en-
ergy input to produce useful power output and then captures reject heat from the power pro-
duction process to provide useful thermal energy. 18 C.F.R. § 292.202(d).
94. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(1).
95. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.205(a)(1), (a)(2) (requiring that at least 5% of the total annual
energy output be in the form of useful thermal energy and basing the efficiency requirements on
the proportion of thermal energy produced).
96. See 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.202(g)-(h) (1988) (defining "useful power output" as "the electric
or mechanical energy made available for use, exclusive of any such energy used in the power
production process;" and "useful thermal energy output" as "the thermal energy made available
for use in any industrial or commercial process, or used in any heating or cooling application").
97. 18 C.F.R. § 292.202(h). The Commission's regulations provide the following definition:
"(h) 'Useful thermal energy output' of a topping-cycle cogeneration facility means the thermal
energy:
(1) That is made available to an industrial or commercial process. . . ;
(2) That is used in a heating application (e.g., space heating, domestic hot water heating); or
(3) That is used in a space cooling application (i.e., thermal energy used by an absorption
chiller)." Id.
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fuels of limited resource. Under the efficiency standard, the QF’s use-
ful power output plus one-half of the useful thermal energy output
during any calendar year must be no less than 42.5% of the total en-
ergy input of natural gas or oil.98
These standards require the use of efficient combinations of elec-
tric and thermal energy production technologies.99 FERC’s efficiency
standards were set to ensure that a cogenerating QF produced power
and heat more efficiently than a conventional combined cycle unit
with a heat rate of 8,500 British Thermal Units (Btu)/kWh operating
at 90% boiler efficiency. FERC has reiterated that at the pre-
operational stage, it will accept as true or attainable the assertions of
a QF project developer as to satisfying QF requirements at the time
of operation. This also is true with respect to the efficiency and 5%
minimum output requirements of cogeneration facilities.100
The relevant time to determine whether efficiency requirements
are met is the time of first commercial operation of the facility, and
thereafter.101 On rehearing of Order No. 70, in which the efficiency
standard regulations were established, the Commission found that
98. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(2).
99. For topping cycle technologies using oil or natural gas as their fuel inputs, the useful
power output of the facility plus one-half the useful thermal energy output during each calendar
year must exceed 42.5% of the total energy input, where the thermal output is greater than 15%
of the total. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(2)(i)(A). Where thermal output is less than 15% of the total,
the efficiency standard is 45% where oil or natural gas is used as the energy input. 18 C.F.R. §
292.205(a)(2)(i)(B). There is no efficiency standard for topping cycle technologies where neither
oil nor natural gas is used as the energy input. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(2)(ii). Bottoming cycle
technologies employing natural gas or oil as their primary energy inputs must achieve 45%
combined output efficiency as a fraction of total energy input. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(b)(1). If
natural gas or oil is not employed, there is no efficiency standard for bottoming cycles. 18 C.F.R.
§ 292.205(b)(2).
100. See Cherokee County Cogeneration Partners, L.P., 75 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,156, at 61,513-14
(1996) (finding filing that asserts that a QF will meet the 5% minimum output requirement in
each of its three modes of operation satisfies Commission's regulations. This facility planned to
operate a topping-cycle cogeneration facility, the thermal output of which would be used to pro-
cess ammonia refrigerant, which would then be used in ice production, or in a liquefied natural
gas production facility, or both).
101. See Georgetown Cogeneration, L.P., 54 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,049, at 61,186 (1991) (finding
that empirical data must be submitted to support alleged data inconsistencies between data
submitted to FERC and data available elsewhere and denying an abeyance because of the in-
consistency was not sufficiently demonstrated); Georgetown Cogeneration L.P., 55 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,038, at 61,111 (1991) (finding Coalition improperly used current data, rather than data from
the date the proposed facility first produces energy in asserting that the facility would not meet
minimum energy requirements); see also Kamine/Besicorp Alleghany L.P. 63 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,320,
at 63,157 (1993) (finding Kamine provided sufficient information to grant certification when
prospective data for QF certification was submitted from the date the facility anticipates first
producing electrical energy).
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“energy obtained from supplementary firing was inadvertently ex-
cluded from the definition of the total energy input.”102 The Commis-
sion amended the definition of “total energy input” so that it included
all forms of energy supplied from external sources, including supple-
mentary firing.103
When calculating compliance with the efficiency requirement, all
supplemental natural gas or oil consumed must be calculated in the
input calculation. If a QF facility is grafted onto an existing facility,
the operation of the equipment from the original installation must be
part of the calculation of the total energy input, if it still operates in
tandem.104 This is true even if there are separate qualifying and non-
qualifying parts of the facility.
Many cogenerators employ an extraction steam turbine technol-
ogy to draw minimal thermal energy from the cogeneration facility.105
FERC allows extraction steam turbine technology to qualify for QF
status,106 despite the apparent inconsistency of that rule with the se-
quential use rule articulated in other cases.107
Where efficient thermal energy is not produced sequentially,
FERC will deny QF status. Where auxiliary boilers are employed to
boost thermal energy, some of the capacity can be disqualified from
QF status. Where steam is produced directly for thermal uses and is
102. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Rehearing of Order Nos. 69 and 70, and
Amending Regulations, F.E.R.C. Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles 1977-1981 ¶
30,160, at 31,112 (1980) ("Since energy from supplementary firing was not excluded from the
definition of total energy output," the rule as it originally appeared distorted "the efficiency of
facilities in which large amounts of energy [were] supplied from supplementary firing, making
them appear more efficient that they [actually were]."); 18 C.F.R. § 292.202(i).
103. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Rehearing of Order Nos. 69 and 70, and
Amending Regulations, F.E.R.C. Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles 1977-1981
¶30,160, at 31,112 (1980); 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.202(f), (j).
104. Walker Res., Inc., 47 F.E.R.C. ¶61,399, at 62,316 (1989) (counting existing preheated
feed water in gas use for entire facility); Walker Res., Inc., 47 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,088, at 61,249 (1989)
(denying application for certification as qualifying cogeneration facility because applicant im-
properly failed to account for total existing preheated feed water in measuring the gas use for
the entire facility).
105. The extraction steam turbine draws minimal waste heat off an otherwise conventional
electric generating system, downstream of the electricity production.
106. See Texas Indus., Inc., 29 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,051, at 61,111 (1984) (holding for extraction
steam turbines the part of steam flow used for thermal application need only have been previ-
ously used for generation, rather than that all steam used for generation sequentially flow to a
subsequent thermal application. Because the facility in question in this case was fueled by coal,
no efficiency standards were applicable).
107. See, e.g., Cal. Portland Cement Co., 20 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,217, at 61,419 (1982) (granting
qualifying cogeneration status to that portion of a facility representing sequential energy use,
but not to that portion employing non-sequential energy use).
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not sequentially used for the production of electricity, that proportion
of the electricity production represented by the auxiliary steam is not
counted toward the qualifying capacity.108
This decision, essentially, allows conventional electric generating
technologies to obtain QF status merely by capturing waste heat for
some useful thermal purpose. Most small power production facilities,
which exceed the PURPA small power producer size requirements,
could qualify instead as cogeneration QFs by finding a useful thermal
application.109
Two exceptions to these cogeneration requirements are notable.
First, cogeneration facilities for which construction began prior to
March 13, 1980, are not subject to efficiency criteria.110 Second, FERC
can waive either the efficiency or the 5% thermal output require-
ments if it finds that a project will produce significant energy sav-
ings.111 FERC has waived, on a case-by-case basis, the QF efficiency
standard where additional capacity is required by the local utility to
meet temporary emergency capacity shortfalls.112
Waiver of the FERC requirement potentially is available for a
QF that cannot achieve the efficiency or output requirements.113 Sev-
eral QFs that failed to comply have retroactively asked FERC for a
waiver. These have generally been denied. Typically, this is because
the QF applicant has been unable to demonstrate significant energy
108. U.S. West Fin. Servs., 55 F.E.R.C. ¶61,377, at 62,147 (1991) (refusing to find satisfac-
tion of 18 C.F.R. § 292.202(c)'s sequential use requirement. 3.2 MW of a 22.2 MW cogeneration
unit at a cement plant host facility was deemed not to qualify for QF status, because 14.5% of
the steam for the turbines was provided by an auxiliary boiler. The reduction in QF qualifying
capacity was based on the percentage of steam that was produced by the auxiliary boilers di-
rectly for electricity production not related to a direct thermal application. The technology em-
ployed was a bottoming cycle, for which no PURPA efficiency standard exists. The sequential
use requirement is contained at 18 C.F.R. § 292.202(c)).
109. However, FERC denied a requalification of a 27 MW facility from small power to co-
generation status. This was because FERC found that heating liquid sodium in a furnace for re-
search purposes while simultaneously producing steam for electricity at a sodium research facil-
ity did not constitute an independent thermal application. See Rockwell Int'l Corp., 27 F.E.R.C.
¶ 62,190 (1984).
110. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(a)(2)(B)(ii).
111. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(c).
112. FERC granted a request in 1990 to allow a QF to generate an additional 2 MW of
power even if that resulted in it not meeting the QF efficiency standards for cogenerators. This
waiver was conditioned on there being a system emergency in the New England Power Pool and
that the particular cogenerator was specifically called on to generate a maximum capacity. Con-
solidated Power Co., 52 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,220 (1990).
113. 18 C.F.R. § 292.205(c) (stating that a waiver will be granted if a facility shows that it will
produce significant energy savings).
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savings, which is the regulatory criterion for a waiver.114 Waivers are
denied for the first phase of a facility’s operation, even where the fa-
cility may achieve the operating efficiency and output requirements
during its second phase.115
A waiver is permitted when there is a temporary need, typically
associated with problems with start-up and shakedown of a facility. It
is not fatal if the waiver is requested after the fact.116 Temporary waiv-
ers in these limited circumstances have been granted by FERC from
the output requirement and the efficiency requirement.117
2. Output Parameters
At least 5% of total QF cogeneration energy output must be use-
ful thermal energy. This threshold is used to assure that a project co-
generates two useful forms of energy. In 1995, the Commission con-
sidered how to calculate the useful thermal energy output of a QF
that produced and sold steam to a thermal host.118 FERC calculated
114. See, e.g., Metro. Dade County, Fla. v. Energy Sys. of Thermo Electron Corp., 65
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,090, at 61,539, 61,540 (1993) (denying a request for a waiver, retroactive for a pe-
riod of five years, when no evidence of energy savings was presented); see also Nelson Indus.
Steam Co., 38 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,162, at 61,146 (1987) (denying request for temporary waiver; no
energy savings demonstrated); Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 18 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,128, at 61,256 (1982)
(denying a request for a permanent waiver for a proposed cogeneration facility, despite a 4.4%
energy savings (when compared with a non-cogeneration facility), because proposed alternative
facility could achieve an 18.4% energy savings).
115. See Nelson Indus. Steam Co., 38 F.E.R.C. ¶61,162, at 61,146 (1987) (denying sixty
month waiver of efficiency standards).
116. Altamount Cogeneration Corp., 62 F.E.R.C. ¶61,206, at 62,489 (1993) (granting a re-
quest for a temporary waiver, effective three years prior).
117. The Commission has exercised its waiver authority in a number of cases based on fac-
tors such as the limited duration of the requested waiver; the fact that noncompliance was con-
fined to the testing stage and that further waivers would therefore be unnecessary; and the fact
that granting waiver would fulfill PURPA's goal of encouraging cogeneration development. See
LG&E-Westmoreland Hopewell, 62 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,098, at 61,712 (1993) (granting temporary
waiver for operating standard for qualifying topping-cycle for co-generation facilities); O.L.S.
Energy-Agnews, Inc., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,293, at 62,114-15 (1992) (granting request for temporary
waiver in part when request prompted by the facility not complying with operating standards
during start-up and testing phases); Archbald Power Corp., 53 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,324, at 62,199
(1990) (granting waiver when facility will not meet operating standard because peak thermal
requirements are seasonal); Continental Power Co., 52 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,220, at 62,305 (1990); CMS
Midland, Inc., 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,098, at 61,305 (1990) (granting waiver petition in light of techni-
cal and ownership changes to facility), reh'g denied, 56 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,177 (1991); Nelson Indus.
Steam Co., 39 FERC ¶ 61,201, at 61,724 (1987) (granting a request for waiver subject to condi-
tions on basis of multiple case-specific facts including lack of opposition, and resulting increased
employment). Cf. Megan-Racine Assoc., Inc., 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,308, at 61,309 (1995) (denying
waiver because it was requested only after a revocation request had been filed. Waiver request
was untimely because it came four years after start-up, during which time the facility was aware
that it was not in compliance).
118. Megan-Racine Assoc., Inc., 73 F.E.R.C. at 61,309.
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the QF’s “useful thermal energy” as the thermal content of the steam
delivered, rather than the thermal content of the steam used.
FERC has stated that thermal output is “useful” if it has “an in-
dependent business purpose with some economic justification.”119
However, the Commission has stopped short of articulating a rule to
determine when a thermal application is “useful.” It is clear that “use-
ful output” must not be used for internal QF purposes, such as feed-
water preheating or deaerating. “Useful output” must be used for
heating or affecting a chemical or physical change as part of a process
that demonstrates economic significance.120
Two FERC opinions demarcate the basic boundaries of what
satisfies the requirement of at least 5% “useful” thermal output from
a QF facility. The requirement was met when thermal energy by-
product was used to raise the temperature of water by forty degrees
to heat aquaculture ponds, and thus, the thermal energy use provided
the requisite economic “independent benefit.”121 Where FERC found
119. Electrodyne Research Corp., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,102, at 61,278 (1985) (finding culm dry-
ing process "useful" because the opportunity to cogenerate electricity efficiently was predicated
on an independent market for processed culm. The 80 MW topping cycle cogeneration facility
where steam would be used to dry an affiliate's anthracite coal was certified as a QF). This
means that the thermal energy must profit an industrial or commercial operation without sub-
sidy from the QF's sale of electricity. The QF must present quantitative evidence that a person
contemplating the use of thermal energy would find it economical to pursue, absent the incen-
tive to qualify as a cogeneration facility. Otherwise, the QF may find that the cost of the thermal
output exceeds its value but that the opportunity to sell power as avoided cost rates more than
makes up for the diseconomy. In Electrodyne, the QF proposed burning anthracite coal culm
and selling its thermal energy output, in the form of process steam, to Gilberton Coal to pro-
duce dry culm. The dry culm was to be sold back to Electrodyne for use in the cogeneration
process and to other commercial consumers. The Commission found the culm drying process
"useful" because the opportunity to cogenerate electricity efficiently was predicated on an inde-
pendent market for processed culm. Although Electrodyne showed that dried culm has reduced
storage and transportation costs and is preferable to "wet" culm as a fuel, the Commission
deemed useful only the use of steam to dry culm for sale to entities not affiliated with the QF.
The Commission explained that Gilberton, the thermal host, may be willing to pay an uneco-
nomical price to Electrodyne for steam if, in exchange, Electrodyne purchased culm exclusively
from Gilberton. Id.
120. Id.
121. John W. Savage, 28 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,273, at 61,501 (1984). This application involved an
internal combustion topping cycle 1 MW system driven by natural gas. Exhausted thermal out-
put was used to raise the ambient average temperature of a stream from 40°F to 80°F to raise
catfish in aquaculture ponds. FERC found persuasive that evidence of the economics of the
aquaculture venture was offered, the temperature of the aquaculture operation would be con-
trolled, and the thermal output was substantially greater than the required minimum 5% of total
output (indicating that the thermal application was not a mere afterthought). The thermal appli-
cation had viable independent economic significance. See also James A. Drake & Miller's Plant
Farm, , 28 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,241, at 61,455 (1984) (granting QF status to a facility that used thermal
output to heat a greenhouse, in which ornamental plants were grown to saleable size).
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that a similar aquaculture application was not independent, but was
merely an attempt to dump cooling water from a conventional power
plant design, cogenerator QF status was denied.122 The independent
basis for the thermal energy application is critical to satisfy FERC’s
5% output minimum. This independent basis must not be related to
the power generation process, such as the use of thermal energy to as-
sist in fuel scrubbing or fuel preparation before combustion.123 For ex-
ample, the use of thermal energy to produce electricity or mechanical
energy is not a thermal output under FERC’s definition of useful-
ness.124
When a QF files with FERC stating that it will achieve QF status,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the thermal output is “use-
122. Electrodyne Research Corp. 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,102, at 61,279 (1985) (granting cogenera-
tion status to a proposed 580 MW topping cycle cogeneration plant using gasified coal as a fuel
source in a combined cycle, providing extraction steam for its thermal application. Condenser
discharge water would be used at 70°-100°F to raise fish. The Commission did not believe that
fuel would be burned independently for the aquaculture application, absent the PURPA regula-
tory benefits. Nothing distinguished this thermal application from exhaust of thermal energy in
a conventional power plant operation.) (citing E.G.&G., 16 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,060, at 61,104, 61,105
(1981) (finding that thermal applications such as power plant feed water, deaerating and fuel
preparation are internal to the power production cycle, and therefore, inapposite to the thermal
output requirement)).
123. E.G.&G., Inc., 16 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,060, at 61,104 (1981). See also LaJet Energy Co., 43
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,288, at 61,790 (1988) (finding distilled water process was not economically viable
on its own in the consideration of "useful" economic viability and therefore the facility doesn't
meet definition of topping-cycle cogeneration facility. Furthermore, steam may not merely en-
hance generation of electricity in another affiliated facility); Everett Energy Corp., 45 F.E.R.C.
¶ 61,314, at 62,000 (1988) (denying Everett's appeal of prior denial of application for certifica-
tion as qualifying cogeneration facility because use of thermal energy is not completely inde-
pendent of power production process and is not useful thermal energy output.); Everett Energy
Corp., 43 FERC ¶ 62,306 (1988) (finding failure to satisfy 292.205 criteria for reasons similar to
LaJet. Thermal output may not be utilized to perform residual heating in commercial power
plant). In LaJet, the QF proposed selling steam generated with exhaust heat from diesel genera-
tors to a solar small power producer to enhance the producer's start-up and operating efficiency.
The commission did not find an independent need for thermal energy because the application
proposed one ultimate product, electricity. In Everett, FERC objected to the applicant's use of
steam, though separate from the power production cycle, to enhance generation at another
plant. Everett proposed to sell steam extracted from its extraction/condensing turbine generator
to Boston Edison Company for space heating in buildings housing generating units, steam trac-
ing of pipes, condensate tank heating, and the heating of residual fuel oil tanks. The commission
noted that the multitude of steam uses within a typical power plant would require a detailed
analysis to determine how the power plant would operate in the absence of cogeneration to
identify independently useful thermal energy.
124. See 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,288, at 61,199 (1988) (finding proposed uses of thermal output of
LaJet's facility do not constitute useful thermal energy and denying rehearing of decision of de-
nial of application for certification).
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ful.”125 “Usefulness” is determined by any common industrial or
commercial application.126 If the use is not common, a more exacting
standard is applied. It has two parts. Where a thermal using energy
facility is not related127 to the QF, either plausible evidence of an
arm’s length market transaction for the thermal energy or an end
product produced with the aid of the thermal output can establish its
“usefulness.”128 However, if the thermal use is related to the QF, a
more careful examination without a presumption of legitimacy is ap-
plied by FERC.129 If a challenger rebuts or raises questions about
125. See Kamine/Besicorp Alleghany L.P., 63 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,320, at 63,158 (1993) (noting the
thermal energy output of the Kamine facility is presumptively useful).
126. Id. (noting the Commission adjudges the thermal output presumptively useful, regard-
less of the user's relationship to the cogeneration facility). See LaJet Energy Company, 43
F.E.R.C. at ¶ 61,288, at 61,789 (generally, the commission accepts as useful any common indus-
trial or commercial thermal application, such as space heating, crop drying, or chemical process
use) ; Electrodyne Research Corp., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,102, at 61,279 (1985) (describing ways to
establish that a thermal application is useful). See also Overland Energy Corp., 43 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,224, at 61,575 (1988) (finding energy sold to Great River is useful because common industrial
applications such as space heating and cooling are presumptively useful.). Overland proposed
thermal energy recovery from the engine exhaust of two natural gas-fired generators and from
jacket cooling water to provide domestic hot water, space heating and cooling, and to supply
process heating for boiling/vaporization of liquid propane. Even assuming that the QF and its
thermal host were affiliated, FERC found that space heating and cooling constituted common
industrial applications, and ordered the application presumptively useful. Furthermore, the
commission determined that most natural gas utilities maintained peak shaving facilities, and
the proposed use of thermal energy to heat a water bath vaporizer was common industry prac-
tice.
127. The Commission defines the term "affiliate" when used in relation to any person or
entity, "as another person or entity [that] controls, is controlled by, or is under common control
with such person or entity." Electrodyne Research Corp., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,102, at 61,278 n.8
(1985). Affiliate use of QF power raises the issue of whether the proposed arrangement is the
result of arm's length negotiations. See Overland Energy Corp., 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,224, at 61,575
(stating that even assuming that the QF and its thermal host were affiliated, FERC found that
space heating and cooling constituted common industrial applications, and ordered the applica-
tion presumptively useful).
128. Electrodyne Research Corp., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,102, at 61,278 (1985).
129. Common suppliers and financiers are not evidence of an affiliation between the QF and
its thermal energy host. The ultimate determination of usefulness will be made in the market-
place. Electrodyne Research Corp, 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,102, at 61,278 (1985). Under the "plausible
evidence" standard, applicants might submit quantitative data, statements by or contracts with
potential purchasers, or such other evidence of a market as is available. Id. at 61,279. See River
Delta Cogeneration, 40 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,103, at 63,175 (1987) (finding usefulness of the thermal
output established by contract for sale of the thermal energy where thermal energy output was
sold to a non-affiliated purchaser for use in a brine desalinization plant pursuant to an arm's-
length contract); Rio Grande Cogen, Inc., 39 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,082, at 63,236 (1987) (finding that
the provision of fresh water for an entire city constitutes an arm's-length market for a product,
when no electric utility or electric utility holding company had "any ownership interest in the
facility," thus satisfying the requirement of a prima facie showing of usefulness). Cf. LaJet, 44
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,070, at 61,195, 61,196 (finding an "obligation to review the economic justification
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qualification, then FERC will review the actual contracts for thermal
energy use to reach a decision.130
If, however, the cogenerator or an affiliate use the output in an
innovative fashion, the Commission requires qualitative evidence of
economic justification.131 Under the affiliate use test, the applicant
may provide a cost-benefit analysis132 or submit other evidence of a
market establishing economic viability.133
The Commission fails to require “economic usefulness” of ther-
mal output when the application produces an end product whose
market is established—the independent business test does not ap-
ply.134 Accordingly, FERC overlooked statements by QF personnel
claiming innovative recovery of thermal energy in providing refrigera-
tion for an adjacent ice-skating rink.135
once presented," even if the project's thermal output, if used by a non-affiliate, would be con-
sidered presumptively useful and refusing to find presumptively useful an affiliated water distil-
lation process of smaller proportion. Thus, where a non-affiliated thermal host uses the non-
electric output, plausible evidence of an arm's-length transaction makes a prima facie case for
usefulness, according to FERC.).
130. Contra Kamine/Besicorp Alleghany L.P., 63 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,320, at 63,158 (1993) (find-
ing that "[b]ecause the thermal energy output of the Kamine facility is presumptively useful, the
Commission has no need to review the contracts between Kamine and the non-affiliated pur-
chaser of the facility's thermal output").
131. Electrodyne Research Corp., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,102, at 61,279 (1985).
132. See, e.g., Long Island Cogeneration Ltd. Partners, 40 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,272, at 63,442
(1987) (noting the facility's provision of a cost-benefit analysis that established the economic
viability of the affiliated sludge waste processing system, independent of revenue earned by the
cogeneration facility's electricity sales).
133. See e.g., Freeport-McMoRan Inc. and Gunnison Capital, Ltd., 38 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,059, at
61,165 (1987) (noting the production of evidence that the product had been "marketed for many
years and the revenues from [its] production have at times been sufficient to maintain opera-
tions and induce capital expenditures"); York Canyon Cogeneration Assoc., 44 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,101, at 61,288 (1988) (noting the provision of evidence of an escalating future sales price, and
a cost-benefit analysis projecting profitability based on the transportation cost savings and in-
creased value of coal with a lower moisture content. York Canyon proposed the recovery of
steam to produce hot oil for purchase by an affiliated user in a thermal coal drying operation.
The commission found that neither the thermal coal drying process, nor the application of a
QF's thermal output to produce dry coal were common. As a result, York Canyon provided
evidence of an escalating future sales price, and a cost-benefit analysis projecting profitability
based on the transportation cost savings and increased value of coal with a lower moisture con-
tent. The commission also analyzed projected increases in tonnage of washed coal produced,
and certified the facility).
134. See Polk Power Partners, L.P., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,300, at 62,128 (1992) (finding that the
use of thermal output to produce carbon dioxide is common and therefore, concluding it is pre-
sumptively useful).
135. Arroyo Energy, L.P., 62 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,257, at 62,722, 62,723 (1993) (The innovative use
of technology to provide refrigeration for an ice rink did not trigger the independent business
purpose test because, the Commissioner explained, "ice is a universal product and its use in ice
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Thermal applications which would not be undertaken, but for the
by-product availability of inexpensive thermal energy, are not “use-
ful” thermal applications.136 Use of by-product thermal energy for ag-
ricultural purposes are particularly suspect, because conventional
power plants dump waste thermal energy into the water or the air.137
The Commission found that “[t]hermal applications such as
power plant feedwater heating, deaerating and fuel preparation are
internal to the power production cycle,” and therefore, inapposite to
the thermal output requirement.138 However, where there is a close
sizing of the facility to the thermal needs of the facility, rather than
sizing to the maximum electric output available, an agricultural use of
the thermal output can pass muster as “useful” thermal output.139
Where the facility is sized for maximum electric output and reve-
nues, where the heat that is produced is not efficiently used and con-
trolled, where the heat-using facility is not independent, or where the
product is not economic (that meaning the product is dumped on the
market to justify the QF status and electric production), the thermal
application may not be “useful.”
FERC finds presumptively useful a common, if inefficient, appli-
cation of thermal output.140 The distillation of water originally was
skating rinks is also common." Thus, innovative uses do not compel a rigorous economic analy-
sis when FERC finds that a market for the end product is already established).
136. EG&G, Inc., 16 F.E.R.C. ¶61,060, at 61,104, 61,105 (1981) (finding that the aquaculture
facility would not burn natural gas for the purpose of heating pond water but simply in order to
achieve QF status for the facility).
137. Id.
138. Electrodyne Research Corp., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,102, at 61,279 (1985).
139. John W. Savage, 28 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,273, at 61,501 (1984) (finding that four factors al-
lowed an aquaculture thermal use to qualify as "useful." First, the facility was sized to deliver
the appropriate amount of thermal energy—more than 50% of the useful energy output was
thermal energy. Its primary purpose was not the production of electric power. Second, there was
independent economic significance to the production of fast-maturing catfish. The production of
catfish achieved a profit. Third, there was no relationship between the electric and thermal proj-
ects. Both were independent of the other. Fourth, the heat was adequately controlled to best use
the thermal output.).
140. Polk Power Partners, L.P., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,300, at 62,128 (1992) (approving applica-
tion for certification as a qualifying cogeneration facility. Liquid Carbonic Industries Corpora-
tion, a competing carbon dioxide producer, submitted evidence that the QF's thermal hosts
failed to employ the most economic process of carbon dioxide production , and could not exist
viably without subsidies from electric sales. The commission found no reason to investigate the
presumption of usefulness because it had certified fourteen other such facilities. Moreover, six
of the QFs involved unaffiliated thermal hosts, demonstrating that there was a market for ther-
mal output to produce carbon dioxide. Therefore, FERC upheld certification of all three facili-
ties, noting concern that a potential competitor could undermine PURPA by alleging that a
thermal process is not the most economic, no matter how common the process.); see Polk Power
Partners, L.P., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,030, at 61,162 (1992) (noting Liquid Carbonic asserted that the
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not, but now is, considered a “useful” thermal output application. In
Bayside Cogeneration, L.P., the Commission explained that it had re-
viewed sufficient applications to declare the use of thermal energy to
water distillation as common and, therefore, presumptively useful.141
The Brazos Electric Power Cooperative sought court review of
the FERC decision upholding QF status of the 284 MW Tenaska
Power Project in Cleburne, Texas. FERC had held that the thermal
output of a QF under PURPA need not be economic to be consid-
ered “presumptively useful.” The FERC opinion rested on the finding
that there is no statutory requirement that the thermal output be used
in a cost-effective or economic manner. “Presumptively useful” to
FERC means that, in theory, such a thermal energy project could be
economically useful. It is irrelevant if in fact it is useful in the specific
circumstances for a specific project, or is effectively a sham.142
Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. opposed FERC’s de-
termination of what is “useful thermal energy” generally, and
whether water distillation constitutes an economically justified busi-
ness purpose, per se.143 Tenaska finds support in Brooklyn Navy Yard
flue gas method of carbon dioxide employed by Lavair is much more expensive and inefficient
than the conventional method of recovering carbon dioxide as a waste gas from another indus-
trial process. It also argued that the Florida market for carbon dioxide is easily met with the
plant which Polk proposes.).
141. Bayside Cogeneration, L.P., 67 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,290, at 62,005 (1994) (noting the Com-
mission expressly rejected that its finding of usefulness in Kamine may have been influenced by
evidence presented by the QF as to arm's length contracts with unaffiliated local chemical com-
panies to dilute solid and concentrated chemicals that otherwise would be produced in solution
form). The Commission rejected the electric company's view of "presumption" as a rebuttable
evidentiary burden that may be overcome by the submission of economic evidence. The Com-
mission explained that it only examines economic viability "when the thermal host is an affiliate
of the cogenerator. . . and only when the technology is previously unproven." Id. at 62,006.
FERC recognizes that poor management may render an operation inefficient. Therefore, water
distillation passed the independent business purpose test because a thermal host "is in theory
capable of making money employing the new technology." Id. See also Kamine/Besicorp Al-
leghany L.P., 63 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,320, at 63,158 (1993) (stating that, "the distillation of water can
no longer be treated as novel, but rather is a common use of thermal output").
142. See Brazos Electric Power Coop. v. Tenaska IV Tex. Partners, Ltd., 83 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,176, 61,727 (1998) (denying petition for revocation). The appeal was taken to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In response, the project owner, Tenaska, began exploring sev-
eral alternative uses for the purified water product made with the thermal output. In theory, this
might attract additional companies to the host city industrial park. The very fact that the project
sponsor was looking for alternatives for the water, which on paper was sold to the city—which
occasionally simply dumped it into the sewer—rather than the city looking for such alternative
uses, underscores the suspicious nature of the economic relationships involved with a particular
thermal application. See id. at 61,724.
143. Id. at 61,725-61,727. Tenaska owns a topping-cycle cogeneration facility located in
Cleburne, Texas, which sells electricity exclusively to Brazos pursuant to a 1993 power purchase
agreement. In an effort to obtain QF status, Tenaska IV Texas Partners initially applied for cer-
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Cogeneration Partners, L.P.,144 a project that planned to use cogener-
ated steam to process the waste water effluent of a water pollution
control plant in order to produce distilled water. The Commission de-
clined to investigate the actual use of a product that “has already met
the Commission’s usefulness requirement.” FERC decided in 1998
that there is a presumption of usefulness even when the facts indicate
that thermal output is not useful, is not used in an economic manner,
or is being discarded, as long as there is a common usage in theory for
the output, making it “presumptively useful” thermal energy.145
FERC refused to remove a 56 MW cogeneration facility at
Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. from QF status, when
challenged by citizen groups on grounds of not satisfying the thermal
output and project efficiency tests of PURPA.146 In its decision, FERC
noted that allegations of self-dealing were not properly raised in a
proceeding for QF certification.147 A cogenerator can achieve QF
status if it satisfies the efficiency and output requirements. With this
QF status, the cogenerator is exempt from state utility-type regulation
or discouragement.
b. Small Power Production
There is a second way that self-generation can attain QF status.
Small power production facilities may attain QF status if they are
waste or renewable energy-fueled freestanding electric generating
units. They may be independent power producers that only produce
tification representing that extracted steam would be used to dry brewer's spent grains which
would then serve as livestock feed. The Texas Public Utilities Commission certified the power
purchase agreement, and less than two weeks later, Tenaska filed a new notice of self-
certification stating that low pressure steam would be used to distill water for sale to a third
party. A few months later, FERC certified the facility based on the same representations re-
garding the use of thermal output. Brazos alleges that the distilled water produced by the QF is
not useful because it is "returned to the city" and disposed of into the city's sewer system. The
QF maintains that it satisfies operating and efficiency standards, and that its application of the
thermal output to produce distilled water is "common" and thus, "presumptively useful."
Moreover, the QF asserts that Brazos' argument fails because it incorrectly focuses on how the
distilled water is being used by the non-affiliated party to which it is sold. Tenaska charges that
FERC need not consider how the City uses the distilled water because water distillation is a pre-
sumptively useful application of thermal heat.
144. Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, 74 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,015, at 61,046 (1996); see
also Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners, 79 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,006, at 64,009 (1997) (grant-
ing certification of Brooklyn Navy Yard's cogeneration facility as a QF. Consolidated Edison
challenged the QF's use of the distilled water as not constituting a "useful" application and the
Commission found such use to be common and, therefore, presumptively useful).
145. Brazos Electric Power Coop., 83 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,176, at 61,727.
146. Georgetown Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship, 54 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,049, at 61,186 (1991).
147. Id.
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electric power or power producers that do not produce thermal en-
ergy in excess of 5% of the facilities’ total output.148
1. Size Parameters
Although there are no applicable efficiency or operating re-
quirements, small power producers are limited in size to less than 80
MW149 at the same site,150 with the exception that, as of 1990, renew-
able energy-fueled and industrial waste byproduct-fueled facilities
may exceed 80 MW.151 Some QF units that are too large to qualify for
QF exemptions based on their engineering and technology have
qualified by downlisting the rating of the prime mover so that it ap-
pears legally to be smaller than it actually is.152
FERC denied QF status to a second waste incinerator within one
mile of another waste incinerator owned by the same county agency,
where their combined capacity exceeded 80 MW.153 For the purpose
of determining the size of a small power production facility, project
148. 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.203(a), 292.204(a)-(b).
149. A small power producer that exceeds a 30 MW threshold can still qualify if its generat-
ing source is biomass energy. Biomass is any organic matter not derived from fossil fuels. 18
C.F.R. § 292.202(a) (thus logically including agricultural waste, wood and refuse). To be consid-
ered biomass, the fuel must consist of at least 50% of such matter, thereby permitting some
blending of fuels. 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(b) (1987). There is no clue in the legislative history as to
why the distinction for small power production facilities greater or less than 30 MW was en-
acted. Both the 30 MW limit for additional exemptions and the ultimate 80 MW cap appear ar-
bitrarily selected and not based on any technologic, economic, or environmental criteria.
150. Facilities within a one mile radius (measured from their respective generating equip-
ment) are deemed to be at a common site; hydroelectric facilities that utilize the water from the
same impoundment are deemed at a common site. 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(a)(2). In this instance,
nine distinct ridgetops in a region were designated for installation of wind turbines ranging in
size from 5 to 25 MW each, with an aggregate installed capacity of 87.5 MW. The applicant
sought successfully a determination that each of the nine locations could be individually re-
garded as a separate site of less than 30 MW. Windfarms, Ltd., 19 F.E.R.C. ¶61,220, at 61,435
(1982); Windfarms, Ltd., 20 F.E.R.C. ¶61,165, at 61,340 (1982); see also Windpower Partners, 23
F.E.R.C. ¶61,470, at 62,025 (1983) (holding that a 60 MW wind turbine complex did not exceed
the 30 MW limit for exemption at "any single site," where a single site is defined as the aggre-
gate of all wind generating facilities "within a one mile radius of any one wind generating facil-
ity"); El Dorado County Water Agency and El Dorado Irrigation District, 24 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,280,
at 61,576-61,578 (1983) (finding that a 110.4 MW cluster of three hydroelectric facilities that
were not within a one mile radius did not exceed the 80 MW limit)..
151. Solar, Wind, Waste, and Geothermal Power Production Incentives Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-575, 104 Stat. 2834 (1990) (stating that projects that qualify to be larger than 80 MW
had until the end of 1994 to apply for FERC certification and until the end of 1999 to begin con-
struction or to exercise reasonable diligence towards completion).; Cambria Cogen Co., 53
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,459, at 62,617 n.3 (1990).
152. For example, in New York State units owned by Besicorp Group and by Kamine De-
velopment Corp. with technologically rated turbines at 100 MW, listed the ratings at 79 MW to
qualify under applicable New York statute for certain QF benefits.
153. Pinellas County, Fla., 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,269, at 61,852, 61,855-61,857 (1990).
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size/capacity can be determined at the busbar, rather than at the point
of interconnection with the utility grid.154 Size and fuel therefore, are
key to determining small power producer QF status.155
FERC declined to grant QF status to a proposed small power
production facility comprised of two methane production facilities as-
sociated with municipal sewage treatment plants located forty-five
miles apart. The methane would be traded to a natural gas company
that, in return, would provide natural gas at a third location to supply
a 20 MW small power producer.156 It appeared that this concept’s fail-
ure to gain QF status was related not so much to its disparate sites or
convoluted trading structure, but, rather, to the fact that the fuel ul-
timately burned would be pipeline quality natural gas. Under FERC
regulations, QF status is not granted to small power producers pro-
ducing pipeline quality natural gas. FERC found unconvincing the pe-
titioner’s argument that the gas was acquired in exchange for recov-
ered methane, thus in an accounting sense, if not in a physical sense,
the small power production facility was offsetting the fossil fuel it
consumed with a waste resource.
2. Fuel Input Parameters
A small power producer must employ primarily alternative fuel
or waste inputs. The definition of alternative fuel has evolved from
case law. “Waste” is defined as “byproduct material” that has little or
no commercial value and is considered to be unessential and subordi-
nate to the overall economic goal of an industrial process or opera-
tion. 157
In some limited situations, even conventional fossil fuels can
qualify as “waste” material to allow certification as a small power
project. FERC defines “waste” to include natural gas, which would
154. Malacha Hydro Limited Partnership, 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,267 (1988). This reverses a prior
FERC determination allowing subtraction of line losses and measuring capacity at the point of
interconnection, Malacha Power Project, Inc., 41 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,350, at 61,946 (1987). This pre-
viously measured the actual amount of power delivered to the utility after any line losses, rather
than the net power sendout of the project after allowance for on-site consumption, as the de-
terminative value. In this instance, it rendered Malacha Power at a net capacity of no more than
30 MW and thus exempted the project from federal regulation.
155. Total energy input by the small power producer must be at least 75% biomass, waste,
renewable resources, geothermal resources, or a combination of these sources. 18 C.F.R. §
292.204(b)(1).
156. Gary Hibbert, 53 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,259, at 63,380 (1990). The problem with this configura-
tion is that the synthetic waste-derived fuel produced would not necessarily be the same gas that
was burned at the remote small power production facility, given that the gas would be blended
into the distribution system and transported by a common carriage pipeline.
157. American Lignite Prods. Co., 25 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,054, at 61,228 (1983).
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otherwise be flared and used as refuse lignite/anthracite.158 Low or
medium-quality natural gas with minimal commercial value can qual-
ify as a “waste” material.159 However, FERC did not consider the
downstroke portion of an ordinary oil well pump as “wasted” and did
not consider the inertial energy of such a facility to qualify for the
benefits of PURPA.160
FERC will grant waivers from the fuel use requirement under
several circumstances. If a project encounters problems during start-
up or testing of a new project, it can receive a waiver.161 FERC also
grants waivers where there are unanticipated problems associated
with innovative or novel technologies.162 Where there is a single un-
usual event that is outside the normal control of the QF sponsor, a
waiver also may be granted.163 In deciding whether or not to grant a
waiver, FERC will consider the duration of the waiver period, how
the waiver will effect the financial health of the company, whether a
waiver request was submitted in a timely fashion, whether the waiver
is likely to be a one-time event, employment impacts associated with
closing the QF, and how the waiver fits within general policy goals.164
Several situations have prompted FERC fuel use waivers. FERC
granted a waiver from the 25% fossil fuel maximum limitation for a
QF when weather-related factors temporarily diminished the inherent
capability to use renewable energy sources.165 Where there have been
158. Id. at 61,229; Steiren Farms, 17 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,260 , at 61,509 (1981).
159. Gabriel Mills, 41 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,288, at 63,645 (1987).
160. Turbine Tech, 31 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,184, at 61,357, 61,359 (1985) (holding that a properly
balanced pump would not produce any wasted mechanical energy, and denying the application
to consider as a QF an 11 kW pump electric system.)
161. E.g., Polk Power Partners, L.P., 66 F.E.R.C. ¶61,116, at 61,202 (1994); LG&E-
Westmoreland Hopewell, 62 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,098, 61,712 (1993); O.L.S. Energy-Agnews, Inc., 61
F.E.R.C. ¶61,293, 62,115 (1992).
162. See Continental Energy Assoc., 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,425, at 62,306 (1990) (also taking into
account the local economic interests).
163. E.g., Kramer Junction Co., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,309, at 62,159, 62,160 (1992); Daggett
Leasing Corp., 64 F.E.R.C. ¶61,148, at 62,177 (1993).
164. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Red Top Cogeneration L.P., 84 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,138, at 61,757
(1998) (rejecting a request for waiver since non-compliance extended beyond initial start-up and
testing, was sought only after challenge, and a grant would not produce significant energy sav-
ings or serve the public interest).
165. Kramer Junction Co., Harper Lake Co. VIII and HLC IX Co., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,309, at
62,159-62,160 (1992). This case involved the LUZ Solar Partnerships, in which generation was
partially solar electric and partially from traditional fossil fuels. Because of volcanic activity
from the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, solar insulation was reduced, cutting power production.
This event was seen as unforeseen, or the result of uncontrollable force or force majeure. This
event reduced available solar infiltration. Although opposed by Southern California Edison, the
utility purchasing power from the facility, FERC elected to grant a waiver. Under this waiver, it
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start-up or other testing problems or the introduction of novel tech-
nologies, FERC has granted waivers from the 25% fossil fuel limita-
tion.166 FERC has also allowed waivers where the purchasing utility
declares a system emergency and needs additional power.167
FERC rejected a request to waive the fuel use limitation for a
small power producer while that facility underwent repairs.168 Essen-
tially, this would force the QF to shut-down or scale back its produc-
tion during the repair period to stay within the fuel use requirements.
During any calendar year, not more than 25% of the fuel input
into a small power production QF can be from fossil fuels.169 In lim-
ited situations, however, fossil fuels can be used in excess of this per-
centage limitation to enhance overall efficiency.170 In 1989, FERC
waived the 25% fossil fuel ceiling for small power producers for three
solar energy projects to meet an electric system supply emergency in
Southern California.
4. Legal Criteria for Ownership
Whether a cogenerator or a small power producer, a QF must
not be primarily owned by an electric utility, an electric utility holding
company, or a subsidiary of either.171 Implementing rules define
greater than 50% cumulative equity ownership by any such regulated
electric utility entities as disqualifying the project from QF status.172 A
partially or wholly owned subsidiary of an electric utility or a utility
would fire more fossil fuel and use less than 75% solar energy. A waiver was granted for the
calendar year of the volcanic activity, allowing the project to exceed 25% utilization of fossil
fuels. Id. at 62,158 n.11, 62,156.
166. See e.g., O.L.S. Energy-Agnews, Inc., 61 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,293, at 62,114 (1992); Archibald
Power Corp., 53 F.E.R.C. ¶61,324, at 62,199 (1990); Consolidated Water Power Co., 52 F.E.R.C.
¶61,220, at 61,778 (1990); CMS Midland, Inc., 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,098, at 61,305 (1990); Nelson
Indus. Steam Co., 39 F.E.R.C. ¶61,201, at 61,724 (1987).
167. LUZ Solar Partners III, Ltd., 49 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,070, at 61,273 (1989) (granting a waiver
due to a system emergency that resulted when Southern California Edison, the purchasing util-
ity, had a curtailment of natural gas to its power generation equipment. It was necessary for the
purchasing utility to rely on maximum output of renewable energy facilities. This greater use of
fossil fuel at the QF facility caused the QF to exceed its air emission limitations under its air
permits.).
168. New Charleston Power, Inc., 65 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,378, at 63,026-63,027 (1993).
169. 18 C.F.R. § 292.204(b)(2).
170. Luz Solar Partners II, Ltd., 34 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,383, at 61,714 (1986); Luz Solar Partners,
Ltd., 30 F.E.R.C. ¶61,122, at 61,227 (1986); Power Developers, Inc., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,101, at
61,276 (1985); Northeastern Power Co., 34 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,197, at 61,330 (1986).
171. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e); 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c).
172. 18 C.F.R. § 292.206(b).
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holding company is treated as utility ownership in applying the 50%
limitation.173
Certain subsidiaries of electric utility holding companies are ex-
empt from this restriction.174 There are very limited but critical excep-
tions to this definitional structure, which allow certain wholly-owned
subsidiaries of electric utility holding companies to wholly own QFs.175
PURPA itself is silent regarding ownership by utility subsidiar-
ies. In one sense, FERC conservatively construed the PURPA statu-
tory limitation by restricting utility subsidiary ownership of a QF by
the same parameters as the restriction of parent utility company own-
ership. In another sense, FERC liberally construed the statutory
ownership limitation by defining utility ownership as ownership only
in excess of a 50% equity share. State regulatory commissions can fur-
ther limit investments in QFs by the electric utilities they regulate.
FERC bases QF certification on the sale of a facility’s net output
power measured at the point of sale. For purposes of size and effi-
ciency determinations, net output power is the gross output power of
a facility minus the power utilized on-site. Therefore, a facility may
exceed the 50% utility ownership limitation until the point of com-
mercial operation without jeopardizing ultimate QF status.
FERC interprets the 50% utility ownership limitation as permit-
ting the subsidiary of a regulated electric utility to invest more than
50% of the capital in a QF project as long as it retains no more than
50% of the equity interest.176 If capital contributions do not reflect
173. Id.
174. 18 C.F.R. § 292.602(c)(1).
175. 18 C.F.R. § 292.206(c) (stating that a company shall not be considered to be an "electric
utility" company if it (1) is a subsidiary of an electric utility holding company which is exempt by
rule or order adopted or issued pursuant to section 3(a)(3) or 3(a)(5) of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79c(a)(3), 79c(a)(5); or (2) is declared not to be an
electric utility company by rule or order of the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant
to section 2(a)(3)(A) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §
79b(a)(3)(A).). These critical exceptions were not contained in the original regulations. 45 Fed.
Reg. 17959-17976 (1980). They were added later.
176. Ultrapower 3, 27 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,094, at 61,183-61,184 (1984) (involving a fuel facility
that had an 11.4 MW power production capacity and was owned by a general partnership in
California. One of the two general partners was a wholly owned subsidiary of Tucson Electric
Power Company (Rincon), which made an initial capital investment of $5 million; the other
non-utility partner contributed $2.5 million (Ultrapower 3). The partnership agreement pro-
vided a half interest in all decisions, profits, losses, and tax consequences to each general part-
ner. According to 18 C.F.R. § 292.206(b), equity interest determines ownership interest. 18
C.F.R. § 292.206(b). The Ultrapower 3 decision was the first effort by FERC to specify and
weigh factors contributing to equity. The decision construed capital contribution, management
control and shares of profits and losses as they bear on equity interest. Even though capital con-
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management control they do not affect equity. A partner’s entitle-
ment to profits, losses, and surplus (stream of benefits) is a dispositive
factor in determining a partner’s equity position in a facility.177 FERC
has limited its discussion of equity interests to situations where part-
ners own facility assets on an undivided basis and no shares of stock
are outstanding.
In a 1987 ruling, FERC held that a return of capital contribution
is a mere return of debt and not part of the equity interest.178 This ef-
fectively allowed the utility partner to receive larger distributions of
cash flow until its initial capital contribution was repaid.179
In September 1988, FERC granted QF status to a project where
the utility subsidiary co-owner received more than 50% of the tax de-
preciation on the facility for the first five years of operation. All other
streams of benefits were distributed equally.180 FERC agreed that, by
taking all of the tax depreciation benefits, the utility partner’s claim to
assets at the dissolution of the joint venture correspondingly lessened.
Although the utility partner received more than 50% of the tax de-
preciation, the nonutility partner received more than 50% of the
claim at dissolution. Provided the partnership takes the time value of
money into account, utility partners may trade away future capital ac-
count assets for current tax depreciation benefits.
Since 1991, FERC has let utility partners take more than 50% of
the stream of benefits early in the partnership in an exchange for a
promise that over the life of the partnership, ownership will not ex-
ceed the 50% equity limitation.181
The Commission also effectively may waive the ownership limit
by declaring that a retail sale of electricity does not qualify the selling
entity as an “electric utility,” despite general precedent to the con-
trary. In particular, FERC sanctioned QF status for a real estate de-
velopment corporation generating and reselling electricity to building
tenants, based on the theory that the corporation was not an “electric
tribution provided one partner greater balance sheet assets, FERC indicated that the capital
contribution was debt and not equity. Therefore the utility partner did not exceed the 50% eq-
uity limitation by contributing twice as much capital as the non-utility partner.)
177. 27 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,094, at 61,184.
178. Prodek-/Hydro Resources Joint Venture, 41 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,152, at 61,381 (1987); but see
NYSD Ltd. Partnership, 53 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,223, at 63,344 (1990) (granting QF status. A utility
partner taking more than 50% tax benefit can be offset by a greater than 50% capital contribu-
tion.).
179. Prodek/Hydro Resources Joint Venture, 41 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,152, at 61,381 (1987).
180. James River Cogeneration Co., 44 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,352, at 62,189-62,190 (1988).
181. Zond Sky River Dev. Co., 57 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,019, 63,027 (1991).
040704 FERREY.DOC 04/26/04  10:58 AM
42 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 14:1
utility” and thus could wholly own the QF project.182 A sale-leaseback
to an electric utility may not avoid the ownership limitation.183
The QF ownership limitations are measured at the point after
construction when the QF first sells its power output, and thereafter.
The ownership limitation need not be satisfied prior to commercial
operations. Therefore, a utility may own greater than 50% of a QF
during development and construction phases, reducing its ownership
to less than 50% at the point of commercial operation.
5. Federal Requirements for Utility Purchases of Power from
QFs at State-Administered Prices
Regulated and unregulated electric utilities are directed to pur-
chase energy and capacity offered to them by QFs.184 PURPA re-
quires that rates for purchase of this power not exceed the “incre-
mental cost” of the power supply to the purchasing utility and must
be both “just and reasonable” to electric utility customers and be in
the public interest.185
a. Rates for Purchase
By regulation, FERC (1) defined the “incremental cost” of a
purchasing utility as its “avoided cost,” and (2) dictated that this
avoided cost was the requirement for electric utilities purchasing QF
power. FERC regulations define “avoided costs” as “the incremental
costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which,
but for the purchase from the qualifying facility or qualifying facili-
ties, such utility would generate itself or purchase from another
source.”186 The Supreme Court upheld FERC’s discretion to set the
price that utilities must pay for QF power at the ceiling value allowed
by the Congress.187 All electric utilities must purchase power offered
to them by QFs.188 This obligation is absolute whether QF power is
supplied by a QF within the service territory, or transmitted to it
182. Riverbay Corp., 25 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,316, at 61,719 (1983).
183. Allegheny Elec. Coop., F.E.R.C. Docket No. QF-88-452 (approved in draft form Mar.
29, 1989). A lessee entity that fails the electric utility ownership limitation, controls the power
facility and enjoys an option to purchase at the end of the lease term, "owns" the facility for the
purposes of this test. Substance is emphasized over form of the transaction in evaluating which
party (the lessee) enjoys the "stream of benefits" and is the putative "owner."
184. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a).
185. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a).
186. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(6).
187. Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 413 (1983).
188. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a).
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through the service territory and transmission system of another util-
ity.189
Rates required to be paid by utilities for QF power must simul-
taneously satisfy three criteria: (1) they must be “just and reasonable”
to electric consumers of the purchasing utility, (2) they must be in the
public interest, and (3) they must be not discriminatory against QFs.190
This is in the nature of a simultaneous equation: One rate determina-
tion must simultaneously satisfy all three criteria. The value that satis-
fies the criteria per se is a rate established at the purchasing utility’s
avoided cost.191 Nothing in PURPA requires a purchasing utility to
pay more than avoided cost.192 States can set QF power purchase rates
less than utilities’ avoided costs for other than new capacity only.193
However, some states require utilities, as a matter of state law, to pay
in excess of avoided cost for QF power.194 Although QF rates are nec-
essarily estimated for the purposes of entering a long-term contract,
the avoided cost concept is not violated by such estimates.195
Each state regulatory commission, for each electric utility it
regulates, and each unregulated electric utilities on its own account,
must calculate the variable costs and the fixed capacity costs that the
utility avoids by purchasing blocks of QF power.196 The constitution-
ality of this federal action-forcing statute vis-à-vis the states, was ini-
tially held unconstitutional by a federal district court; however, on
appeal, the Supreme Court narrowly upheld the statute.197
FERC announced that once a contract for power sale is signed, it
thereafter is too late to challenge whether a particular power sale rate
exceeds avoided costs.198 FERC announced that it would not entertain
any requests to invalidate on preemption grounds any preexisting
189. 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(d).
190. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a).
191. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2).
192. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(2).
193. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(3). "New capacity" is defined as any purchase from capacity of a
qualifying facility, construction of which was commenced on or after November 9, 1978. 18
C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(1) (2003).
194. New York established a minimum $0.06/KWh rate, in excess of short-term avoided
cost. This was subsequently repealed.
195. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(5).
196. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e). Relevant factors include, among other things, peak loads, pur-
chased power agreements, the value of electric power, the ability to defer capacity additions and
net line losses. Id.
197. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759 (1982) (holding that the statute "does noth-
ing more than preempt conflicting state enactments in the traditional way").
198. Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,012, at 61,029 (1995).
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contracts where the avoided cost issue could have been previously
raised.199 A federal district court ruled that it had no authority to deal
with rates or state regulation affecting an individual QF. Instead, it
ruled that it only had authority to ensure that states implemented QF
regulations.200
FERC regulations specify three considerations each state regula-
tory commission should consider in establishing “avoided cost”
rates.201 First, all QF power quality is not identical. State regulatory
commissions are directed to evaluate the availability of any particular
QF power to be available at daily and seasonal peak demand times.202
Factors relevant to availability include the dispatchability of the
power, reliability, maintenance requirements that take the QF off-
line, and availability at times of system emergencies.203
Second, avoided costs may only reflect the particular capacity
situation faced by each electric utility.204 Therefore, utilities may offer
very different avoided cost rates. A QF offering capacity and energy
to the utility is entitled to the utility’s full avoided capacity costs for
any year in which the utility has capacity additions in its supply fore-
cast or plan.205 This comports with the federal requirement to pay the
QF the purchasing utility’s full avoided costs, which include avoided
capacity and avoided energy. Third, the avoided cost paid by a pur-
chasing electric utility can reflect the net power actually delivered to
the utility’s load center.206
199. Williams Natural Gas Co. v. F.E.R.C., 3 F.3d 1544, 1554 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying ret-
roactive effective date to an agency rule to protect expectations of those relying on preexisting
rule); Pearlman v. F.E.R.C., 845 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating no retroactive effect to a
new FERC rule); Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. F.E.R.C., 826 F.2d 1074, 1081 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding retroactive application of new rule avoided to prevent manifest injustice);
Aliceville Hydro Assocs. v. F.E.R.C., 800 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (allowing retroac-
tive application under certain conditions); Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. F.E.R.C., 606 F.2d 1094,
1115-16, 1116 n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (permitting retroactive application of new rule when there
was no reasonable basis for reliance on preexisting rule).
200. Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Mass. Dept. of Pub. Utils., 941 F. Supp. 233, 236-38 (D. Mass.
1996).
201. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e).
202. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2). Peak periods of demand are usually during the period ap-
proximately from 8:00 A.M. to 9:00 P.M. during warmest summer and/or coldest winter months.
203. These are qualitative variables which indicate whether the QF can be controlled as can
power generating facilities owned and operated by the utility. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(2)(i)-
(vii).
204. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(3).
205. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(5).
206. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e)(4). A certain amount of electricity transported by wire is lost as
by-product heat in the process of transmission. Power purchased can be net of line losses under
conventional power transactions.
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It is permissible under PURPA to sell QF power to a neighbor-
ing territory rather than to a host utility. If the host territory utility re-
fuses to wheel QF power, it must offer to purchase the power. The
Energy Policy Act of 1992 allows QFs to obtain wholesale power
wheeling. FERC has the power to order utility wheeling.207
Small QFs producing 100 kilowatts per hour or less are entitled
under federal law to benefit from standardized tariffs.208 Several states
extend the standardized tariff to larger facilities.209 Utilities are also
allowed to suspend temporarily purchasing power from QFs in situa-
tions in which such purchases would increase the operating costs of
the utility.210
b. Net Versus Gross Power Sale
There is a controversy presented in several states regarding
whether a QF is entitled to sell only net power211 or can sell its gross
power output, regardless of on-site requirements for power. Many
QFs were purchasing supplemental power from the host native utility
in an amount equal to their internal needs, thereby allowing the
maximum sale of nameplate generating capacity output back to the
utility at avoided cost rates. The question arises as to whose power is
actually being (re)sold to the purchasing utility.
The issue of sale of gross versus net QF power output was
touched upon in early FERC decisions, but never squarely addressed
until 1998. Early in the QF era, the commission determined that the
“power production capacity” of a geothermal QF facility is equal to
the maximum net output that the facility safely and reliably achieves
under the most favorable operating conditions likely to occur over its
lifetime. The net output was determined to be what the QF facility
sends out after all station use of power for auxiliary equipment and
207. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3).
208. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c). The limit reflects design capacity. Id.
209. Pennsylvania and the Tennessee Valley Authority raised this limit to 500 kW; Mary-
land, Delaware and New Jersey have a 1 MW limit; North Carolina has 5 MW limit. WILLIAM
R. MEADE & KEVIN L. PORTER, RENEWABLE ENERGY INSTITUTE, TRENDS IN STATE UTILITY
REGULATION AFFECTING RENEWABLE ENERGY 16 (1987).
210. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(f) (stating a utility is not required to purchase energy or capacity
from a QF during any period in which purchases from QFs will result in costs greater than those
which the utility would incur if it did not make such purchases, but generated the power itself).
This provision has not been interpreted by either FERC or any courts.
211. Net power is defined as gross facility power output, reduced by the amount of native
load, or power consumed by the QF for its own internal needs.
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other electricity uses at the facility.212 FERC later clarified that line
losses incurred while moving power from its point of generation to its
point of grid interconnection must be deducted to determine net out-
put.213
FERC interpreted that the prohibition on selling in excess of net
output could cause a QF to violate the PURPA prohibition that the
unit must be owned by a person not primarily engaged in sale of elec-
tric power, unless such sale of power was solely from cogeneration fa-
cilities or small power production facilities.214 In its 1991 decision in
Turner Falls Limited Partnership, FERC first articulated that while
QFs are entitled to simultaneously buy and sell power, they are not
allowed to sell power in excess of their net outputs. FERC explains
the meshing of these two principles—simultaneous QF buy-sell and
sale only of net output—as necessary to separate the production and
consumption functions of a QF.
FERC distinguishes between the power purchases of a cogenera-
tion QF and a small power producer QF. First, for purposes of auxil-
iary station power requirements, FERC does not allow any QF to
displace native power with power supplied by the purchasing utility,
and it may not sell gross power and buy back from the utility power it
requires for such station uses.215 By contrast, a cogeneration QF is
deemed to be able to supply its host facility’s electricity needs, de-
pending upon whether such a sale is permitted under state law. A co-
generator could sell its entire net output to the utility and buy back
from the utility such power as is necessary for host uses not associated
with electric generation at the QF.216
212. Occidental Geothermal, Inc., 17 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,231, at 61,445 (1981) (stating that such
auxiliary equipment uses could be for pumps, blowers, machinery necessary to prepare fuel, ex-
citers for the generators, lighting, computerized controls, electric waste-handling equipment,
emission monitors, etc. and construing whether the net or gross output facility was used for pur-
poses of determining whether the facility was below the 80 MW limitation of PURPA for geo-
thermal QF projects); see also Power Developers, Inc., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,101, at 61,276 (1985),
reh'g denied, 34 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,136 (1986) (stating that the power production capability of a fa-
cility is equal to its net output, not its gross output).
213. Malacha Power Project, Inc., 41 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,350, at 61,946 (1987).
214. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)(3); Turners Falls Limited Partnership, 55 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,487, at
62,668 (1991) (describing how loss of QF status would subject a project to regulation as a utility
and sale of power under FERC-approved rates).
215. Conn. Valley Elec. Co. v. Wheelabrator Claremont Co., 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,116, at 61,419
(1998) (deciding three disputes regarding gross versus net power output sale involving Wheela-
brator and a Connecticut utility, Stone Container Corp. and a South Carolina power company,
and Penntech Papers and Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. in New York).
216. Id.; Union Carbide Corp., 48 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,130, at 61, 505-07 (1989), reh'g denied, 49
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,209 (1989).
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FERC elected to measure the quantity of power sales on a roll-
ing hour-to-hour basis, so that there must be a constant limitation of
sale to no more than net power output.217 FERC holds that the pur-
chase of a line loss service for losses beyond the point of interconnec-
tion or some other ancillary service by a QF from a third party does
not result in the QF engaging in a sale for resale of power.
The penalty for selling gross power in lieu of net power that
takes account of station use and line losses is declared by FERC as of
February 1998 to be loss of QF status. Loss of QF status causes the
QF to lose avoided cost prices for all its QF power sales.218 If a QF
loses its QF protections, it files rates pursuant to Section 205 of the
Federal Power Act.219 If a QF facility that has been selling more than
net output decides thereafter only to sell net output, it could then re-
gain QF status on a prospective basis from the date of this change.
However, the temporary loss of QF status retroactively could, as a
matter of contract law, jeopardize the QF power sale agreement with
the purchasing utility, depending upon whether retention at all times
of such QF status is mandated by the power sale contract.220
The two 1998 Connecticut Valley Electric Company, Inc. deci-
sions do not address directly whether, even though QF status is re-
tained by continuing to sell gross output under a pre-1991 QF con-
tract, the purchasing utility must pay the contract price up to full
avoided costs for that output in excess of net station output. FERC
does declare in dicta that the price paid for power under a QF con-
217. Conn. Valley Elec. Co., 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,116, at 61,420-61,421 (holding such method is
consistent with how FERC measures a facility's net capacity); Am. Ref-Fuel Co. of Bergen
County, 54 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,287, at 61, 816 (March 14, 1991) (asserting that a one-hour period for
measuring customer demand also is typical in the industry and recognizing that use of a rolling
one-hour period does not allow the potential for manipulation of maximum power outputs as
would a longer measuring period).
218. To lose QF status once a QF is certified by FERC, there must be an affirmative petition
filed by a complainant questioning QF status. Pending that, it is possible that a purchasing utility
ultimately might refuse to pay the QF contract or QF avoided cost price to a QF for the amount
of power sold in excess of its net station output.
219. LG&E-Westmoreland Southhampton, 76 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,116, at 61,605 (1996).
220. Medina Power Co., 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,264, 62,051 (1995), reh'g denied, 72 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,224 (1995) (stating that FERC does not retroactively impose new rules on pre-existing QF
contracts). This is particularly true of revision of existing QF contracts at the unilateral request
of a single party. FERC acknowledged that its rules regarding net versus gross power sales were
ambiguous, at least until the point of the Turner Falls Limited Partnership decision in 1991. 55
F.E.R.C. ¶61,487 (1991). Any contract executed before this decision, in which the contract ex-
plicitly, or the conduct of the parties implicitly, indicates that gross output may be sold to the
utility with station requirements purchased from the utility, will be respected by FERC without
the loss of QF status. Id. at 62,670 n.33.
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tract should be the price specified in the contract with the utility up to
the net output of the QF facility, suggesting that the contract price is
paid for all output in a pre-1991 “grandfathered” contract.221
FERC denied rehearing and issued a partially clarifying decision
in May 1998.222 In its May 1998 Order, FERC clarified that it had
ruled as a matter of federal law that “a QF may not sell in excess of its
net output.”223 The determining date for implementing this new rule
by revoking QF status for any sale in excess of net power is contracts
entered into before June 25, 1991, the date of promulgation of the
Turner Falls Limited Partnership decision. The key here is the date of
contract execution, not the date of any development or operation of
the QF facility. The two 1998 Connecticut Valley Electric Company,
Inc. FERC opinions do not specifically discuss the remedy, other than
loss of QF status, if a QF sells more than net output.
6. Utility Power Sales to QFs
Electric utilities must offer to sell necessary backup,224
interruptible,225 maintenance226 or supplementary227 power to QFs.
221. Because the Connecticut Valley case involved a challenge to QF status rather than per
se a QF pricing dispute, this issue was not at the focal point of this matter. The Connecticut Val-
ley decision states that
While a QF can never sell more power than its net output at its point of interconnec-
tion with the grid, its location in relation to its purchaser (and thus its losses) may be
relevant in the calculation of the avoided cost which it is entitled for the power it does
deliver to its electric utility purchaser.
Conn. Valley Elec. Co. Inc. v. Wheelabrator Claremont Co., 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,116, at 61,421
(1998). Later the decision continues, "The rate for all amounts sold up to the facility's net out-
put should be the contract rate reflected in the parties' agreement, assuming such rate is no
higher than the applicable avoided cost rate established by the State regulatory authority or
non-regulated electric utility." Id. at 61,421-22. A utility might attack a pre-1991 QF contract
either by refusing to purchase that power in excess of net station output, or claiming that that
increment of power is entitled neither to full avoided cost nor the contract price, but only on
energy price. FERC states in its reconsideration of the Connecticut Valley decision:
In the event that a court were to determine that a QF with a pre-Turners Falls contract
that has not previously sold up to gross output does in fact have the contractual right to
sell up to gross output, and that right has not been modified through, for example, the
parties' course of performance, we would consider that contract to be grandfathered
in, as is the case for those pre-Turner contracts under which a QF has consistently sold
up to gross output.
Conn. Valley Elec. Co., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Claremont Co., 83 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,136, at 61,611
(1998). FERC recognizes that ambiguities in contracts can be interpreted through the UCC's
courses of performance.
222. Conn. Valley Elec. Co., Inc., 83 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,136, at 61,607.
223. Id.
224. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(9) (defining backup power as the electric energy or capacity
during an unscheduled outage to supply power generally self-generated).
225. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(10) (defining interruptible power as the power or capacity sup-
plied by an electric utility to a QF subject to interruption under specific conditions).
040704 FERREY.DOC 04/26/04  10:58 AM
2003] NOTHING BUT NET 49
PURPA requires that such power sales by a utility to a QF be made
nondiscriminatory, and their rate for sales must be “just and reason-
able and in the public interest.”228 Essentially, there must be a cost ba-
sis and justification for any QF power sale activity that is inconsistent
with economic principles.
A QF is entitled to simultaneously purchase from and sell power
to a utility.229 In essence, the purchase and sale relationships between
a QF and a utility are legally separated; each transaction is independ-
ent and self-contained as a matter of regulatory and contract law. The
Supreme Court upheld this provision against challenge by utilities.230
Rates for backup and standby power under federal law must be
nondiscriminatory to hosts which self-generate or have a third-party
self-generate power at their facilities. Under Alcon (Puerto Rico),
Inc.,231 hosts are allowed to receive backup power from the utility
226. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(11) (defining maintenance power as the power or capacity sup-
plied by an electric utility to a QF during periods of scheduled outages).
227. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(8) (defining supplementary power as the power or capacity sup-
plied by an electric utility to a QF to augment self-generated electricity).
228. 18 C.F.R. § 292.305(a).
229. There is no requirement that only "excess" electricity of a QF must be purchased by
the electric utility. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3; 18 C.F.R. § 292.101 et seq.. Consequently, for bookkeep-
ing purposes, the QF can sell all electrical output to the utility, if it so desires.
230. Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 423 (1983).
231. 32 FERC ¶ 61,247 (1985). After initially ruling that the host customer of a third-party
owned QF power project was not eligible to receive standby power, FERC later reversed itself
on rehearing. Alcon (Puerto Rico), Inc., 38 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,042 (1987)), aff'd, Puerto Rico Elec.
Power Auth. v. F.E.R.C., 848 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding a broad reading of QFs fulfills
congressional purpose). This case involved two topping cycle cogeneration facilities with a com-
bined capacity of 1.8 MW. Alcon (Puerto Rico), Inc., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,247, at 61,576. Alcon, the
owner of the site and consumer of energy produced, leases the cogeneration equipment from
O'Brien which installed and will operate the equipment. Id. Alcon argued that, effectively, it
was the owner of the equipment. Id. at 61,576. If this was the case, Alcon could purchase backup
power directly from the local electric utility, However, if O'Brien was the owner of the QF fa-
cility's backup power, it was prohibited from reselling or retailing that backup power to Alcon.
The lease/purchase arrangement between the parties was not persuasive initially in convincing
FERC that Alcon and O'Brien were joint owners of the equipment. Id. at 61,579. FERC also
declined to find that the entire Alcon pharmaceutical facility was a cogeneration facility. Id. O'-
Brien was not permitted to sell backup power to Alcon. Id. at 61,579 Commissioner Stalon vig-
orously dissented from this position on the grounds that the form of corporate ownership se-
lected should not bias the right to backup power for a QF. Id. at 61,581. On hearing and
reversal, his position became the majority opinion. FERC's reversal of position was motivated
by a desire to encourage cogeneration. This reversal was prompted by a storm of protest from
QFs, states, and the natural gas industry. Alcon (Puerto Rico), Inc., 38 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,042, at
61,118 (1987). FERC held that the consequence of its earlier order was to deny backup power to
some entities which consume QF power merely because of the financial and legal structuring of
these entities. Id. at 61,119. Third party ownership of QFs would be disadvantaged. Id. at 61,120.
FERC deemed this result to be inconsistent with the intent of PURPA. Id. at 61,119. The legis-
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notwithstanding acquiring primary power from a private third party.
Rates for backup power vary dramatically. In some jurisdictions,
these rates are set and standardized, in others they must be negoti-
ated with the utility.
There are several factors outlined by the FERC to be considered
by utilities when determining standby rates.232 They are:
(1)  The expected timing of forced outages of the QF, if there is any
reason to expect they could not occur with random probability;
(2) The expected frequency of forced outages of the QF;
(3)  The expected duration of forced outages of the QF;
(4)  The expected demand placed on the supplying utility’s gener-
ating resources in the event of a forced outage of the QF;
(5)  The expected cost of electrical energy associated with the ca-
pacity to be used to meet the demand in the event of a forced out-
age of the QF;
(6)  The cost, if any, associated with transmission and distribution
facilities used to meet the demand resulting from a forced outage of
the QF; and
(7)  The terms of backup service, in regard to its position as firm or
interruptible service, and the cost of such terms of service imposed
on the supplying utility.
There are other major issues and concerns for utilities beyond
those factors mandated by FERC when creating standby rates. In an
effort to recognize all costs imposed, utilities may consider the
changes from a standby customer to a full requirements customer, or
alternatively, the changes from full requirements to standby cus-
tomer, timing and probability of peak load outages, need to provide
operating reserves, number and size of backup customers, the meter-
ing of energy and demand, and system protection requirements.233
lative history of PURPA indicates a desire to liberally afford nondiscriminatory backup power,
without distinction as to ownership and use. Id. at 61,120 n.5. Alcon, while leasing rather than
owning the QF equipment, consumed the energy output and contractually had an option to pur-
chase the QF equipment at the conclusion of the lease term. Because the output of the QF was
dedicated to Alcon for consumption, FERC found distinctions in ownership to be immaterial.
Id. at 61,120. Although the owner of the QF equipment and consumer of the QF energy output
were distinct, the distinction was compelled by tax and financing advantages, and the two enti-
ties demonstrated a close nexus. Id. FERC Commissioner Sousa dissented on the reversal,
based on his literal reading of PURPA. Id. at 61,121. He found the FERC regulations, which the
majority used to support its reversal, to be inconsistent with the plain mandate of PURPA. Id.
FERC would codify the substance of the Alcon decision. See FERC Docket RM88-6-000, 53
Fed. Reg. 9331 (1988).  But see 84 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,265 (1998) (terminating docket and noting that
competition has overtaken the need to regulate in this area).
232. See FERC, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking RM88-6-000, 53 Fed. Reg. 9331 (1988).
233. Edison Electric Institute, Standby Rates: Methods and Descriptions 9, 18 (1991).
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The goal in standby rate design is cost recovery. Rate design
must contemplate unit size and outage rates of standby rate custom-
ers. The utility system tries to maintain a given loss-of-load probabil-
ity in designing its standby rates. To determine standby rates, which
are designed on a cost recovery basis, utilities must first consider the
costs of providing this service.
The methodologies for standby rate design vary. Most utilities
price standby service through a modification of a general service rate,
while others use a complex pricing analysis for this service.234 The sto-
chastic method of analysis is a statistical determination of the level of
power generation required to provide a sufficient level of reliability to
standby service customers.235 This approach takes into account the
unit sizes and outage rates of each individual standby customer. A
second approach, called the reserve rationale approach, provides
utility generation reserves for the standby customer based on a utility
planning reserve factor multiplied by the standby customer’s peak
load.236 The third method, the dispatch model, is based on an assess-
ment of a utility’s entire system, as well as an individual standby cus-
tomer’s outage rate and size. A determination of requisite capacity is
made to maintain the same system-wide loss-of-load probability; the
standby rate is set according to the cost of producing this level of
power.237 The fourth method is called the customer-based standby rate
approach. This market-driven approach sets the price for standby
service based on what the customer would pay if the customer pro-
vided standby service.238
As a result of these methods, demand rates for standby service
are normally lower than a utility’s general service rates.239 Energy
charges, however, usually exceed the comparable general service
234. Id. at 35-39. The modification is most often a percentage of the allocated capacity
charge for the general service rate, using the equivalent forced outage rate (EFOR) estimated
to exist for the standby load. Id. Thus the standby rate is designed based on the cost incurred by
having standby load during peak hours. Id. at 18. Of ninety utility companies across forty-five
states, 61% of the standby rates are modifications of general service rates; 20% are the same as
the general service rate; and 19% of those utilities studied use a completely separate and distinct
standby rate. Id. at 40.
235. Id. The stochastic analysis considers the standby customer class only. Standby Rates:
Methods and Descriptions, supra note 233 at 13.
236. Standby Rates: Methods and Descriptions, supra note 233, at 14.
237. Id. at 14.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 29. The lower demand rate reflects the probability of usage of the standby service
on the utility system. Id.
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rates.240 Interestingly, there is no correlation between the amount of
self-generation or its penetration on utility systems and the method-
ology employed to determine the standby rate.241 Therefore, rates and
methodologies are not necessarily less favorable in service territories
where there is extensive penetration of independent power.242
7. Summary
The PURPA rules require that QFs be efficient cogenerators
who productively use both electrical and thermal energy production,
or consume renewable or waste resources. The ownership limitations
prevent majority utility ownership. QFs benefit from the ability to sell
power to the utility at full avoided cost and to purchase supplemental
power from the utility. These on-site generation facilities can have
significant efficiency and environmental advantages over conven-
tional centralized electric generation – but they only exist either as
QFs or as authorized entities in that minority of states that have both
deregulated and not imposed exit fees on self generating consumers.
C. Net Metering Law: Born in Minnesota
Minnesota was the first state to implement a net metering statute
shortly after the enactment of PURPA and its companion regulations
promulgated by FERC. The Minnesota Cogeneration and Small
Power Production Act (MCSPPA) was adopted in 1981, and in 1983
the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (MPUC) adopted rules to
implement the Act.243 The net metering statute provides that in the
event that a QF consumes more electricity than it produces, the QF
shall be billed according to the QFs customer class as determined by
the utility. However, if the QF generates more electricity than it con-
240. Id.
241. Id. at 12.
242. STEVEN FERREY, supra note 53, § 4:25 (20th ed. 2003); see also id. at § 4:31 (standby
and backup rates for more than sixty-five utilities are disaggregated at Table 4.1 for demand
charges, capacity charges, energy charges, peak and off-peak periods, and voltage at delivery).
243. Colton & Brehl, supra note 3, at 479 n.15. The Minnesota net metering statute provides
that any facility that utilizes cogeneration or renewable fuels will be considered a qualifying fa-
cility ("QF") if its operating capacity is less than 40 kW. MINN. STAT. § 216B-164, Subd. 3(a)
(2002). The statute provides that the utilities are required to interconnect with any QF that re-
quests interconnection, provided that the QF reimburse the utility for its normal interconnec-
tion costs. MINN. STAT. § 216B-164, Subd. 8. In the event a dispute arises between the QF and
the utility the statute provides for a determination before the MPUC, however, the utility al-
ways has the burden of proof in such a hearing. MINN. STAT. § 216B-164, Subd. 5.
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sumes the utility shall compensate the QF according to rates set by
the MPUC based on avoided costs as they are defined by FERC.244
FERC defines avoided costs as “the incremental costs to an elec-
tric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the
purchase from the QF or QFs, such utility would generate itself or
purchase from another source.”245
However, notwithstanding the provision providing for the
avoided cost rate, the Minnesota net metering statute provides that a
net metering customer-generator may elect to receive compensation
from the utility at the “average retail utility energy rate.”246
In Minnesota, a potential small power producer, Ann Lanners,
filed a petition with the MPUC against the Minnesota Valley Coop-
erative Light and Power Association (MVCLPA) regarding this par-
ticular issue.247 Ms. Lanners sought to be compensated at the average
retail utility rate that was $0.0608 per kilowatt hour.248 The MVCLPA
argued that its avoided cost was $0.0100 per kilowatt hour.249 The
power company also argued that the Minnesota statute was pre-
empted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution because federal law bars the states from forcing
utilities to pay QFs more than avoided cost for electricity purchases.250
244. MINN. STAT. § 216B-164, Subd. 3 (2002). The determination of how, or even if, a utility
should compensate a QF that generates more electricity than it uses is controversial. The FERC
rules provide that no utility shall have to pay more than its avoided costs for purchases of elec-
tricity. 18 C.F.R. 292.304(a)(2). The problem arises when state net metering laws, such as the
statute in Minnesota, provide for purchases at a rate that is potentially higher than the utility's
avoided cost.
245. 18 C.F.R. 292.101(6). It appeared that the Minnesota statute was clear that a customer-
generator was only entitled to receive the utility's avoided cost for the excess electricity pro-
vided. Originally, the MPUC rules provided that a QF with a capacity of less than 20 kilowatts
would be compensated at the lowest retail rate and a QF with a capacity of 20-40 kilowatts
would be compensated at the utility's avoided cost. Colton & Brehl, supra note 3, at 485. The
MPUC rule that provided for these alternative rates was subsequently amended to provide for
the current rates as described above. MINN. R. 7835.3300 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 216B-164,
Subd. 3(c) (2002).
246. MINN. STAT. § 216B-164, Subd. 3(c) (2002). "The 'average retail utility rate' means, for
any class of utility customer, the quotient of the total annual class revenue from sales of elec-
tricity minus the annual revenue resulting from fixed charges, divided by the annual class kilo-
watt-hour sales". MINN. R. 7835.0100 Subp. 2a (2002). This rate is "exclusive of special rates
based on income age, or energy conservation, according to the applicable rate schedule of the
utility for sales to that class of customer". MINN. STAT. § 216B-164, Subd. 3(c) (2002).
247. Lanners v. Minn. Valley Coop. Light and Power Ass'n, No. E-123/C-95-1085 (Minn.
Pub. Utils Comm’n March 31, 1997).
248. Id. at 2.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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The MPUC ruled that the proposition that QF compensation
cannot exceed avoided cost is not settled at law.251 The MPUC rea-
soned that although FERC itself could not set QF rates above
avoided costs, the states were free to do so and the preamble to the
FERC rules provided so.252 The MPUC argued that FERC could not
reverse its position from that taken in the preamble to the one it
seeks to impose now without initiating a rulemaking under the federal
Administrative Procedure Act.253 The MPUC then held that other
FERC decisions on this issue were not binding on the MPUC without
judicial action, and even if they were, the factual difference between
the cases would prevent comparison.254 Finally, the MPUC held that
the alternative rate set by the MPUC should be upheld because it
provides an alternative to the avoided cost determination proceeding
by providing a reasonable statutory proxy.255 In other words, a small
power producer should not have to take part in an expensive, time
consuming, avoided cost determination hearing since the statute has
provided a reasonable, somewhat comparable alternative. As a result
of this ruling, the MVCLPA was required to compensate Ms. Lanners
at the statutory rate provided for small power producers.
D. Net Metering in Other States
While Minnesota was the first state to enact net metering, it was
not the only state.  Between 1980 and 2000, twenty-nine other states
adopted some form of net metering.   Those states are analyzed in
Appendix I to this article.256  Since the 2001 FERC decision in Mid-
American sanctioning net metering, eight additional states have im-
plemented net metering.  All thirty-eight of these states' net metering
programs are set forth on the following table.
251. Id. The MPUC first found that it could not accept the MVCLPA's statement that its
avoided cost was $0.010, this had to be proven through a fact intensive process.
252. Id. The MPUC pointed to the preamble of FERC's 1980 rules in which FERC stated
that "if a state program were to provide that electric utilities must purchase power from certain
types of facilities, among which are QFs, at a rate higher than that provided by these rules, a QF
might seek to obtain the benefits of that state program. In such a case, however, the higher rates
would be based on state authority to establish such rates, and not on the Commission's rules."
Id. MPUC argued that FERC could not reverse its position from that taken in the preamble to
the one it seeks to impose now without initiating a rulemaking under the federal Administrative
Procedure Act. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 2.
255. Id.
    256. The appendix, because of its scope and depth, is not published with the article.  However,
it is available online at www.law.duke.edy/journals/delpf.
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Note: NEG is net energy generated in excess of purchases.
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IV.  CHANGING [MID] AMERICAN VALUES:
A TALE OF TWO FORUMS
Net metering is the cornerstone of state energy policy to encour-
age private investment in renewable energy resources. Under net me-
tering, the customer who utilizes an alternate (typically renewable)
energy production system connects with the utility grid employing a
bi-directional single meter. The single meter allows the customer to
draw power to meet instantaneous energy consumption when need
exceeds the self-generated production. Conversely the small energy
producer can offset the amount of such power “takes” by self-
generated production put back into the grid at any time during the
billing period, which causes the single meter to run backwards.257
A. The Iowa Proceeding Finds Against Iowa
On August 24, 1999, the Polk County District Court of Iowa is-
sued a decision that would impact energy policy throughout the
United States.258 The district court ruled that federal law preempts
Iowa regulatory authority used to compel a utility to permit small
generating facilities, such as on-site dispersed wind and solar facilities,
to interconnect with the power grid under net metering arrange-
ments.259 The Polk County District Court ruled that small electric
generation facilities are Qualifying Facilities (QFs) governed by
PURPA, which precludes sales of excess power generated by QFs at
rates in excess of the purchasing utility’s avoided cost.260 The court
also ruled that, if these small generating facilities are not QFs under
PURPA, then they are public utilities engaged in the wholesale sale
of power in interstate commerce and are, therefore, governed by the
Federal Power Act and regulated by the FERC.261
In either event, federal law governed all activities. In Iowa, prior
to the Polk County decision, the utility company compensated the
customer for such excess power delivered at the utility’s avoided cost.
257. MidAmerican Energy Company v. Iowa Utilities Board, No. AA3173, 3195, 3196, at
18-20 (Iowa District Court May 25, 1999).
258. Id. (finding that the case involved potential conflicts between state and federal laws.
The court further held that federal preemption under PURPA is broad enough to encompass
state regulations affecting the avoided cost rate change to utilities purchasing alternative energy
from AEPs because of three FERC decisions that the district court interpreted as "unequivo-
cally" stating the scope of federal preemption).
259. Id. at 7.
     260. Id at 7-8.
261. Colton & Brehl, supra note 3, at 480.
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Iowa, and other states with net billing laws or rules, assumed the right
to regulate these billing arrangements locally, without regard to fed-
eral law or FERC regulation of wholesale power transactions.262
1. The Choreography
How did this all begin? In the beginning: In 1998, two individuals
and a school district sought a ruling from the Iowa Utilities Board
(IUB) compelling MidAmerican Energy Company (MEC), the local
monopoly retail utility, to allow them to interconnect their small elec-
tric generation facilities with the utility’s power grid and to enter into
net billing arrangements with them.263 The IUB issued a ruling favor-
able to the three small energy producers pursuant to Iowa’s Alterna-
tive Energy Producers Statute and §199-15.11(5) of the regulations
thereunder.264 Federal law was not involved.
The utility then sought FERC’s intervention in a federal forum
to block the Iowa action. On October 8, 1998, MEC filed a Petition
for Enforcement and Declaratory Order with FERC, asserting juris-
diction under PURPA, 16 U.S.C. §824a-3(h).265 MEC sought a ruling
that if the small renewable Alternative Energy Producers are QFs,
then PURPA federally preempts IUB’s state actions directing net
billing arrangements.266 MEC contended in the alternative that if the
Alternative Energy Producers are not QFs, a wholesale transaction is
involved and the IUB’s action is preempted by the Federal Power
Act.267 Interventions were allowed by FERC.268
262. See The Green Power Network, Net Metering Policies, at http://www.eere.energy.gov/
greenpower/netmetering/ (last modified Oct. 31, 2003); see also The Green Power Network, Net
Metering Policies at The Green Power Network – Net Metering Policies, at http://www.eere.
energy.gov/greenpower/netmetering/#state (last modified Oct. 31, 2003) (listing net metering
policies by state).
263. See MidAmerican Energy Co., No. AA3173, 3195, 3196.
264. See Reply Brief of Respondent/Appellant Iowa Utilities Board at 1, MidAmerican En-
ergy Co. v. Iowa Util. Bd. (August 18, 2000) (No. 99-1529).
265. See Order Granting Waiver and Approving, with Clarifications, Tariff at 4,
MidAmerican Energy Co. (March 8, 2002) (Nos. TF-01-293 WRU-02-8-156) available at
http://www.state.ia.us/government/com/util/_private/Orders/2002/0308_tf01293.pdf.
266. Id.
267. See MidAmerican Energy Company v. Iowa Utilities Board, Brief of Petitioner,
Docket No. 99-1529.
268. A motion to intervene and protest was filed with FERC by the American Solar Energy
Society, the American Wind Energy Association, California Solar Energy Industries Associa-
tion, the Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Hawaii Renewable Energy Alliance, Solar
Energy Industries Association and the Solarex Corporation (Renewable Energy Advocates).
See Motion To Intervene and Protest Of the American Solar Energy Society, American Wind
Energy Assoc., California Solar Energy Industries Assoc., Environmental And Energy Study
Institute, Hawaii Renewable Energy Alliance, Solar Energy Industries Assoc., and the Solarex
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FERC received intervener filings from the Renewable Energy
Advocates’ filing and the Protest’s filings in early December, 1998.269
Almost immediately, on December 30, 1998, FERC declined to enter-
tain the enforcement action requested by MEC.270 FERC indicated,
however, that it would address at a later date MEC’s request for an
order declaring that the IUB’s order directing net billing arrange-
ments is preempted by federal law.271 Left without federal venue,
MEC then filed a petition for judicial review of the IUB’s order in an
Iowa district court.272 While a federal quasi-judicial forum was denied,
a state judicial forum was opened. Little did MEC appreciate that
what then seemed like a forum disadvantage was in fact fortuitous.
2. The Positions of the Parties
Before examining the district court proceeding, the initial pos-
ture of interveners before FERC in support of net metering illumi-
nated the battle to come. On a jurisdictional level, the intervener Re-
newable Energy Advocates argued to FERC that the Iowa trial court
misinterpreted PURPA, the Federal Power Act, and FERC’s orders
thereunder as prohibiting states from imposing net billing require-
ments.273 They contended that MEC requested FERC intervention to
adjudicate an area of retail electricity service, which uniquely and ex-
clusively is reserved to the states under the Act and FERC’s prior or-
Corp., FERC No. EL99-3-000 (Dec. 3, 1998) [hereinafter "Motion to Intervene"]. A protest was
filed with FERC by the Project for Sustainable FERC Energy Policy on behalf of multiple pub-
lic interest organizations and renewable energy groups (the Project); Id. These group filed ar-
guments with FERC. The arguments are instructional because they emphasize the need for a
factual basis for any decision regarding the issues, not only before the IUB, but also before
FERC and the Polk County District Court and Supreme Court of Iowa.. Without the policy
considerations, definitions of, and limitations on, small-scale facilities, as well as the benefits
both to the environment and to existing utility companies of such facilities, the decision of the
Polk County District Court stands without a full policy context. The public policy considerations
were not reached, and the factual premise for implementation of net billing was not available to
the court. No expert testimony was presented from which the court could conclude that the rate
the utility was required to pay for the excess energy generated actually exceeded avoided costs.
It is a uniquely factual inquiry whether a net metering facility, by virtue of its location, and local
area peak demand, actually produces excess energy at a higher value than avoided cost to the
utility. Additionally, in order to prove that excess electricity produced is transmitted in inter-
state commerce, expert testimony is required.
269. See id. at 1.
270. See MidAmerican Energy Co., 85 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,470, at 62,713 (1998).
271. Id.
272. MidAmerican Energy Company v. Iowa Utilities Board, No. AA3173, 3195, 3196 (Iowa
District Court May 25, 1999).
273. See Motion to Intervene, supra note 268, at 3.
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ders.274 On a substantive level, the intervenors focused on the nature
of the transaction. They argued that MEC mischaracterized the trans-
action between the net billing customer and the utility as the “sale” of
electricity, thereby converting retail net billing customers into
PURPA QFs.275
The renewable energy advocates urged FERC to place the issue
into two separate contexts. First, they argued that from a policy per-
spective, state net billing and metering policies are evolving into one
of the cornerstones of renewable energy policy for small-scale solar
and wind energy facilities used by residential and non-commercial
customers supplying their own energy needs. There is little dispute
that subsidies, in whatever form, help the recipients.
Second, they argued that net billing policies impose no direct
costs on utilities and cause only minor reductions in retail sales, not
unlike reductions associated with customer investments in energy ef-
ficiency.276 Emphasis on direct costs may obscure the fact that net me-
tering shifts the responsibility to cover fixed system costs among rate-
payers.
Additionally, they charged that MEC did not allege facts upon
which the court could conclude that direct costs result from Iowa’s
net billing policy.277 The renewable energy advocates contended that
MEC’s analysis failed to address the benefits to the utility of cus-
tomer-sited small-scale distribution generating facilities.278 They con-
tended that:
274. Id. at 3.
275. Id. at 3-9.
276. Id.(presenting the Motion, by the Advocates, as issues of national importance. With
thirty states, ten of those in the last four years, adopting net billing policies, the Advocates posit
the intent is to encourage private investment in renewable energy resources, while improving
the environment, and at the same time reducing the economic costs that act as an economic bar-
rier to self-generation); Id. at 4-5.
277. Id. (failing to demonstrate a technical burden on the utility if sometimes, when cus-
tomer demand is reduced below zero, power is returned to the grid. Instead they allege that Mi-
dAmerican focuses solely on the legalism of preemption, completely devoid of concern for the
policy considerations underlying net billing).
278. Id. at 4-5 (arguing for FERC to take a position on the MidAmerican request that would
favor the long-term public interest. It argued that renewable technologies, energy efficiency and
other demand side management resources must play a greater role in the supply mix in order to
achieve lower costs and a cleaner environment. The Project acknowledged that net metering has
the effect of lowering utility revenues, but it urged that the purpose is to encourage customer
investment in small scale renewable energy resources—the latter incentive being consistent with
both state and federal policy. Ignoring this policy, to fit within the federal regulatory scheme,
MidAmerican argues the net metering customers are either QFs under PURPA, or public utili-
ties under the Federal Power Act selling energy at wholesale in interstate commerce).
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Distributed generation reduces energy losses in transmission and
distribution lines, provides voltage support, reduces reactive power
losses, defers substation upgrades, defers the need for new trans-
mission and distribution capacity, increases reliability of electricity
supply and reduces the demand for spinning reserve capacity. A
number of studies—including several sponsored by the utilities—
have identified direct, measurable economic benefits of having gen-
eration sources located close to the end user.279
The Project, another intervener, also attempted to recharacterize
the nature of the net metering transaction by urging FERC to con-
sider net billing arrangements as energy “offsets” subject to state
regulation. Further, the Project contended that it is inaccurate to refer
to the daily energy offset produced by the customer as a “purchase,”
because it is only a reduction in the amount that will be purchased by
the customer at the end of the month.280 In other words, a “purchase”
is not when one takes something but only when one pays for it. The
Project argued that these generating customers are not PURPA QFs,
and the IUB did not rely on PURPA to require the utility to purchase
any excess power generated.281 Moreover, it submitted that retail cus-
279. See Motion To Intervene, supra at 268, at 4.
280. Id. at 5-6. (submitting that the nature of the transaction is an exchange or offset of elec-
tricity, and not a sale; Id. at 10-11. (reflecting the states' differing treatment of excess energy
produced. For instance, Ohio excludes from the definition of purchased power, non-monetary
exchanges of electricity. In addition, the Federal Power Act distinguishes between sales and ex-
changes of electricity); Id. at 11 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(i)(C)). Although the determination of
retail rates is customarily based on measures of energy use and demand on a periodic basis, Mi-
dAmerican's argument depends on measuring energy demand instantaneously, rather than pe-
riodically. The offset of produced power versus drawn power occurs over the entire billing pe-
riod. It is only excess generation, over the whole billing period, which is required to be
purchased at avoided cost rate).
281. The Project argued that MidAmerican assumes that the net billing customers rely on
PURPA to force net billing through the IUB because PURPA contains a provision requiring
utilities to purchase power from QFs at utility avoided cost. The MidAmerican argument fur-
ther assumes that if net billing customers are QFs, that status transforms actions under state law
as if taken under PURPA. The MidAmerican assumptions ignore the fact that the IUB's action
was pursuant to state statute under which a PURPA QF is not precluded from qualifying for net
billing. This exception allowing PURPA QFs to qualify for net billing does not make all net
billing into a PURPA-governed issue, or all net billing customers into QFs controlled by
PURPA. The Project argues that state laws have governed intrastate retail sales and distribution
of electricity for decades, and the only authorities addressing net billing are state agencies in
Maine and in Iowa. The state statutes and rules dealing with net billing were enacted without
reference to the Federal Power Act or PURPA because they were doing no more than creating
a new category of customer, not of energy producer. Both the Federal Power Act and PURPA
are silent on net billing; therefore, the issue is uniquely a state issue, as recognized by the IUB
and the Maine Public Utilities Commission, citing to Iowa Utilities Board, Order Denying Re-
quest for Formal Complaint Proceedings, Docket No. C-97-53 (July 14, 1998), and Maine Public
Utilities Commission, Order Re: Petition regarding Commission Intercession Regarding Efforts
to Obtain Net Energy Billing Purchasing Contract with Central Maine Power Company, No. 97-
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tomers are not public utilities,282 energy offsets are not “sales” for re-
sale, and these offsets are not wholesale purchases in interstate com-
merce.283
The Project then argued that because no evidence was presented
which illustrated the cost avoided by purchasing excess energy from
local small-scale wind or solar producers, there was no factual basis
for a ruling that the IUB compels purchases at a price in excess of
avoided costs. They argued that in order to determine those avoided
costs, a comparison must be made between electricity costs within a
distribution system at or near the load center and wholesale price. In
addition, the Project argued the comparison is not complete until a
determination is made regarding whether a net metering facility actu-
ally produced excess energy at a higher value to the utility than
avoided cost.
The Project disputed that FERC and the Federal Power Act
govern the billing arrangements of these small-scale facilities. In fact,
the Federal Power Act excludes “facilities used in local distribution”
from the jurisdiction of FERC.284 PURPA is completely silent as to
net billing practices; FERC, as of 1998, had only made a passing ref-
erence to the practice: “The Commission will leave to state regulatory
authorities and the non-regulated electric utilities the determination
532 (Oct. 27, 1997). Both regulatory agencies determined that billing and metering practices be-
tween residential customers and the utility and the practices themselves are within the state's
authority and regulatory jurisdiction.
282. The Project argued that MidAmerican's Federal Power Act argument that net metering
customers are utilities selling power in interstate commerce was rejected by the IUB because
net metering is exclusively limited to retail customers who meet state requirements. Both cases
cited by MidAmerican to support its contention that retail customers who are afforded net bill-
ing are transformed into public utilities, do not stand for that proposition according to the Proj-
ect. MidAmerican cited the 1997 FERC opinion, Zond Development Corp, 80 F.E.R.C.
¶61,051, at 61,151-61,155 (1997); See, MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., No. AA3173,
3195, 3196 (Iowa District Court May 25, 1999) (involving an Iowa facility consisting of approxi-
mately 150 large 750 kW wind turbines involved in the wholesale sale of power to MidAmeri-
can).
283. The Project claimed that MidAmerican's claims are without merit when it asserts, with-
out legal authority or the cloak of policy, that net billing sets rates for QFs above avoided cost,
contrary to PURPA and rates for wholesale sales in interstate commerce by public utilities, con-
trary to the Federal Power Act. First, the Project claimed that MidAmerican cites no facts to
establish that net metering customers are QFs, or that it must purchase their energy because of
PURPA's mandatory purchase provisions. Even if it were conceded that the transaction was
governed by PURPA, no evidence was submitted to prove that MidAmerican is required to
purchase energy at rates in excess of avoided costs. Protest of the Project For Sustainable FERC
Energy Policy On Behalf Of Multiple Public Interest Organizations And Renewable Energy
Groups, FERC No. EL99-3-000 at 14. [hereinafter "Project Protest"]
284. See Id. at 9-12.
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as to whether to institute net energy billing.”285 Nevertheless, MEC
contended that net metering customers are public utilities that net
metering energy offsets are actually “sales for resale,” and that net
metering customers are operating in interstate commerce.286
The intervening Project next argued that because the excess en-
ergy going into local distribution is incidental to the facilities’ basic
function, regulation of billing is subject to state, not federal jurisdic-
tion.287 The Project asked FERC to analyze the facility in terms of the
criteria set out in FERC Order No. 888, which, it contends, leads to
the conclusion that net billing customers are local distribution facili-
ties only, exempt from federal jurisdiction under 16 U.S.C. §
824(b)(1).288
The interveners, therefore, chose to characterize the actual
physical flow of electrons at a given second or hour as an event with-
out legal significance. Once its legal significance was eliminated, an
285. See Id. at 9.
286. Id. The Project characterized these claims as "baseless and bizarre". Consistent with
the ruling of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in Salt River Project Agric. Improvement &
Power Dist. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 391 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1968), that nonprofit rural electric
cooperatives are not subject to the Federal Power Act or FERC, small consumer-owned self
generating facilities are not either. Neither cooperative rural electric customers nor consumer-
owned small scale generating customers are "public utilities." However, QFs typically are not
coops. In addition, no case can be made that the net billing customer is involved in sales for re-
sale. First, no evidence was presented to support that they are in any way "wholesale produc-
ers." These customers are merely involved in an exchange of electricity, with only an occasional
arguable "sale" occurring when there is excess energy produced. They are not wholesale pro-
ducers involved in interstate commerce because no proof has been provided that their electrons
go anywhere other than the local grid, and they are not public utilities. FERC does not have ju-
risdiction over "any other sale of electric energy." In order for MidAmerican to prove that any
of the excess energy produced is transmitted in interstate commerce, expert testimony is re-
quired, as the determination of where electricity flows is "an engineering and scientific, rather
than a legalistic test." FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 209 n.5 (citing Conn. Light &
Power Co. v. FPC, 325 U.S. 515 (1945)). A determination by FERC that any flow of electricity
triggers federal jurisdiction must be supported by expert opinion that is in accord with the facts
known for certain. FPC v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972), reh'g denied, 405 U.S.
948 (1972).
287. Id.
288. See Project Protest, supra note 283, at 22. (setting out in the order are seven factors for
qualifying as a local distribution facility: it is normally in close proximity to the retail customer,
primarily radial in character, with power flowing into the local distribution systems, rarely out,
and energy is consumed in the local distribution system, and not recosigned to another market;
meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface to measure flows into local dis-
tribution system, and that flow will be of reduced voltage. Although FERC did not have the
facts necessary to determine the application of these factors, the Project contended that if the
facts were before FERC, the conclusion would be that net billing facilities are exempt local dis-
tribution facilities. The Project asks FERC to make those factual findings and deny MidAmeri-
can's requests). Id. at 20-21.
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alternative rubric of a single “sale” or transfer of energy only at the
time of billing was substituted. This altered construct provided the
foundation for shifting the jurisdictional authority from federal to
state law. But to get to this alternative state authority, it is necessary
to create a legal fiction superimposed on the actual physical flow of
the net metered power in question.
3. The Iowa District Court Opinion
After FERC declined to act on MEC’s request for a federal in-
junction, MEC retrenched its petition for judicial review in state
court. At the outset, the local court found the case involved a poten-
tial conflict between state and federal law. The court found that fed-
eral preemption under PURPA is broad enough to encompass con-
trol of state regulations affecting the avoided cost rate imposed on
utilities purchasing alternative energy producers’ excess energy.289
Central to the court’s conclusion was a determination of what the
transaction involves at its core: A finding that net billing involves a
“sale” of electricity. It followed from this finding that irrespective of
the volume of power involved, the transactions are considered whole-
sale sales; as soon as the energy flowing to the utility is commingled
with other energy in the power grid, it is sold in interstate com-
merce.290
In an earlier decision, the Iowa Supreme Court had ruled that
“. . . the broad language of the federal regulations accompanying
PURPA does not suggest federal preemption . . . [and] the states are
free under their own authority to enact laws or regulations providing
rates which would result in even greater encouragement of these
technologies.”291 A subsequent decision by FERC in Orange & Rock-
land Utilities, Inc. cast doubt on the validity of such state holdings.292
The district court interpreted three subsequent FERC decisions as
“unequivocally” stating the scope of federal preemption to control
state regulation of net billing customers.293 The federal rules govern.
289. See MidAmerican Energy Co., No. AA3173, 3195, 3196, at 3-4 (Iowa District Court
Aug. 24, 1999) (indicating that the size of the three proposed net billing customers' facilities is
disclosed: two 20kW wind turbines, and the school district's 45kW wind turbine).
290. Id.
291. Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 410 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Iowa
1987).
292. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,197 (1983).
293. See MidAmerican Energy Co., No. AA3173, 3195, 3196, at 11; These three decisions,
Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶61,012 (1995), S. Cal. Edison Co. and San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (1995), and Midwest Power Sys. Inc., 78 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067
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The district court decision next turned to whether the state net
metering rule fell within the class of regulations FERC declared pre-
empted.294 The IUB had submitted that the rule was not preempted
because it was not a rate setting provision, but merely a metering and
billing practice within state regulatory jurisdiction.
The IUB then blamed itself for its poor drafting of prior orders
explaining net billing to the public. The IUB argued that irrespective
of this poorly drafted language, MEC does not “pay” a retail rate to a
net billed customer. There is no discrete sale when the meter runs
backward; there is a monthly transaction of measuring how much
commodity or service was produced or purchased, not what price was
paid. The flow of power back and forth is in the category of a like-
kind exchange, not a purchase and sale of electricity.
On the other hand, MEC contended that net billing required it to
purchase power above avoided cost. MEC argued that each instant of
backward meter operation measures a discrete purchase and sale
transaction.295
The court discussed the two options under the Iowa rule for pur-
chases or “sales” of energy,296 and found that irrespective of the dif-
(1997), all involved QFs under PURPA. The IUB points out in its brief to the Iowa Supreme
Court that one of these rulings recognizes the state's broad authority to direct planning and re-
source decisions of electric utilities and section 201(a) of the Federal Power Act specifically pre-
serves state retail jurisdiction. The brief quotes from S. Cal. Edison Co. and San Diego Gas and
Elec.:
As a general matter, states have broad powers under state law to direct the planning
and resource decisions of utilities under their jurisdiction. States may, for example, or-
der utilities to build renewable generators themselves, or deny certification of other
types of facilities if state law so permits. They also, assuming state law permits, may
order utilities to purchase renewable generation.
70 FERC ¶ 61,215, at 61,676 (1995).
294. MidAmerican Energy Co., No. AA3173, 3195, 3196, at 11.
295. Id. Each backward run from an AEP is a payment to the utility; and each draw or
transmit from the utility is a purchase and sale. MidAmerican contends to the court that because
its obligation to pay is fixed at the point of transmission and receipt, even if the transactions are
netted at the end of a billing cycle.
296. The district court conceptualized net billing as allowing the AEP to "charge" the utility
retail rates when the meter runs backward during the billing cycle, and only to charge avoided
cost when there is a net negative. The district court assumes that net billing assumes a "sale" of
electricity to the utility when the AEP uses less than it produced. The court characterized the
rate of sale as a "negotiated or buy-back" rate. Under the first option for the AEP, the single
meter method, if the AEP produces less energy than it needs, it purchases at retail rates as the
meter runs forward; if it produces more, the meter runs backward offsetting the AEP purchases
at retail rates. Under the second option, two meters, the purchase meter is at retail rates, and
the "sale" meter is at avoided cost rates, and there is no offset at retail rates during the billing
period. The court concludes that so long as the tariffed retail rate is greater than the avoided
cost rate, option one is more attractive to the AEP.
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ferent language used by the IUB and the intervener, the nature of the
transaction remained a purchase and sale.297 The district court re-
jected the IUB’s use of different terms to avoid the discrete purchase
and sale transaction.298 It characterizes the IUB’s euphemistic verb
artistry with verbs such as “receive,” “draw,” “supply,” and “trans-
mit,” as “linguistic distinctions” which do not mask the true nature of
a purchase and sale each instant that energy is exchanged.299
The court then dealt with the fact that only one of theses AEPs
was actually federally certified as a QF under PURPA.300 Although
PURPA QFs are not precluded from seeking net billing arrange-
ments under the Iowa rule, the court acknowledged that non-QFs are
not governed by PURPA. The court determined, however, that non-
QFs are still governed by the Federal Power Act.301
FERC has exclusive jurisdiction to set rates governing wholesale
sale of electricity in interstate commerce.302 The MidAmerican court
then found that energy flowing to the utility is commingled with other
energy in the power grid and is therefore sold in interstate commerce.
Accordingly, FERC’s exclusive rate-setting authority over interstate
commerce under the Federal Power Act preempts the IUB’s ruling.
The fact that power flow was actually transacted is significant.
The United States Supreme Court held that “mere connection [to the
local power grid] is not enough” to invoke federal regulation.303 FERC
ruled in 1992 that the “hypothetical flow of a negligible amount of
electricity” . . . where the “possibility of . . . power even entering . . .
the system is both remote and inconsequential” does not invoke fed-
eral jurisdiction.304
In Iowa, given the uncertainty created by the pending case, the
IUB granted the utilities waivers to permit them to recoup from the
297. Id.
298. Id. at 15-16.
299. See Id. at 17.
300. Id. at 17-18.
301. Id. at 18.
302. Id. This is assuming a customer can store, or bank, his generation from month-to-
month over a one year period. After the end of the year, neither the utility nor any generation
provider would be obligated to pay for any net generation from the customer. The Commission
set limits on the type of facility that was eligible for annualized net billing. The customer will
have to employ one of the technologies or fuel types listed in the rule, such as small hydro and
wind power, and have a maximum installed capacity of 100 kW or less. Availability is not re-
stricted to residential customers as the Commission saw no reason to exclude small businesses
that wish to generate their own electricity from taking advantage of net billing.
303. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 72 (1943).
304. People's Elec. Coop., 60 F.E.R.C. ¶ 63,004, at 65,073 (1992).
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energy adjustment clause any lost margin revenues resulting from the
self-use of generated power. The IUB acknowledges in one order:
The court challenge to [Iowa’s net billing rule] has put a chill on all
alternative energy development that is primarily for self-use,
whether through net billing arrangements or through arrangements
such as the one proposed here.305
The utility had been granted the right not only to recover the al-
leged losses it experienced because of net billing, but also losses
claimed as a result of customer use of self-generation.306 Thus, the
utility prevailed, unexpectedly, in a state forum.
All the while, a second case was proceeding in Maine. The Maine
Public Utilities Commission developed a new net metering rule.307 Be-
cause the net billing practice was found consistent with legislative
policies favoring renewable energy generation and energy efficiency,
the commission decided not to eliminate it solely as a result of indus-
try restructuring.308 The commission announced it would include new
annualized methods of net billing in which usage and generation
would be netted against each other on a twelve-month basis.309
The annualized netting approach taken by the Maine Public
Utilities Commission enables use of small renewable technologies
whose output varies greatly over a given year. The absence of any
power “sales” removes any incentive to size facilities larger than nec-
305. In re Eldora-New Providence School District, No. C-00-171, (Iowa Utils. Bd. Aug. 4,
2000) (order requiring interconnection and granting waivers) (justifying its approach as follows:
"While the Board continues to believe these [net billing] arrangements are valid and that the
rule will ultimately be upheld, the delay caused by the litigation may cause some worthwhile
projects to be canceled. Therefore, to encourage continued development of alternate energy
pending the outcome of the litigation, the Board will grant the waiver as originally proposed by
IES in the waiver docket."); Id. at 5.
306. One commissioner dissented. While supporting the utilities' ability to recoup any lost
revenues as a result of net billing, during the pendency of the litigation, she opposed granting a
right to recover for customer use of self-generation, writing: "A small power producer should
not be required to sell all of his output to the utility but should be able to determine how much
self-generated electricity is kept for self-use. I do not view the amount of self-generated elec-
tricity retained by the producer as a 'loss' to the utility that should be reimbursed by ratepayers
though the EAC. This is simply the cost of doing business." Id. at 7.
307. See generally Talmage, Nos. 97-513 & 97-532 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n Oct. 27, 1997)
(issuing an order that addressed the need to adopt new rules to reflect the change in Maine law
and the impact on the electric utility industry by deregulation of electric generation facilities and
allowance of retail competition. The Commission found that net billing had become more than a
way of reducing metering costs. It found that it has developed into a means of encouraging the
use of small-scale renewable technologies designed primarily to serve the customer's own en-
ergy needs).
308. Id. at 6 (finding that new net billing arrangements ought to be governed by a rule that
generally oversees the promotion of renewable resources in a restructured industry).
309. Id.
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essary to generate more power than necessary to meet the customer’s
needs.
But the utility victory would be short-lived. FERC Commissioner
William L. Massey, while delivering an address in Washington D.C.
on April 28, 2000, forecasted what might come on subsequent appeal:
“No sale by the distributed generator seems to be involved so I would
think this interconnection would not be FERC jurisdictional.”310
B. The FERC Decision Abandons Federal Authority
When the utility board sought appeal to the state supreme court,
the utility moved laterally and took its grievance back to FERC,
which on this second approach accepted grievance.311 MEC contended
that Iowa’s Alternate Energy Production statute312 was preempted by
PURPA.313 MEC also claimed that under Iowa’s statute it would be
forced to pay in excess of its avoided costs for QF power generated by
Iowa’s Alternative Energy Production facilities.
On March 28, 2001, FERC denied MEC’s request for a declara-
tory order.314
In its decision, FERC held that the IUB decisions were not pre-
empted by federal law. FERC reformulated the issue in this case as
310. See William L. Massey, ISO/RTO Interconnection Policy For Distributed Generation,
Keynote Address to Distributed Power Coalition of America conference (April 28, 2000) at
http://www.distributed-generation.com/dpca/events/Massey%204-28-00%20ISO%20Speech.pdf
(emphasizing how situational each interconnection is, presenting a number of scenarios that
may or may not involve a wholesale or resale sale. He specifically recognized the scenario where
a distributed generator solely loads on the generator's side of the interconnection and the inter-
connection solely receives back-up or standby power, such as a fuel cell installed in a house or
business. He further characterized the current state of the regulations as a "jurisdictional quag-
mire" and asked the attendees to help FERC in evolving a policy to guide the individual deci-
sions.
311. After the adverse district court decision, the Iowa Utilities Board took an appeal to the
Iowa Supreme Court, which entertained the appeal but never rendered a decision. The FERC
decision stands as the ultimate adjudication and was not appealed.
312. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 476.41 (2003) (requiring Iowa's electric utilities to buy power
from generators using renewable resources under terms and conditions approved by the IUB).
313. See Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067 (1988) (holding that FERC
eliminated any possibility that the states can impose rates exceeding avoided cost on wholesale
purchases in interstate commerce).
314. See MidAmerican Energy Co., 85 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,470, at 62,264 (stating that in March
2001, MidAmerican Energy Company challenged before FERC the state of Iowa's regulations
directing MEC to interconnect with three "Alternate Energy facilities and to offer net billing
arrangements to those facilities." MEC also requested a declaratory order that federal law pre-
empted these regulations and asked FERC to undertake enforcement action against the Iowa
Board, or to issue a declaratory order that the final orders of the Iowa Board are preempted by
PURPA).
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how to measure the transaction between MEC and those entities that
installed generation on their premises. FERC held inapposite MEC’s
argument that every flow of power constitutes a sale and that every
flow of power from a QF or a non-QF to MEC must be priced consis-
tently with the requirements of either PURPA or the Federal Power
Act. In its holding, FERC held that no sale occurs when an individual
homeowner, farmer, or similar entity installs generation and accounts
for its dealings with a utility through netting.315
This surprising decision appeared to contradict FERC precedent
in its upholding state jurisdiction over such net metering transactions,
declining FERC jurisdiction, and deeming a change of title to power
to not constitute a “sale.”316
FERC rejected MEC’s argument that a “sale” occurs each time
ownership and control of a flow of power changes. As a result, energy
flow must be measured on a net basis rather than on a transactional
basis. MEC argued that the state could not measure sales on a net ba-
sis. It asserted that these transactions are separate and each is whole-
sale in nature, thus falling under the jurisdiction of PURPA for Quali-
fying Facilities or the Federal Power Act for AEPs that are not
designated as QFs.317
The rationale behind MEC’s arguments was economic. The illus-
tration used in the opinion shows that the utility would incur a greater
loss with net metering than with two separate and billable-recorded
transactions. Assume a QF customer generates 1000 kWh in one
month, and in turn consumes 2000 kWh that same month. Under net
billing, a single meter measures the net quantity delivered to the
AEP, which is 1000 kWh. Assuming the retail rate for service is $0.07
per kWh, the bill for MEC’s electricity to the AEP is $70.00.318
On the other hand, as a PURPA transaction two meters would
be employed. One meter would measure the AEP’s production, billed
at the utility’s avoided cost of $0.02 per kWh. This meter would gen-
erate a bill to MEC of $20.00, payable to the AEP. The second meter,
accounting for the energy used by the AEP, would be billed at the
$0.07 per kWh retail rate, and would equal $140.00 payable to MEC
315. Id. at 62,261.
316. Id. at 62,203 n.7.
317. Id. at 62,261 n.1.
318. Id.
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by the AEP.319 This three to one differential between the retail rate
and the wholesale rate is typical of most utilities.320
Thus, if the transaction was a net metering transaction rather
than a PURPA transaction MEC would collect $50.00, or 60% less
per month. Depending on the volume of QF contracts a utility has in
place and the amount of power transacted, the utility could experi-
ence noticeable shortfalls. MEC pointed out this differential in argu-
ing that net billing resulted in a utility “paying in excess of its avoided
cost”321 for power, which it claimed violates PURPA.
In reviewing the argument that MEC would have to pay retail
rates for all power generated by the AEP, FERC took issue with
MEC’s illustration of how net billing operates.322 FERC explained
that under net billing the AEP produces power primarily for its own
needs, and when it produces power in excess of those needs, it is sup-
plied to the utility through the single meter.323 FERC stated that at
times when the AEP does not generate enough power to fulfill its
own needs, the AEP will draw energy from the utility and it will be
measured through that same meter: “Energy flows through one meter
in both directions and is netted out.”324
Ultimately, FERC held that a “sale” does not occur when an in-
dividual installs generation and accounts for its dealings with the util-
ity through the practice of netting.325 Thus, FERC reached a decision
supported by policy only. FERC leaves regulation of the netting as-
pect of the transaction to the state.326
FERC did not address the fact that the utility is forced to take ti-
tle to, and dispose of, energy that a small power producer generates in
excess of its own needs. Title, physical possession, and the right to
make subsequent sale of the power pass concomitantly to the utility
so, the transaction could be characterized as a wholesale “purchase”
of power by the utility to be resold to other end users., FERC arrived
at the position that AEPs are retail consumers and that sales are retail
319. Id.
320. See e.g., www.iso-ne.com (providing wholesale New England prices);
www.nstaronline.com (providing retail New England prices).
321. 85 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,470, at 62,261.
322. Id. at 62,263.
323. Id. (holding that net billing involves "only one meter and one net transaction").
324. Id.
325. Id. at 62,263.
326. Id. at 62,263 n.8.
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in nature, with all retail sales jurisdictionally governed by state regu-
lation.
While the first half of this final statement is true, the second half
is not. A transaction to a utility cannot be retail, even if the seller of
power is, at times, a retail consumer. This FERC holding appears con-
trary to other FERC jurisdictional decisions. Notwithstanding, FERC
cited various cases to support each aspect of its decision. Does prece-
dent, in fact, ground the decision?
V.  ANATOMY OF A DECISION WITHOUT PRECEDENT:
THE FOUNDATION ERODES
A. What Constitutes a “Sale”: The Missing Precedent.
FERC stated in MidAmerican that “there is no sale (for end use
or otherwise) between two different parties when one party is using
its own generating resources for the purpose of self-supply of station
power, and accounting for such usage through the practice of net-
ting,” citing a former FERC opinion, PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.327
FERC cited more than eight decisions in MidAmerican that purport-
edly support its holding. However, with the exception of PJM Inter-
connection,328 none of the cases cited concern the issues raised in Mi-
dAmerican. Furthermore, a careful examination of PJM
Interconnection reveals that it does not support the broad proposition
for which it is cited. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, there is no
“there” there.
Specifically, PJM Interconnection states that “a generator’s self-
supply of station power does not involve a sale. However, the third-
party provision of station power generally involves a sale for end use
that is not subject to our jurisdiction.” No one disputes that the retail
sale of power from the utility to the consumer is not subject to federal
jurisdiction. PJM Interconnection does not address the transfer of
power back to the utility’s lines. The key issue in MidAmerican is not
the initial self-supply of power, but whether excess self-generated
power transferred to a utility should be transferred back to the con-
sumer/generator regardless of whether or not power is later resold to
the consumer/generator. Therefore, PJM Interconnection only con-
327. Id. at 62,263; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 94 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,251 (2001). [hereinafter
"PJM Interconnection "]
328. Id.
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cludes an issue raised by net metering transactions that is not in ques-
tion in MidAmerican.
In PJM Interconnection, FERC reviewed the Federal Power
Act’s definition of “sale of electricity at wholesale” as “sale of electric
energy to any person for resale.”329 FERC only has jurisdiction over
the transmission of power in interstate commerce and the sale of elec-
tricity at wholesale in interstate commerce.330 FERC does not have ju-
risdiction over the sale of electricity for end use.331 Therefore, for
FERC to decide it does not have jurisdiction over net-metering trans-
actions, it must find that in net-metering transactions, a “sale” does
not occur. Therefore, it must be determined whether the provision of
station power from a generator to an unwilling utility is a “sale.” In
making this determination, FERC examined three circumstances of
small generator supply of power to an unwilling utility:
(1)  The small generator is on-line and producing enough energy to
meet its needs (self-supply).
(2)  The small generator uses an off-site source of power owned by
the same company (remote self-supply).
(3)  The small generator uses an off-site source of power owned by
third party (third party supply).332
In PJM Interconnection, FERC found that a generator’s self-
supply of station power does not involve a “sale.”333 This is not con-
troversial. Logically speaking, it does not constitute a “sale” because
there is only one party, and it cannot sell to itself. Whether the source
of supply is on-site or off-site, the generator is using its own power re-
sources, so facilities typically self-supply net power requirements
against gross output.334 Thus, the first two situations above are not
“sales.”
PJM Interconnection does not address the third situation. But
even if it did, the third situation is not directly applicable to a net me-
tering situation because it does not address whether transfer of excess
self-supply to a utility is a sale. 
Thus, PJM Interconnection does not offer the support that
FERC’s MidAmerican decision claims. But perhaps the support is in
the precedent underlying PJM Interconnection? FERC in PJM Inter-
329. Id. at 61,889 (noting that 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) invests FERC with jurisdiction).




334. Id. at 61,891.
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connection cites three cases in support of its analysis, but, as analyzed
below, none of these address the factual or legal situation of net me-
tering. They seem, rather, to support a conclusion opposite to that
reached by FERC.
1. Occidental Geothermal, Inc. (1981)
In Occidental Geothermal, Inc., FERC strived to define the
“power production capacity” of a facility. In this case, it was disputed
whether the actual capacity would exceed the maximum allowed size
limit of the facility, thus disallowing its certification to be a small
power producer QF. FERC held that the actual output of the facility
may vary over time due to changes in operating conditions,335 and that
the power production capacity will be the maximum net output that
can reliably be achieved over a period of several years.336
There can be little argument with this method to determine ca-
pacity, but it does not address either net metering or the definition of
“sale.” PJM Interconnection cites the Occidental Geothermal, Inc.
case for the simple premise that the net output of the facility is what it
can transmit to the power grid after subtracting the power used to op-
erate the equipment necessary for the actual power generation (i.e.
station power).337 There is no discussion whatsoever of the key legal
issue of whether this transaction is treated as a “sale.”
2. Power Developers, Inc. (1985)
PJM Interconnection also cites Power Developers, Inc., which ad-
dresses a very similar issue to that addressed in Occidental Geother-
mal, Inc. and Penntech Papers, Inc. FERC reviewed an application for
certification of a small power producer as a QF, and addressed the
question of whether the facility gross output or its net electricity out-
put is the qualifying capacity for the project.338 In its opinion, FERC
clarified that although section 292.303(a) of the commission’s regula-
tions states that electric utilities must purchase “any energy and ca-
pacity that is made available from a qualifying facility,” FERC has in-
terpreted “the capacity of a qualifying facility for purposes of
335. Occidental Geothermal, Inc., 17 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61, 231, at 61,445 (1981).
336. See id. (taking into account favorable operating conditions most likely to occur in that
time period).
337. Id.; see also PJM Interconnection L.L.C., 94 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,251, at 61,891.
338. Power Developers, Inc., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61, 101, at 61,274 (1985).
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obtaining qualifying status to be its net power production output,
rather than its gross output.”339
This is consistent with Occidental Geothermal, Inc. and with the
subsequent holding in Penntech Papers, Inc., that only excess “net”
power can be sold by a QF to the utility. From the date of Occidental
Geothermal, Inc., FERC holds that even though there is no specific
statement that QF sales are limited to net output, it was implicit in its
discussion. FERC emphasizes that if a QF were allowed to sell all the
gross power it could produce, while buying power for its own station
needs from another source, it would be selling power that the facility,
without assistance from the grid, is capable of delivering.340
Sale of gross power output was prohibited also because it has a
disparate impact on the utilities involved, much as net metering can.
This is because the “QF would be receiving avoided cost prices for
power that it does not enable the utility to avoid generating or pur-
chasing,” much as net metering does.341 The utility would be forced to
produce more electricity because the QF is not self-supplying its own
station needs, thus increasing “the utility’s load over what it would be
in the absence of the QF.”342
Through netting, the QF may or may not cause the utility to pro-
duce more power than it would have been producing anyway. But net
metering does shift—randomly in many instances—the time at which
energy is transferred to the utility, and at certain hours could saddle
the utility with additional unsaleable excess power. This may explain
why FERC finds no need to have the transfer of energy accounted for
by two separate meters at the respective retail and wholesale rates.
The issue that FERC avoids is the effect on the utility when it is
forced to take excess power from the generating AEP or QF, thus
taking title to a surplus of energy it cannot sell and is forced to
ground.
This line of precedent more supports MEC, the utility, than the
utility commission or the power producer. Yet FERC grasped at this
straw, without obvious rationale, to attempt to cobble together some
foundation for its departure in MidAmerican. Although PJM Inter-
connection cites Power Developers, Inc. for the premise that qualify-
ing capacity is net, not gross, power production capacity, the analysis
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in this case helps to underscore the unsuccessful arguments made by
MEC.
3. Penntech Papers, Inc. (1989)
PJM Interconnection next cites Penntech Papers Inc., wherein a
QF wanted to sell its entire gross output to a utility and purchase any
and all power it needed for its own operations from a third-party sup-
plier, creating a total separation between the power sold to the utility
and the power purchased from the third-party supplier.343 In Penntech
Papers, Inc., FERC held that this arrangement was inconsistent with
FERC regulations prohibiting the sale of gross output.344 FERC went
on to state that allowing Penntech Papers Inc. to sell gross output at
“the utility’s avoided cost rate while the cogenerator purchases aux-
iliary power at another utility’s retail rate” could result in economic
distortion.345 While establishing the principle that only excess power
can be sold to the utility, Penntech Papers, Inc. also seems to imply
that the transfer of power to a utility is a “sale.”
PJM Interconnection cites Penntech Papers, Inc. to establish that
only “excess” power can be sold by a QF pursuant to PURPA.346
Power used by the QF itself cannot constitute a “sale” to the QF. Net
metering is analogous to the sale of power under PURPA in that it
typically (although not always) only transacts excess power. However,
the analogy does not directly address whether net metering and bill-
ing, where power is put to an unwilling utility, is a “sale” or an ex-
change of power.
4. MidAmerican Redux
None of these three precedential foundations for PJM Intercon-
nection supports FERC’s holding in MidAmerican. In fact, they seem
to suggest the contrary; that when a utility takes generator power, a
sale of wholesale power occurs. FERC does admit in PJM Intercon-
nection that the legal issue becomes more complicated when a facility
cannot meet its station power needs, so that a generator’s “gross out-
put would be less than station power requirements, and thus it has a
negative net output.”347 The generator then turns to an off-site source,
343. 94 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,251, at 61,891 (citing Penntech Papers, Inc., 48 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,120, at
61,442 (1989)).
344. 48 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,120, at 61,423.
345. Id.
346. 94 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,251, at 61,891.
347. Id. at 61,890.
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whether it be a remote generator, utility, or an affiliate, and the gen-
erator “with negative output ‘leans’ on the interconnected network
and takes it’s station power requirements from any generating source
located on the network, without regard to ownership.”348
FERC’s statement raises more questions than clarifications and
does not address the controversial net metering transaction to a util-
ity. The example in PJM Interconnection refers to self-supply, which
is neither the uni-party supply nor the transfer of power to a utility
involved in net metering. Yet FERC uses PJM Interconnection as the
springboard in MidAmerican to define “sale” as not including uni-
party supply or the transfer of power to a utility.
The opinion in PJM Interconnection never confronts the legal
implications of a net metering “sale” from a QF to a utility. Instead, it
focuses on the converse issue; the unidirectional transfer of power
from a utility to a QF when needed. In PJM Interconnection, FERC
notes that it has never treated netting as a “sale.”349 Thus, PJM Inter-
connection is a negative declaration but does not reach the issue: It
does not define a “sale” nor does it deal with net metering. It only
states that self-supply is not a “sale.” But self-supply is not the key
transaction in the net metering debate.
FERC concluded in MidAmerican that net billing arrangements
would be appropriate in some situations, and left the decision of when
to allow such arrangements to state regulatory authorities.350 In
American Electric Power Services Corp., a utility appealed both the
provisions of PURPA and FERC regulations governing the “simulta-
neous transaction” rule, the “avoided cost” rule, and the “intercon-
nection” rule.351 FERC deemed that utilities must simultaneously pur-
chase and sell to the QF.352 “Simultaneous transactions” are
mechanically similar to net metering transactions.
348. Id. (remarking that the idea that ownership is immaterial may be another reason why
the netting of energy does not indicate a sale, because the actual parties involved are no longer
separate. If ownership does not matter, than there would be no need to track the delivery and
purchase of electricity to and from the QF as separate. The single meter would account for the
totality of activity).
349. Id. at 61,891.
350. MidAmerican Energy Co., 85 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,470, at 62,264.
351. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 675 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, Am.
Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983).
352. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 675 F.2d at 1237 (upholding FERC's "simultaneous
transaction" rule, in which a utility is deemed to have purchased all of a cogenerator's power,
and to have sold back what the cogenerator used for itself), modified, Conn. Valley Elec. Co. v.
Wheelabrator Claremont Co., 82 FERC ¶ 61,116, at 61,419 (1998) (finding that the "avoided
cost" rule, as implemented by FERC, would have states set rates for purchases of power from
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In the opinion, the intermediate court stressed the need for
FERC to encourage small power production and to promulgate
regulations to advance that goal.353 The circuit court feared that the
utility would suffer economic injury from an “across the board” rule,
and then pass its costs along to the consumer.354 The circuit court
found that this was not in the public interest.
The U.S. Supreme Court was not as concerned. It overruled the
Appeals Court in American Paper Institute, Inc. v. American Electric
Power Service Corp., upholding both the “avoided cost” rule and the
“interconnection” rule promulgated by FERC.355 There is no mention
of net metering or billing in either opinion.
B. The Wholesale
In Occidental Geothermal, Inc. and Power Developers, Inc.,
FERC discusses the importance of preventing economic distortion in
QF power production capacity. However, MidAmerican illustrates a
clear example of a utility subject to economic distortion and losing
revenue. In MidAmerican, FERC notes that wholesale-avoided cost
rates have, at times, exceeded current avoided cost. However, FERC
cited routine expressions of contract payments above avoided cost,
and was, in fact, quite disapproving of such above-avoided-cost pay-
ments. FERC allowed them to continue, not in principle, but only as a
matter of estoppel and reliance where the QF contract was final and
implemented prior to FERC’s decision.356 These cases, when closely
AEPs at the utility's full avoided cost). Examining the legislative history, the court found that
Congress made a clear distinction between a "just and reasonable" rate and a rate based on the
full avoided cost, although they may overlap at times. Id. The court went on to point out that
"the essence of the just and reasonable standard is a balancing of the interests of the affected
parties," and that the mandate of the agency is to balance the interests of cogenerators, con-
sumers, and the public interest, not just to ensure that cogenerators are not discriminated
against. Id.
353. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 675 F.2d at 1230.
354. Id. at 1236.
355. Am. Paper Inst., Inc., 461 U.S. 402 (1983). In overturning Am. Electric Power Services
Corp. the Court noted that the agency was not arbitrary or capricious in applying the full
avoided cost rule, nor did it exceed its authority applying the "interconnection" rule. Basically,
the full avoided cost rule was in the best interest of the public because the support and encour-
agement of alternative fuels and energy are in the public's best interest. The interconnection
rule, on the other hand, was in the spirit of judicial economy. Thus, a case by case hearing, as
mandated by American Electric Power Services Corp., was unnecessary.
356. See Conn. Valley Elec. Co., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Claremont Co., L.P., 82 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,116, (1998); Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,012, (1995); Niagara Mohawk Power
Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 117 F.3d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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examined, actually seem to cut against FERC’s MidAmerican deci-
sion.
1. Connecticut Valley Electric Company, Inc.
In Connecticut Valley Electric Company, Inc., the issue presented
was gross versus net power sale, or whether the interpretation of the
“simultaneous buy-sell” rule by state regulatory authorities had been
correct in light of FERC precedent.357 The QF argued that it was not
clear from previous FERC statements whether QFs were able to sell
gross output at avoided cost while purchasing back needed power at
the utility’s retail rate.
This combined transaction evidences similarities to net metering
and billing in that the QF would actually seek to sell higher priced QF
power to the utility at full avoided cost and simultaneously buy back
its host electric requirements—it wants two separate sales recognized.
In contrast, in net metering, the QF wants this same transaction not to
be recognized as a “sale.” In net metering the QF only wants to buy,
rather than sell, net requirements.
What Connecticut Valley Electric Co. does not address is whether
that net amount can be reduced or offset by sales or transactions of
QF power to the utility. FERC held in Connecticut Valley Electric Co.
that Power Developers, Inc.358 and Turner Falls Limited Partnership359
several years earlier put the industry on notice that this simultaneous
gross sale and buy back cannot happen. Citing Power Developers,
Inc., the Commission stated that QF generator sales are limited to net
output, and QFs cannot sell in excess of that net amount (that being
the sale of gross output).360
The Commission made it clear that if a QF were allowed to sell
gross output, the QF would receive avoided cost prices for that in-
cremental amount of power that the purchasing utility could not
avoid generating.361 In citing Turner Falls Limited Partnership, FERC
held that its opinions make it clear that a sale in excess of net output
would deprive a generating facility of QF status, thus removing any
357. Conn. Valley Elec. Co., 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,116, at 61,411.
358. Power Developers, Inc., 32 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,101 (1985).
359. Turner Falls Limited Partnership, 55 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,487 (1991).
360. Conn. Valley Elec. Co. v. Wheelabrator Claremont Co., 82 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,116, at 61,417
(1998). The facts in Connecticut Valley involved two uni-directional meters, not a single bi-
directional net meter.
361. Id. at 61,418 (stating the "simultaneous buy-sell" rule was not intended to permit a QF
to sell at avoided cost rate while buying back at a lower retail rate).
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obligation of the utility to purchase any QF power.362 Only unneeded
or excess power may be sold.363
2. Connecticut Light & Power Co.
In Connecticut Light & Power Co., FERC addressed the issue of
whether a state statute regulating the sale of power to an electric util-
ity from a resource recovery facility (owned and operated by a mu-
nicipality) is preempted by PURPA, where the rate prescribed by
state statute exceeds the utility buyer’s federal avoided cost. The
commission held that federal regulations require that rates charged to
a utility by any QF shall “be just and reasonable and in the public in-
terest, and also not discriminatory,” and such is accomplished if “the
rate equals . . . avoided cost.”364 The commission notes that the Con-
necticut state statute required that the utility must pay the same rate
for purchasing power from a municipal QF that it charges the munici-
pality for power. This is exactly what occurs with net metering. This
rate is essentially the fully loaded retail rate, which should always ex-
ceed the wholesale-avoided cost.
FERC held in Connecticut Light & Power Co. that pursuant to
state requirements, a utility could not be forced to pay more than
avoided cost for any purchased power. The statute in that case was
federally preempted because it compelled a wholesale sale of energy
for resale at more than the avoided cost.365 While this case involved a
state statute applying only to municipally owned QFs, the FERC de-
termination is not limited to these facts. State establishment of utility
power purchase prices in excess of avoided cost is preempted. This is
directly analogous to net metering: the same retail price (greater than
the wholesale price) is assigned by net metering to power transactions
in either direction through the meter.
FERC points out that PURPA does not preempt or regulate
sales of power supplied for retail or end use.366 FERC emphasizes that
states have the ability to pass their own laws on separate grounds to
support small power production, in keeping with the mission of
PURPA. The commission stresses that “the States are free, under
their own authority, to enact laws or regulations providing for rates
362. Id. at 61,417.
363. Id. at 61,411.
364. Conn. Light and Power Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,012, at 61,023, 61,024 (1995).
365. Id. at 61,029.
366. Id. at 61,027, 61,028 (stating that a state may prescribe per unit charge in accordance
with the FERC's rules).
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which would result in even greater encouragement of these technolo-
gies.”367 However, this freedom does not explicitly include setting
wholesale power sale rates for the QF either de facto or de jure in ex-
cess of the wholesale-avoided cost. When a “sale” of power back to a
utility is made, this is and can always be a wholesale transaction not
subject to state jurisdiction, but exclusively within federal jurisdic-
tion.368
The MidAmerican decision, although not supported by the
precedent that FERC relies on, stands for the proposition that no
“sale” occurs when a small power producer installs generation and
uses net metering to measure, and ultimately account for, its power
transactions with a utility. State regulatory authorities are left to de-
cide when net billing arrangements are appropriate. Thus, the physi-
cal transfer of power is legally ignored.
The implications of this are far-reaching. States are free to use
this costless transaction to subsidize projects without FERC over-
sight. This elevates meter reading, an occasional discretionary act, to
a position of more importance than the constant flow of power. If no
sale of power is deemed to occur until the net meter is read at the end
of the billing period, then every retail consumer could refuse to pay
every estimated bill not based on a meter reading sent routinely by a
utility. While it is not possible to track the flow of individual elec-
trons, it is possible to determine the utility transaction by tracking the
gross power transfer.
C. “Sales,” “Trades,” or “Offsets?”: The Characterization of the
Transaction Determines the Applicable Renewable Power Policy
States that have adopted the concept of net billing argue that net
metering is “simply a method to measure the amount of power that
passes to and from the consumer and the utility.”369 These states char-
acterize the transaction as a mere “exchange” of energy; not a sale. So
what is this electricity transaction, and how should it legally be
treated?
Many proponents of net billing describe the transmissions as
mere “offsets” of energy rather than “sales.” These proponents argue
367. Id. at 61,029.
368. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 117 F.3d 1485, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (de-
nying review of a decision upholding FERC PURPA orders to encourage cogeneration). In its
brief opinion, the court cites Conn. Light and Power Co. as part of the predicate for the opinion.
369. Brief for Respondent/Appellant Iowa Utilities Board at 9, MidAmerican Energy Co. v.
Iowa Util. Bd. (Aug. 18, 2000) (No. 99-1529).
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that net billing allows the customer to use “electricity generated at
one point during the billing period to offset electricity delivered from
the utility at some other point during the billing period.”370 When an
“offset” of energy occurs between a customer and a utility, the cus-
tomer’s bill will be reduced accordingly to represent any energy that
has been transmitted from the small producer back to the utility dur-
ing the billing period.371 The proponents of this net billing system have
called such transmission of energy a “non-monetary exchange of elec-
tricity.”372
1. Legal Definitions
So is this an “exchange” or “offset” rather than a “sale?” “Ex-
change” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[t]o barter; to swap.
To part with, give or transfer for an equivalent.”373 Interestingly, also
found under the definition for “exchange” is language setting forth a
criterion distinguishing an “exchange” from a “sale:” “the criterion in
determining whether a transaction is a sale or an exchange is whether
there is a determination of the value of the things exchanged. If no
price is set for either property, it is said to be an exchange.”374
Proponents of the “exchange” view argue that there has been no
value assigned to the energy transmitted because the single meter is
read only at the end of the billing period. Because an assignment of
value cannot take place prior to the meter being read, the criterion
establishing a “sale” will not be met. Therefore, only an “exchange”
has taken place, yielding no PURPA requirements limiting the sale
price. Proponents of the contrary view note that even if no payment is
yet due, the title passes as electrons pass through the meter, and a
monetary obligation accrues to the beneficiary under either a power
purchase agreement or a utility tariff.
There is a related issue of whether electricity transactions involve
a “good” or a service.375 Sales are governed either by common law or
the U.C.C. The common law definition of “sale” as found in Black’s




373. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (6th ed. 1990).
374. Gruver v. Comm'r, 142 F.2d 363, 366 (4th Cir. 1944).
375. See, FERREY, supra note 53; STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW RULES Ch. 12 (Penwell,
2001); Steven Ferrey, Defining Power: Electrons and the Law, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10038 (2002).
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for consideration.”376 “Sale” is also defined as “[a] transfer of property
for a fixed price in money or its equivalent.”377
If electricity is a “good,” the U.C.C. governs the sale of electric-
ity. The U.C.C. defines “sale” in § 2-106(1) as the “[p]assing of title
from seller to buyer for a price.”378 Black’s Law Dictionary further de-
fines “sale” as “[a] contract whereby property is transferred from one
person to another for a consideration of value, implying the passing of
the general and absolute title, as distinguished from a special interest
falling short of complete ownership.”379
The language of U.C.C. § 2-107(1) defines goods to be severed
from realty: “A contract for the sale of minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) or a structure or its materials to be removed from realty is
a contract for the sale of goods within this Article. . .”380 The Federal
Power Act defines the “sale of electric energy at wholesale” as “a sale
of electric energy to any person for resale.”381 Neither the federal
regulations nor a review of federal decisions reveals any language re-
ferring to energy transmission as anything other than a “sale.” Title
passes, a property right is transferred, and power is transmitted for a
wholesale transaction when net metering occurs. This appears to sat-
isfy the U.C.C., common law, and federal statutory definitions of a
sale, not an exchange.
2. Case Law
If not an exchange, the netting transaction is a “sale,” and it may
occur at illegal prices, depending on the state net metering law. In a
string of four cases prior to MidAmerican, FERC established that QF
power sellers may not receive more than avoided cost for power
transmitted to the utility. Under section 210(b) of PURPA, FERC
also made clear that the states cannot impose rates exceeding the
utility’s avoided cost.382 By contrast, in the preamble to the PURPA
376. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1337 (6th ed. 1990).
377. Id.
378. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2003). The U.C.C.'s definition for "good" states that "[g]oods means
all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment
securities (Article 8) and things in action." U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (emphasis added).
379. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1337 (6th ed. 1990).
380. U.C.C. § 2-107(1).
381. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2000).
382. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b). Section 210(b) of PURPA requires electric utilities to offer to
purchase electric energy from QFs at rates that are (1) just and reasonable to the electric con-
sumers of the electric energy and in the public interest, (2) nondiscriminatory with respect to
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regulations promulgated in 1980, FERC originally expressly allowed
state regulators to impose rates exceeding avoided cost.383 This was
later retracted and clarified by FERC in subsequent case precedent.
a. Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc.
In 1988, FERC issued the controversial Orange & Rockland
Utilities, Inc. decision purporting to federally preempt state authority
to establish power purchase rates in excess of avoided cost.384 FERC
never reached a consensus on the rationale for its Orange & Rock-
land Utilities, Inc. decision. Less than two months later, FERC stayed
its decision pending judicial review.385 A state appeals court upheld
FERC’s six-cent minimum rate. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to
grant certiorari.386 Subsequently, the state legislature repealed the
statue in question, and a federal appeals court ruled the utility chal-
lenge moot. Therefore, a definitive resolution was never reached.
The case involved a multistate, fully integrated system with oper-
ating sister companies located in three contiguous states intercon-
nected by transmission capabilities.387 Common system costs were al-
located to the three operating subsidiaries according to a
determination of proportionate use, as embodied in a FERC rate fil-
ing.388 New York, by state statute, mandated a six-cent per Kilowatt
hour minimum rate for utility purchase of QF power.389
QFs, and (3) not in excess of the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric
energy.
383. See FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles 1977-1981 ¶ 30,128, at
30,875 ("the States are free, under their own authority, to enact laws or regulations providing
for rates which would result in even greater encouragement of these technologies").
384. In re Orange & Rockland Util., Inc., 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,194 (1988); see also
Occidental Chem. Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 869 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1989) (dismissing an appeal of the
FERC decision on the grounds of ripeness pending conclusion of the FERC rulemaking in
Docket RM-88-6-000). In June 1988, FERC stayed the enforcement of its administrative deci-
sion pending appeal. In re Orange & Rockland Util., 43 F.E.R.C. ¶61,547, at 62,361 (1988).
385. In re Orange & Rockland Util., 43 F.E.R.C. ¶61,547, at 62,361.
386. Consol. Edison of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 470 U.S. 1075 (1985) (uphold-
ing decision at 472 N.E. 2d 981 (N.Y. 1984)).
387. Operating companies are located in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; how-
ever, Orange & Rockland, the New York entity, owns and operates all generating stations and
supplies full requirements service to its sister companies. 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,185 (1988).
388. Costs are allocated 70% to the New York entity, 29% to the New Jersey entity, and 1%
to the Pennsylvania entity. Id. at 61,186.
389. Id. at 61,186 (comparing N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law §§ 2-a to -c (McKinney Supp. 1987) with
18 C.F.R. §§ 292.202-.209 (1988)). On September 28, 1987, the New York Public Service Com-
mission issued an interim policy statement regarding rates for purchases from qualifying facili-
ties. Interim Statement of Policy and Order on Contracts for the Purchase of Electricity from On-
site Generators, Case Nos. 28962, 28793 and 28689. The New York Commission expressed con-
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The purchasing utility contested whether that minimum New
York rate could be applied to a utility system not operating exclu-
sively in New York.390 As applied to multistate utilities, the question
presented was whether the minimum rate imposed by New York stat-
ute impermissibly causes rates to out-of-state customers to be in-
creased. Since other states may not require a minimum price in excess
of avoided cost, this provision effectively violated the PURPA provi-
sion requiring, in the absence of a state law basis to pay higher costs,
power purchase rates to equal avoided cost. It also could be argued
that it imposes New York policy on contiguous states by virtue of ap-
plication to a multistate utility.391
In July 1987, Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. (O&R), Rock-
land Electric Company, and Pike County Light & Power Company,
filed a petition for declaratory order challenging the application of
the New York Public Service Commissions’ legislation that imposed a
minimum rate of six cents per kWh for purchases by the utilities from
New York state QFs.392 O&R contended that the six-cent rate was in-
valid as applied to an integrated multistate393 utility system such as
theirs, and that the application of the six-cent rate rather than the
avoided cost wholesale rate would result in excess costs to the O&R
system394 and would therefore be inconsistent with the purpose of the
federal avoided cost requirement.395 O&R further argued that the ap-
cern about what it described as consumer overpayments resulting from application of the six-
cent rate in excess of avoided cost. According to the commission, the avoided cost for most ma-
jor New York utilities will not exceed six cents per kilowatt-hour until around 1994-1995. The
New York Commission adopted a policy providing several options for future purchases from
Qualifying Facilities. The commissions stated that it would consider for approval only (1) con-
tracts for the greater of the purchasing utility's avoided cost or the six-cent rate; (2) contracts for
the greater of the purchasing utility's avoided cost or the six-cent rate, as long as the contract
was otherwise consistent with the purposes of PURPA and of the New York program; and (3)
long-term contracts at the six-cent rate when payments would equal the purchasing utility's
avoided cost over the contract period. 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,186 n.3.
390. Id. at 61,186-87 (stating that petitioners rely on Middle S. Serv., Inc., 24 F.E.R.C. ¶
63,119, at 65,209 (1983), modified, 33 F.E.R.C. ¶61,408 (1985) (contending that the six-cent rate
is invalid as applied to a multistate utility system).
391. 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,187 (1998).
392. Id. at 61,185.
393. Id. at 61,185. One operating company each is located in New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. Orange & Rockland, the New York entity, owns and operates all generation sta-
tions and supplies full requirements service to its sister companies. Id. at 61,186.
394. Id. at 61,187. Costs were allocated 70% to the New York entity, 29% to the New Jersey
entity, and 1% to the Pennsylvania entity.
395. Id. Avoided cost is defined as the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy which,
but for the purchase from such cogenerator or small power producer, such utility would gener-
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plication of the six-cent rate would require the O&R system to pass
on the excess costs to its customers or to allow its financial position to
decline, either of which would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent
that PURPA not result in consumer subsidies of QFs.396
O&R contended that FERC has exclusive jurisdiction and that
PURPA does not permit the states to impose rates in excess of
avoided cost on purchases from federal certified QFs.397 O&R rea-
soned that PURPA only authorizes the states to implement PURPA’s
avoided cost rules and that, except for the states’ limited authority
under PURPA, the states have no authority to regulate the sale of
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.398
In response, intervenors supporting the New York Public Service
Commission decision (hereinafter “New York intervenors”) con-
tended that the six-cent minimum rate was a valid exercise of state
power to enact laws that encourage the development of cogeneration
and small power production facilities.399 This is the same policy ra-
tionale that is advanced for net metering. New York intervenors re-
lied on the regulatory preamble and section 210(e) of PURPA to
support its view that states had and could exercise authority inde-
pendently of PURPA to impose rates exceeding avoided cost.400
Founded on this belief, New York intervenors contended that the six-
cent rate does not conflict with PURPA and is therefore not pre-
empted under the Supremacy Clause.401
ate or purchase from another source. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-3(a), (b), (d) (1982); 18 C.F.R. §
292.101(b)(6) (1987).
396. Orange & Rockland relied on the legislative history of PURPA, which provided that §
210 "is not intended to require the ratepayers of a utility to subsidize cogenerators or small
power producers." 43 F.E.R.C. ¶61,067, at 61,187 (1998) (citing Joint Explanatory Statement of
the Committee of Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 95-1750, at 98 (1978), reprinted U.S.C.C.A.N.
7797, 7832).
397. 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,187 (1998). Orange & Rockland conceded the validity of the
six-cent rate as applied to a utility located exclusively within New York, but contended that the
six-cent rate is invalid as applied to an integrated multistate utility system such as theirs.
398. Id. at 61,187.
399. Id. at 61,189 (the briefing in support of this contention was done by another intervenor,
Occidental Chemical Corporation, a manufacturer and operator of a cogeneration facility).
400. See FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preambles 1977-1981 ¶30,128, at 30,
875 (declaring that the Commission specifically recognized that PURPA leaves the states free to
impose rates higher than avoided cost to provide greater encouragement of alternative energy
technologies). Intervening parties supporting the New York Public Service Commission deci-
sion also relied on the commission's holding in Consolidated Edison Co. of N,Y., Inc. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. , 472 N.E.2d 981, 986 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that a state has interests in
encouraging alternative energy sources).
401. 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,189 (1988) (describing Occidental Chemical Corporation's
arguments for their interest in the legality of the six-cent minimum and their contention that the
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New York argued that if a state program such as theirs were to
provide that electric utilities must purchase power from QFs at a rate
higher than the utility’s avoided cost, a QF might seek to obtain the
benefits of that state program. Thus the higher rates would be based
on state authority to establish such rates and not on FERC’s rules.
Alternatively, New York intervenors argued that O&R could avoid
the multistate effect of the six-cent rate simply by localizing the costs
of purchases from QFs.402
The petition presented a very narrow question as to state juris-
dictional power to regulate a particular aspect of multistate utility op-
erations. Another New York utility was granted permission to inter-
vene before FERC. By its intervention it raised the broader question
of whether a minimum power purchase rate above avoided cost is
permissible on any grounds.403 The petitioning utility objected to the
expansion of the issue and stipulated to the validity of a six-cent
minimum rate applied within state boundaries.404
FERC agreed to consider the broader question raised on inter-
vention. The Commission found no genuine issues of fact requiring a
hearing, and disposed of all issues on the pleadings.405 FERC held that
New York could not impose a rate on future purchases that exceeds
actual avoided cost. This is a direct reversal of PURPA regulations
and is contrary to the noncommittal position taken by FERC less
than a month before in its notice of proposed rulemaking on avoided
cost.406 The decision broadly prohibits any state from establishing a
six-cent rate does not conflict with PURPA and is therefore not preempted under the Suprem-
acy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
402. Id. at 61,189 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.
472 N.E.2d 981 (N.Y. 1984), appeal dismissed, 470 U.S. 1075 (1985) (upholding New York's six-
cent rate as applied to purchases by a utility exclusively within New York)); see also Middle S.
Serv., Inc., 24 F.E.R.C. ¶ 63,119, at 65,209 (1983) (holding that a state can impose a system
avoided cost determination on a multistate system and that, in response, a multistate system can
localize the effect of the avoided cost determination by allocating the cost of purchases from
Qualifying Facilities to the purchasing utility).
403. Id. at 61,188 (describing Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's intervention, based on
an interest in the legality of the six-cent minimum rate imposed on it as a New York utility, even
though it could purchase power at a lesser rate from QFs in Pennsylvania).
404. Id. at 61,190, 61,193 (stating that petitioners do not challenge the validity of New
York's six-cent rate, but rather, question whether the rate can be applied to their purchases).
The petitioners objected to this broadening of the issue beyond that raised in their petition. Pe-
titioners did not contest the application of the precedent of Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.,
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 472 N.E.2d 981 (N.Y. 1984).
405. 18 C.F.R. § 385.217 (allowing summary disposition of issues of law).
406. Compare 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,196 (1998) with FERC, Notice of Proposed Rule-
making RM88-6-000, in FERC Statutes and Regulations ¶ 32,457 (1988).
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rate in excess of avoided cost on any wholesale power purchase in in-
terstate commerce. However, the decision was stayed and never en-
forced by FERC, or elsewhere, until 1995.
FERC also found that the Federal Power Act precludes all state
regulation of interstate wholesale transactions.407 FERC held that
prior to the enactment of PURPA, states were preempted under the
Federal Power Act from setting wholesale rates in interstate com-
merce.408 This decision was intended to limit the effect of the exemp-
tions under section 210(e), thus reinstating the preemptive effect of
the Federal Power Act on all state regulation.
This decision precludes the exercise of state authority to set
wholesale rates in interstate commerce exceeding avoided cost on
purchases by either multi-state utilities, such as O&R, or utilities that
operate exclusively in one state under authority alleged to be inde-
pendent of PURPA.409 Under FERC’s position, neither New York nor
another state can impose a rate exceeding avoided cost on any QF or
other wholesale power purchases in interstate commerce.410 The
commission held that a sale to O&R for distribution to O&R’s affili-
ates in other states is a sale in interstate commerce, thereby rejecting
New York’s argument that they could avoid the multistate effect of
their minimum rate.411
407. 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,195 (1988) (finding that, independent of PURPA, the Fed-
eral Power Act precludes the exercise of state authority setting wholesale rates in interstate
commerce, thus preempting wholesale rates in interstate commerce which exceed avoided cost).
In a footnote, FERC qualifies the scope of the impact of its order:
"We take no position herein as to what independent authority, if any, states have in the absence
of the Federal Power Act, and the extent to which they would be barred by the Commerce
Clause from setting QF rates which affect interstate commerce. Our opinion here is directed at
interpreting the statutes under which the commission operates, not these broader issues." Id. at
61,195 n.10.
408. Id. at 61,195 (finding that the Federal Power Act preempts states from setting whole-
sale rates in interstate commerce).
409. Id. at 61,196 (clarifying that "[u]nder [FERC's] new position, states cannot in the future
impose rates exceeding avoided costs on purchases by either multistate utilities such as the
O&R system or utilities that operate exclusively in one state."). FERC eliminated any possibil-
ity that the states can impose rates exceeding avoided cost on wholesale purchases in interstate
commerce stating that "[i]t is beyond dispute that the states cannot impose rates exceeding
avoided cost in implementing the FERC's rules under 210(a) of PURPA." Id. at 61,194.
410. Id. at 61,194 (holding "that New York may not impose a rate exceeding avoided cost on
future purchases by [O & R]"); see also Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S.
453 (1972) (holding that a sale of electricity is in interstate commerce if the electricity is trans-
mitted through an interstate transmission grid).
411. 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,195 (citing Fla. Power & Light, Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972) for
the proposition that "a sale of electricity is in interstate commerce if the electricity is transmit-
ted through an interstate transmission grid").
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The commissioners of FERC were sharply divided. FERC
Commissioner Anthony G. Sousa concurred with the majority posi-
tion, and in a strongly worded opinion argued that the states have
never had, nor could be given by the commission, the authority to set
rates above avoided cost for wholesale purchases in interstate com-
merce.412 Commissioner Sousa argued that the New York rates were
merely a subsidy for cogenerators and small power producers and to
promote this would thwart the congressional objective in PURPA of
preventing consumer subsidies of QFs.413 In his opinion, Commis-
sioner Sousa quickly closed any doors to the possibility of state in-
volvement in QF wholesale rates.414 Commissioner Sousa argued that
PURPA authorizes the commission to delegate to the states the
authority to set rates for purchases from QFs, but that authority is
federal authority delegated to the states, and not any inherent state
authority.415 Finally, Commissioner Sousa addressed the unaccept-
ability of the position that § 210(e) gave the commission both the
authority to enable states to regulate interstate wholesale rates above
412. Id. at 61,197-61,199 (Sousa, Anthony G., Commissioner, concurring) (arguing that
F.E.R.C. does not have discretion to allow states to set rates higher than costs avoided). Com-
missioner Sousa relies upon Middle South Services, Inc., 33 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,408, at 61,788 (1985),
stating that:
PURPA authorizes the Commission to delegate to the states the authority to set rates
for purchases from QFs. But that authority is federal authority delegated to the states;
and not any inherent state authority. In sum, if states have any authority to set rates
exceeding avoided costs for QF purchases that authority must derive from PURPA.
And it doesn't. Nowhere does PURPA either explicitly or implicitly give the states that
authority.
43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,197 (internal citations omitted).
413. Id. at 61,199 (arguing that the New York regulations were in conflict with the congres-
sional intent of PURPA to prevent consumer subsidies of QFs). Commissioner Sousa believed it
was clear that rates exceeding avoided cost thwarted the congressional objective of PURPA to
prevent consumer subsidy to QFs. Id. at 61,199. Sousa based this position on the belief that this
was a purely legal question (as opposed to a policy decision) of interpreting PURPA and the
Federal Power Act. Id. at 61,197
414. Id. at 61,197 (citing H.R.REP. NO. 95-1750, at 98 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7797, 7832 for the conclusion that the commission is "obligated to be faithful to the objective of
Congress that utility ratepayers not be required . . . to subsidize cogenerators or small power
producers"). Commissioner Sousa relied on the Conference Committee Report that the legisla-
tive history of PURPA supports the conclusion that the avoided costs limit "is meant to act as
an upper limit on the price at which utilities can be required under this section to purchase elec-
tric energy". 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,198 (arguing that the states may not set wholesale QF
rates).
415. Id. at 61,197 (citing Nantahala Power Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986), for the
conclusion that the commission has exclusive jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act to regu-
late wholesale rates and extrapolating that without PURPA "states would not have authority to
set rates for wholesale QF transactions in interstate commerce").
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the avoided cost limit and then, in the same section, decided to give
the commission the discretion to undo that limit.416
In Commissioner Charles Stalon’s concurring opinion, he argued
that Commissioner Sousa’s course of action was too strict; Stalon
would allow a looser interpretation based on a policy decision.417 The
basis for this decision was Stalon’s belief that in 1980, the rationale
for FERC’s decision had two distinct goals regarding section 210(e):
(1) to promote QFs by creating an obligation on the utilities to pur-
chase QF power at rates that would encourage QF development but
would also be “just and reasonable” to the utility’s customers and (2)
to exempt QFs in whole or in part from utility regulation.418 Stalon
believed that the priority of these goals had shifted as the QF industry
came of age and no longer needed the competitive advantage of fur-
ther subsidies.419
Commissioner Charles Trabant dissented from the Commission’s
decision as both a matter of policy and as a matter of law. Commis-
sioner Trabant’s dissent argued that the majority’s decision would set
a generic national precedent affecting many state laws substantially
similar to the New York statute without having to go through the
proper procedural approach.420 Trabant concluded that the congres-
416. Id. at 61,198 (arguing that section 210(e) did not give the Commission authority to en-
able states either to regulate interstate wholesale rates independent of PURPA or to set rates
above the avoided cost limit and that holding otherwise would be holding that Congress estab-
lished the avoided cost limit and then gave the Commission the discretion to repeal that limit
"in the same breath"); see also Pub. Utils. Comm'n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273
U.S. 83, 90 (1927) (holding that under the Commerce Clause, the states have no authority to
regulate interstate wholesale rates, thereby restraining state regulation of interstate commerce
even in the absence of federal regulation).
417. 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067, at 61,199-61,199-17 (Stalon, Charles G., Commissioner, concur-
ring). Commissioner Stalon argued that the basis for his decision not to allow the New York
minimum rate was founded on the belief that the industry condition in 1988 did not warrant
permitting the sort of blanket subsidies for all forms of QF power that the commission had
found appropriate in 1980. Stalon argued that its decision does not preclude the commission at
some future time from permitting blanket subsidies of QFs again, should it believe such subsi-
dies were warranted by changing circumstances, e.g., an urgent national need to bring on more
QF power in a hurry. Id. at 61,199-16,199-17.
418. Id. at 61,199-4, 61,199-5 (Stalon, Charles G., Commissioner, concurring) (stating that
the promulgation of rules under § 210 gave the Commission two distinct tasks: ensuring a viable
market for QFs through a regulatory guarantee and exempting QFs in whole or in part from the
public utility regulations).
419. Id. at 61,199-12 (Stalon, Charles G., Commissioner, concurring) (discussing the policy
behind § 210 and arguing that, regardless of the need for QF subsidies in 1980, they were unnec-
essary in 1988).
420. Id. at 61,199-200 (Trabandt, Charles A., Commissioner, dissenting) (stating "I object to
the obvious intent of the order in this complaint proceeding to set a generic national precedent
applicable to many state laws substantially similar to the New York statute preempted here.").
040704 FERREY.DOC 04/26/04  10:58 AM
2003] NOTHING BUT NET 99
sional exemption authority permitted the commission to declare that
cogenerators and small power producers would not become utilities,
with all the regulatory burdens that non-utility status would bring,
simply because they took advantage of PURPA. Commissioner Tra-
bant believed that section 210(e) has nothing to do with the question
at hand; thereby eliminating the preemptive issue for the states and
allowing them to raise rates that would exceed the utility’s avoided
cost.421
By broadly prohibiting any state from imposing a rate exceeding
avoided cost on any wholesale power purchase in interstate com-
merce, the Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. decision radically altered
the states’ perceived power to determine the avoided cost for the
utilities under their jurisdictions. However, less than two months
later, FERC stayed its decision pending judicial review and comple-
tion of a rulemaking proceeding initiated to address the issue of QF
pricing, FERC never enforced the Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc.
decision.422 In 1989, the New York legislature repealed the state sub-
sidy statute, thus making appeal to the Second Circuit moot and
leaving the issue of QF pricing unsettled.
Subsequently, Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. has been cited
approximately a half-dozen times, receiving negative treatment in
both the federal and state courts.423
Commissioner Trabant argued that the proper procedural approach would be in a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) subject to comment under the Administrative Procedures Act.
See id. (stating "[i]f the Commission is persuaded that such generic impact on similar state laws
is appropriate . . . the proper procedural approach would be in a Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing (NOPR) . . .").
421. Id. at 61,202-03 (arguing that § 210(e) or PURPA authorizes the Commission to use
regulations to exempt QFs from the Federal Power Act, the Public Utilities Holding Company
Act, and state laws respecting rates or financial or organizational regulation of electric utilities
in order to encourage cogeneration and small power production). "[N]owhere did Congress ad-
dress the preemption question in considering the commission's exemption authority. Congress
dealt with the much narrower problem of how not to fetter QFs by subjecting them to the rigors
of utility regulation." Id. at 61,203.
422. 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,547 (1988) (staying the decision in Orange & Rockland, 43 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,067 (1988) pending judicial review or until the Commission determines that a stay is no
longer necessary). In February 1989, the Second Circuit dismissed an appeal of the FERC deci-
sion on the grounds of ripeness pending conclusion of the FERC rulemaking. Orange & Rock-
land, 43 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,067 (1988), appeal dismissed sub nom. Occidental Chem. Corp. v.
F.E.R.C., 869 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1989).
423. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Utilities Comm'n v. North Carolina Power, 450 S.E.2d 896 (N.C.
1994).
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b. Connecticut Light & Power Co.
FERC subsequently reached the issue of a state forcing a utility
to purchase wholesale power at its retail rate, which is what is pre-
sented in the net metering issue. In January 1995, in Connecticut
Light & Power Co., FERC clarified the limits of state authority under
PURPA.424 In fact, FERC in MidAmerican purported to rely on Con-
necticut Light & Power Co. to ground its policy. The analysis under-
taken above reveals a different precedent.
The Connecticut legislature had enacted the Municipal Rate
Statute that required utilities to purchase electric energy generated by
a resource recovery facility owned or operated by or for the benefit of
a municipality “at the same rate the electric [utility] charges the mu-
nicipality . . . for electricity”.425 The statute applied only to munici-
pally-owned facilities and gave preferences only to resource recovery
facilities.426 The Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control
ruled that Connecticut Light & Power Company (CL&P) was re-
quired to purchase the electricity generated at the Preston Facility at
a rate that is the same as CL&P’s retail rate.427 CL&P appealed the
Connecticut Commission’s rate determination to the Connecticut Su-
preme Court, which held that since the Preston Facility is a municipal
resources recovery facility under the Municipal Rate Statute, CL&P
is required to purchase the facility’s electric energy at the same rate
the electric utility charges the municipality.428
424. Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,012 (1995) (concluding "[i]n sum, as ex-
plained above, insofar as the Municipal Rate Statute at issue here may require rates for sales by
QFs . . . at wholesale that exceed avoided costs, the statutes is to that extent preempted.").
425. Id. at 61,024 (citing CONN GEN. STAT. § 16-243e). "A resource recovery facility is de-
fined as "a facility utilizing processes aimed at reclaiming the material or energy values from
solid wastes." Id. at 61,024 n.22 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-260(11).
426. Only 70% of the municipal solid waste at issue for the Preston resource recovery facil-
ity came from municipalities served by Connecticut Light & Power Company, the utility which
would purchase the electricity generated by the facility. Thirty percent of the trash for the facil-
ity came from communities outside of the utility's service territory. Id. at 61,025 (citing Conn.
Light & Power Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 554 A.2d 1089 (Conn. 1989)). Thus, while the
facility was owned by a municipality in the service territory of the purchasing utility, the waste
was not generated exclusively from communities in that service territory. Id. at 61,025. There-
fore, the utility was paying a generous rate to assist communities not within its service territory,
because of the peculiarities of the Preston Facility waste stream. Id. at 61,025.
430  Id. at 61,024.
428. Conn. Light & Power Co., 554 A.2d at 1093 (finding "[T]he special rate to be paid by
the electric company . . . is the same rate that it charges the municipality for electricity."); see
also Conn. Light & Power Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,012, at 61,025 (1995) (discussing the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court's decision).
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CL&P requested that the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut issue a declaratory order that the Connecticut statute
was preempted by section 210 of PURPA because the rate that the
statute prescribed exceeded CL&P’s avoided cost. The District Court
refused to hear CL&P’s petition and ruled that the preemption issue
should be decided by FERC.429 CL&P then filed for a declaratory or-
der by FERC.
FERC decided that pursuant to the Federal Power Act, it, and
not the states, had exclusive jurisdiction over QF power sale prices.430
FERC then delegated to the states the authority to approve the exact
price for QF power sales.431 State authority is subject to federal law
and regulations and limited to implementing QF prices.432
In Connecticut Light & Power Co., FERC held that Connecti-
cut’s Municipal Rate Statute overstepped traditional state jurisdic-
tional boundaries, and was preempted by §210 of PURPA.433 FERC
clarified numerous issues in this opinion. First, it certified that it
would not entertain requests to invalidate preexisting contracts be-
tween the utility and any QF. However, “if parties are required by
state law or policy to sign contracts that reflect rates for QF sales at
429. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Southeastern Conn. Reg'l Res. Recovery Auth., 822 F.
Supp. 888, 890-92 (D. Conn. 1993) (holding that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the
matter should be referred to F.E.R.C. because it is "'beyond the conventional experience of
judges'") (citations omitted).
430. 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,012, at 61,027 (1995) (holding "[f]or QFs, jurisdiction over rates for
sales at wholesale is vested in this Commission. PURPA expressly directed this Commission,
and not the states, to prescribe rules governing QF rates."). In the Connecticut matter, the price
had been deliberately set above the full avoided cost.
431. Id. at 61,027-28 (holding that "PURPA gave the states responsibility only for 'imple-
ment[ing]' the Commission's rules. That is, a state may prescribe a particular per unit charge
only if it does so in accordance with the Commission's rules.").
432. Id. at 61,027-28.
433. Id. at 61,031 (concluding "[i]n sum . . . the Municipal Rate Statute . . . may require rates
for sales by QFs . . . at wholesale that exceed avoided cost, [and] the statute is to that extent
preempted.").
In determining whether the Municipal Rate Statute is preempted by federal law, we
[the Commission] must distinguish among the different facilities and sellers to which
the statute may apply: (1) QFs; (2) public utilities; and (3) entities that are neither QFs
nor public utilities (including states and their subdivisions, agencies, authorities, in-
strumentalities, etc.). . .In the case of QFs, the Commission has authority under
PURPA to regulate how rates for QF sales at wholesale will be determined.
Id. at 61,027 (holding "[f]or QFs, jurisdiction over rates for sales at wholesale is vested in this
Commission").
"Although states may set the ultimate per unit (kW and/or kWh) charges for QF sales at
wholesale, they may do so only in accordance with this Commission's regulations." Id. at 61,027-
28 (holding that "PURPA gave the states responsibility only for 'implement[ing]' the Commis-
sion's rules. That is, a state may prescribe a particular per unit charge only if it does so in accor-
dance with the Commission's rules.").
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wholesale rates that are in excess of avoided costs, those contracts will
be considered void ab initio.”434 Second, Connecticut Light & Power
Co. firmly reinforced the Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. decision
by upholding the supremacy of FERC to control the avoided cost
purchase rates, and the premise that PURPA preempts state efforts
to establish QF rates at higher than the utility’s avoided cost.435
FERC also defined some of the limits of its jurisdiction, stating
that some wholesale sales in interstate commerce—those made by
states or their subdivisions or agents—do not fall under FERC juris-
diction.436 Finally, the commission held that wholesale QF rates can-
not both be capped by full avoided cost and exceed the avoided cost
cap.437
The Connecticut Light & Power Co. decision established FERC’s
preemption preeminence with regard to the issue of state efforts to
implement QF rates higher than a utility’s avoided cost. FERC ac-
knowledged that it did not have authority over facilities that are not
selling at wholesale.438 Nonetheless, Connecticut Light & Power Co.
essentially presented the net metering situation. Unless CL&P’s
forced sale to the utility can be distinguished from a net metering
forced transfer to a utility, Connecticut Light & Power Co. would
seem to have prevented the practice. It undercuts rather than sup-
ports FERC’s net metering position.
Connecticut Light & Power Co. has been cited approximately a
dozen times in a number of federal and state courts, receiving both
positive and negative treatment.439 Positive treatment supports both
434. Id. at 61,030.
435. Id. at 61,027-61,028 (asserting that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over set-
ting QF wholesale rates and noting that PURPA "sets full avoided cost as the maximum rate the
Commission may prescribe.").
436. Id. at 61,027 (1995) (stating:
[i]n the case of facilities that are not QFs, but where the capacity and energy is sold by
public utilities at wholesale in interstate commerce, the Commission has exclusive
authority to set the rates. With respect to facilities that are not QFs and where the ca-
pacity and energy is sold by non-public utilities, this Commission does not have
authority to set rates.).
437. Id. at 61,028 (stating "[t]he commission's regulations, in turn, expressly provide that
'[n]othing in [the Commission's regulations] requires any electric utility to pay more than the
avoided cost for purchases" (citing 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(2) (1994)); accord Williams Natural
Gas Co., 47 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,308, at 62,103 and n.9 (1989).
438. 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,012, at 61,030 (stating that "facilities and sellers that are neither QFs
nor public utilities selling at wholesale in interstate commerce . . . rates for such sales are not
within this Commission's authority"). The commission did not reach the question of QF sales at
retail since the Municipal Rate Statute applied only to sales for resale and not to sales at retail.
439. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Co. v. F.E.R.C., 162 F. Supp. 2d 107, 117-18
(N.D.N.Y. 2001); Rosebud Enters. v. State PUC, 917 P.2d 766 (Idaho 1996).
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the affirmation of preexisting contracts and the preemption of states
imposing rates in excess of avoided cost.440 However, the negative
treatment clarifies state roles in determining and setting terms of QF
purchase and sale agreements441 and the setting of avoided costs
prices.442
c. Independent Energy Producers
In February 1994, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its
pivotal decision in the Independent Energy Producers Assoc. case.443
This case addressed the issue of state discretion to regulate QF
wholesale power sales. State authority was preempted.
The challenge was brought by the Trade Association of Inde-
pendent Power Producers against the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) to prevent the Commission from delegating to
the utilities authority to enforce federal operating and efficiency re-
quirements of PURPA and FERC regulations. The district court
granted summary judgment and held that federal law did not preempt
the CPUC’s program.444
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s decision and
held that the CPUC’s program, authorizing electric utilities to moni-
tor QFs and make QF status determinations intruded into an area of
exclusively federal regulation and was preempted under the Federal
Power Act.445 The CPUC’s program to allow the utilities to disconnect
440. In re Megan-Racine Assocs., 102 F.3d 671 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that FERC reaffirms
that the agency recanted – federal law does preempt states from setting rates higher than the
utilities' avoided cost but declined to enforce this order retroactively).
441. See, e.g., W. Penn Power Co., 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,153, at 61,495 (1995):
It is up to the States, not the Commission, to determine the specific parameters of in-
dividual QF power purchase agreements, including the date at which a legally enforce-
able obligation is incurred under State law. Similarly, whether the particular facts ap-
plicable to an individual QF necessitate modification of other terms and conditions of
the QF's contract with the purchasing utility is a matter for the states to determine.
442. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 74 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,179, at 61,629 (1996) (holding
that states can impose procedures for determining rates for QFs, thus circumventing PURPA-
imposed avoided costs caps on QF rates and asserting that, although a tax is acceptable, any at-
tempt to force utilities to pay more than avoided costs would be unacceptable).
443. Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 36 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 1994).
444. Id. at 850. The California Public Utilities Commission program contained three sepa-
rate issues; (1) the California Public Utilities Commission program authorized electric utilities
to monitor PURPA QFs for compliance with the federal operating and efficiency standards; (2)
the program also enabled utilities to disconnect from parallel operation QFs not in compliance
with the federal operating and efficiency standards; and (3) the California Public Utilities
Commission program required PURPA QFs to submit for monitoring, operating date to electric
utilities. See id. at 852-853 (discussing the CPUC programs).
445. Id. at 849; see also Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (2000). 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a
and 824e provide that any person who owns or operates facilities used to transmit or sell electric
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from the non-complying QFs was held to violate PURPA. With the
CPUC’s designation of a QF as “non-complying,” the QF received an
“alternative” avoided cost rate equal to only 80% of the utilities’
avoided cost for short term economy energy. This denied QFs one of
the benefits to which they are statutorily entitled under PURPA, re-
sulting in the effective de-certification of the QF. The court held that
QFs are entitled to receive the full-avoided cost rates, and not a rate
that is less than full.446
However, the third CPUC program that required QFs to submit
monitoring and operating data to electric utilities was not preempted
by PURPA. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that
PURPA delegates to the states broad authority to implement section
210 of the statute.447 The court’s holding attempts to clarify both the
federal and state roles by setting out clear areas where state authority
remains under PURPA. In Southern California Edison, Co., discussed
below, FERC attempted to do the same.
Taking Independent Energy Producers Assoc. forward reveals
that this decision has been cited twenty-five times in non-FERC fed-
eral and state decisions not related to that case, receiving basically
positive treatment.448 Courts have consistently upheld the conclusions
found by the court of appeals restricting state discretion and pre-
venting state-authorized payments to generators that exceed avoided
cost.449
energy in interstate commerce at wholesale is subject to the jurisdiction and regulatory power of
the commission. In 1978, Congress enacted PURPA, which amends the Federal Power Act.
446. Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n, 36 F.3d at 854-55 (holding "QFs are entitled to receive
the full avoided cost rates provided in the QF's standard offer contract, 18 C.F.R. § 292.304, and
not a rate that is 80% (or less than 80%) of the full avoided cost rate) (emphasis in original). In
other words, the state may set the actual charge for power sale, as long as it does so in accor-
dance with the full-avoided cost FERC rule. See id. Full-avoided cost is the "maximum rate that
the Commission may prescribe." Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 461 U.S. 402, 413
(1983).
447. Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n, 36 F.3d at 856 (holding that "the states play the pri-
mary role in calculating avoided costs and in overseeing the contractual relationship between
QFs and utilities operating under the regulations promulgated by F.E.R.C.").
448. See, e.g., Freehold Cogeneration Ass'n, L.P. v. Bd. of Regulatory Comm'rs of N.J., 44
F.3d 1178 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing and following Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n positively); N. Am.
Natural Res., Inc. v. Strand, 252 F.3d 808, 815 (6th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing Indep. Energy Pro-
ducers Ass'n.).
449. See, e.g., N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Saranac Power, 117 F. Supp. 2d 211, 237
(N.D.N.Y 2000) (citing Indep. Energy Producers Ass'n for the proposition that "QFs are enti-
tled to 'lock in' energy sales at an avoided cost rate calculated at the time the contract is signed,
even if the utilities' costs are lower than estimated at the time the energy is delivered.").The
court recognized that at times the avoided cost might be higher or lower than the contract price.
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d. Southern California Edison Co.
In June 1995, FERC issued its Southern California Edison Co.450
order. The issue before FERC was whether the CPUC could require
utilities to purchase significant amounts of unneeded QF power. In
this decision, FERC responded not only to the legal issue analogous
to net metering, but also attempted to define areas of state authority.
FERC attempted to clarify its views on the scope of state
authority, both under and outside of PURPA. FERC held that “[a]
state may not . . . set avoided cost rates or otherwise adjust bids of po-
tential suppliers by imposing environmental adders or subtractors
that are not based on real costs that would be incurred by the utili-
ties.”451 FERC held that the California commission failed to consider
all sources of generation capacity in determining the avoided cost of
the purchasing utilities, thereby setting a rate for renewable energy
projects exceeding the utility’s true avoided cost and violating
PURPA.452
FERC suggested that the states have a number of ways to en-
courage renewable technologies other than causing utilities to pay in
excess of their avoided cost. One alternative FERC proposed is for
the state, through legislation, to order the utilities to build renewable
generators or simply purchase renewable generation.453 FERC also
See id. (stating "QFs are entitled to rely on purchase rates in long term [power purchase agree-
ments] even if they violate PURPA's long term rate cap.").
450. S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,269 (1995).
451. Id. at 62,080. In its decision, FERC never defined a "real" environmental cost to a util-
ity. FERC does, however, provide an example of how to increase the utilities' avoided cost: "[A]
state may impose a tax or other charge on all generation produced by a particular fuel, and thus
increase the costs which would be incurred by the utilities in building and operating plants that
use that fuel." Id. at 62,080.
452. Id. at 62,075 (summarizing that "the California Commission, by failing to consider all
sources of generation capacity in determining the avoided cost of purchasing utilities, violated
the directives of section 210 of PURPA and this Commission's implementing regulations"). The
California Commission's process in determining avoided costs for electric utility's involved a
three-step process:
First, following the latest projections of energy and capacity needs of California utili-
ties made by the California Energy Commission, the utilities filed a resource plan iden-
tifying potential resource additions. The California Commission. . .determined what
new resources the utilities would add. Second,. . .the California Commission deter-
mined the utilities' assumed costs, known as 'benchmark prices,'. . .and determined
which of these resource additions could be avoided. Third, QFs were then allowed to
bid against the utilities' benchmark prices for each of the avoided resources. The win-
ning bidders were paid the price bid by the second lowest bidder with respect to each
avoided resource.
Id. at 62,075.
453. This is done with more than a dozen states enacting renewable portfolio standards or
trust funds. See FERREY, supra note 53, § 10:109 (stating "[a]s of 2000, 15 states had adopted
either or both of the system benefit charge/trust fund and/or the renewable energy portfolio
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suggested that the states can encourage renewables by altering their
tax structures to provide a tax on fossil fuel generators or a tax incen-
tive to the utilities to buy renewable energy. Each of these is a non-
rate mechanism.
FERC then alluded to the possibility that states may have some
flexibility in establishing the avoided cost rate. In its decision, FERC
stated, “a state may account for environmental costs of all fuel
sources included in an all source determination of avoided cost.”454
“This means that environmental costs, if they are real costs that
would be incurred by utilities, may be accounted for in a determina-
tion of actual avoided cost rates.”455
This federal court precedent is important for declaring wholesale
rates in excess of actual avoided cost as impermissible tools to further
renewable energy. Southern California Edison Co. has been cited
seventeen times in both federal and state decisions and generally has
received approval.456 Most of its citation deals directly with states’ at-
tempts to adjust avoided cost rates not in accord with PURPA.457
FERC is aware that net metering results in a higher valuation of
the power transfer (to the utility) transaction than that embodied in
the wholesale avoided cost rate. FERC conceded in MidAmerican
that avoided costs normally are less than retail rates, citing Cuero
Hydroelectric, Inc. v. City of Cuero, Texas,458 North Little Rock Co-
standard"). For a discussion of options available to the states for the promotion of renewable
energy and demand-side management after deregulation of retail service options. See id. at §§
10:93-10:138.
454. See S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, at 61,676 (1995).
455. S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,269, at 62,080.
456. See, e.g., In re Megan-Racine Assoc., 198 B.R. 650, 656 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Fed. Deposit Ins. Comm'n v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (In re:
Morgan-Racine Assoc.), 102 F.3d 671 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing, inter alia, S. Cal. Edison, Co., 71
F.E.R.C. ¶61,269 (1995), for the proposition that:
F.E.R.C. has cast doubt on two aspects of the Con-Ed holding that PURPA preempted
states from imposing rates in excess of avoided cost but declining to enforce this order
retroactively. Indicating in dicta that states can require utilities to purchase power from
alternative energy facilities that are not QFs.).
457. S. Cal. Edison Co., 71 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,269 (1995) has also been cited in a law review arti-
cle. See Rudy Perkins, Note: Electricity Deregulation, Environmental Externalities and the Limi-
tations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1023 n. 240-42 (1998) (discussing S. Cal. Edison Co. and its
effect on the California Public Utilities Commission's policy decisions). In FERC's decision, it
noted that PURPA set the utilities' incremental or avoided cost at the maximum rate at which a
utility would be required to purchase power from a QF. To use environmental adders equaling
rates exceeding the incremental costs to the utility is in violation of PURPA. FERC did not ob-
ject, however, to states using numerous other ways external to PURPA.
458. In Cuero Hydroelectric, Inc. v. City of Cuero, Tex., 77 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,114 (1996), the
commission found that the city was correct in basing the rate it pays QF (Cuero Hydro) on the
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generation, L.P. and Power Systems, Ltd. v. Energy Services, Inc., and
Arkansas Power & Light Company.459 Avoided costs include only the
wholesale acquisition costs of the electric commodity. Net metering
reverses the retail meter, which registers the fully loaded commodity
cost, transmission and distribution expense, any stranded costs,460 and
various taxes and surcharges.
Analyzing the cases cited by FERC to support these premises,
none offers the support for which FERC cites them. FERC insists
that net metering does not involve a “sale,” yet the QF or other
power producer can send excess power to the utility without the util-
ity’s consent or control as to time or amount, which certainly consti-
tutes a forced exchange. If electricity were so tangible as to be capa-
ble of storage, like natural gas and oil, this would not be an issue: A
gallon of fuel today has the same energy content and fungibility as a
gallon of fuel tomorrow.
However, electricity is unique: Electricity cannot be stored effi-
ciently. If not consumed instantly, it is grounded and lost.461 It has no
shelf life. Its value fluctuates dramatically by more than 200% across
the hours in a typical day.462 Therefore, a QF or other seller exchang-
ing power to the utility after midnight, when that power has its least
value and may not be capable of resale and thus valueless, does not
have the same market value as a QF taking power from a utility at
noon when the marginal cost of power is high. Yet, net metering val-
ues each transaction at the same rate. In either direction through the
rate it pays its full requirements supplier (Lower Colorado), which is avoided cost. The case
states that the "avoided cost of an all-requirement utility should be adjusted to reflect the
avoided cost of the supplying utility," which could very well be below retail rates. See id. at
61,442-43 (quoting City of Longmount, Colo., 39 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,301, at 61,974 (1987)).
459. In North Little Rock Cogeneration, L.P. and Power Systems, Ltd. v. Energy Services,
Inc., and Arkansas Power & Light Company, 72 FERC ¶ 61,263 (1995), the petitioners argued
rates in an existing power sale agreement were unreasonable and discriminatory. Id. at 62,170.
The city operated its own hydro unit, but purchased the remainder of power needed from an-
other supplier. Id. The petitioner was not selected as supplier and filed suit challenging the
agreement between the city and Arkansas Power because the agreement provided a rate that
was "discounted," and the QFs were unable to compete with lower rates. Id. FERC dismissed
the complaint, finding the rates reasonable.
460. See generally, Steven Ferrey, Exit Strategy: State Legal Discretion to Environmentally
Sculpt the Deregulating Electric Environment, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109 (2002) (discussing
stranded cost).
461. See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, 491-495
(2d. ed. 2001) ("If not used immediately surplus electricity warms the transmission lines, is
grounded, or overloads the circuits, but it does not work.").
462. See, e.g., www.iso-ne.com (last visited October 7, 2003) (showing the hourly price fluc-
tuations across any day in the New England Power Pool).
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retail meter, the electrons are accounted at the retail sale rate. To call
this transfer of electrons to the utility not a “sale” is to ignore the fact
that power is an instantaneous commodity with an ever-changing
marginal market value.
VI.  THE MODEL OF ELECTRIC FEDERALISM:
HANDS ON THE SWITCH
The substantive issue at the core of the net-metering debate is
whether or not net metering transactions are “sales.” In addition to
the substantive issue, there is a critical issue of whether the transac-
tions are subject to federal or state jurisdiction. If the transaction is
wholesale or in interstate commerce, it is subject to federal jurisdic-
tion and the states have no control. If the transaction is retail or solely
intrastate in nature, it is within state jurisdiction. While the determi-
nation of whether or not a “sale” occurs is critical for future on-site
distributed energy policy, the decision of whether federal or state
regulation governs has profound implications for those who will
sculpt future energy policy.
Here, somewhat ironically, in addressing this issue the state court
system declared it had no authority and the federal regulatory agency,
FERC, declared the federal government would stand back and allow
state law to control.
A. The Federal Power Act and Precedent
FERC regulates entirely wholesale power transactions. The Fed-
eral Power Act defines “sale of electric energy at wholesale” as any
sale to any person for resale.463 FERC also regulates power generation
to a limited degree,464 regulates power transmission in interstate
commerce,465 and regulates interstate power sales.466 “FERC’s jurisdic-
tion is plenary and extends to all . . . sales in interstate commerce.”467
FERC does not regulate the local distribution of power, power
solely in intrastate commerce, or the self-generation and use of
power.468 Section 212 of the Federal Power Act, as amended by the
463. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (2000).
464. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (stating that federal regulation extends only to those matters which
are not subject to regulation by the states).
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 344 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn. 1984).
468. See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 515, 523 (1945) (citing
Section 201(b) of the Federal Power Act as amended in 1935); City of Batavia v. F.E.R.C., 672
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Energy Policy Act of 1992, addresses retail sales of electricity. It con-
tains a prohibition on FERC orders inconsistent with any state law
that governs the retail marketing areas of electric utilities.469
Thus, the most common basis for FERC jurisdiction is a transac-
tion in interstate commerce. Section 201(c) of the Act defines electric
energy transmitted in interstate commerce as energy “transmitted
from a State and consumed at any point outside thereof . . . .”470 How-
ever, this provision has consistently been interpreted to mean that
FERC has jurisdiction when the system is interconnected and capable
of transmitting energy across the state boundary, even though the
contracting parties are in fact in one state. Similarly, the transmission
of power over a utility transmission grid that is used in interstate
commerce is subject to FERC jurisdiction, even when all parties to
the transaction are located within the same state.471
The legal meaning of “interstate commerce” is broad.472 Sales of
power that appear to be intrastate or local in character may be con-
sidered interstate for purposes of FERC jurisdiction. A utility, even if
it sold its power first to an intermediate utility that then places the
power in interstate commerce, may be regulated by FERC.473 FERC
jurisdiction can extend from the point of the power’s origin on the ba-
sis that the entire sale “affects [interstate] commerce.”474 There is no
statutorily or judicially imposed threshold amount of interstate sale of
power, which triggers FERC jurisdiction. Although the amount of
power an electric utility may place in interstate commerce is de mini-
mis compared to the same utility’s sales in intrastate commerce,
F.2d 64, 68 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that FERC regulates wholesale transactions and states
regulate retail transactions).
469. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).
470. 16 U.S.C. § 824(c).
471. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 475 (1972), (stating that
federal jurisdiction attaches even if the utility has no direct connection with another utility out-
side the state but is interconnected with another utility that in turn has interstate connections
with other utilities).
472. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(c) (stating "electric energy shall be held to be transmitted in inter-
state commerce if transmitted from a State and consumed at any point outside thereof").
473. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 430 F.2d 1377, 1385 (5th Cir. 1970),
rev'd on other grounds, 404 U.S. 453 (1972) (stating that the burden is on FERC to assert and
prove jurisdiction).
474. See Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 319 U.S. 61, 70-72 (1943)
(holding that where a New Jersey electric company transmitted the electricity through its line to
another company which transmitted the electricity to a New York company in interstate com-
merce, the flow of electricity from the New Jersey company would be subject to federal regula-
tion as affecting interstate commerce).
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FERC may assert its regulatory authority over such a utility.475 If a
small amount of interstate power is commingled with intrastate
power, the entire amount becomes “interstate” for purposes of vest-
ing FERC with the authority to exercise jurisdiction.476 Once FERC
exercised jurisdiction over a utility, the entire wholesale structure of
the entity’s operations becomes subject to FERC regulation.
Section 201(a) of the Federal Power Act prohibits infringement
of federal regulation on matters subject to regulation by the states.
Until now, the states have typically regulated bundled retail transmis-
sion services. First, a public utility’s facilities used to deliver electric
energy to a wholesale purchaser are subject to exclusive FERC juris-
diction.477 Second, a public utility’s facilities used to deliver electric
energy from the wholesale purchaser to the consumer are local distri-
bution facilities subject to the rate jurisdictions of the state.
It is clear that FERC has no jurisdiction “over facilities used in
local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in in-
trastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric
energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.”478 Thus, if an entity
transmits electricity from its own facility to itself, it should be subject
only to state jurisdiction. The Federal Power Act defines electricity
475. Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 209 n.5 (1964) (holding that
the fact that any out-of-state energy was de minimis in amount would be relevant only to the of
question whether Edison was a public utility over which the Federal Power Commission could,
in its discretion, assume jurisdiction); Ark. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 368 F.2d
376, 384 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding that the fact that the volume of interstate energy may be small
is a factor which Congress has left to the discretion of the Commission in determining whether
to exercise its jurisdiction).
476. United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 300 (1953) (stating that "the
fact that this electricity is transmitted across the state boundary over lines owned by the Navy
and by the County" is irrelevant); Pa. Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 343 U.S. 414,
419 (1952) (finding that the sales were in interstate commerce notwithstanding that 83% of its
sales were made to intrastate customers); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n,
376 F.2d 506, 508 (6th Cir. 1967) (stating that the commingling of interstate and intrastate gen-
erated electricity that flowed through the CG&E system was enough to sustain the FERC's ju-
risdiction); Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 375 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1967)
(finding that interstate energy entered all of the sales in question and commingled with PSCI-
generated energy); Ark. Power & Light Co., 368 F.2d at 394 (holding that the fact that the vol-
ume of interstate energy passing over Arkansas' transmission lines may be small compared to its
intrastate generated energy is a factor for FERC to determine whether to exercise its jurisdic-
tion); Wis.-Mich. Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 197 F.2d 472, 477-78 (7th Cir. 1952) (find-
ing that out-of-state energy does not shed its interstate commerce garb when, after arrival in
Wisconsin, it is continued in transmission and commingled with relatively larger quantities of
Wisconsin generated energy).
477. This jurisdiction is established by Sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act. 16
U.S.C. § 824(d)-(e).
478. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1).
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transmitted in interstate commerce as electricity “transmitted from a
State and consumed at any point outside thereof; but only insofar as
such transmission takes place within the United States.”479
U.S. Supreme Court case law establishes that FERC jurisdiction
results when electricity flows into or out of a state, and therefore in
interstate commerce, regardless of whether technically there is “sale”
in interstate commerce.480 The Court concluded that a utility, Jersey
Central Power & Light Co., had facilities that were utilized for trans-
mission of electric energy across state lines and therefore, that Jersey
Central Power & Light Co. was a public utility within the meaning of
Section 201(e) of the Federal Power Act.481
Therefore, FERC has jurisdiction only over transmission facili-
ties used in interstate commerce which are not facilities used in local
distribution. This is a two-part test: The facilities must be used in in-
terstate commerce and must not be local distribution facilities. While
establishing the principle, the Court did not define “local distribution
facility.”482 Where a utility operates two or more divisions in two or
more separate states and commingles energy that it supplies, it trans-
acts power in interstate commerce, and FERC has jurisdictional
authority over its facilities and rates.483
479. 16 U.S.C. § 824(c).
480. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 319 U.S. 61, 71 (1943) (citing
16 U.S.C. § 824(c)).
481. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 515, 536 (1945) (stating that
Congress has left to the FERC's sound administrative discretion to determine whether or not to
assert its authority in the situations where only about .2% of all the energy received and gener-
ated by the Company was transmitted out of the State). Even where the distribution systems of
the utility normally operate with intrastate transmission, just a few transactions make the trans-
mission system of the utility one which is engaged in interstate business. This establishes FERC
jurisdiction over the accounts of the utility. However, FERC jurisdiction does not extend to
utility lines used for local distribution; they are exempt from federal jurisdiction. Id. at 531. Re-
gardless of what the original source is for electric energy carried by local distribution facilities,
they are exempt under the Federal Power Act from FERC jurisdiction.
482. See United States v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 316 (1953) (stating that
facilities supplied 'local distribution' only after the current was subdivided for individual con-
sumers); Ark. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 368 F.2d 376, 383 (8th Cir. 1966)
(stating that there is no ground for the position that local distribution includes any transmission
occurring before the wholesaler who sells at retail is reached).
483. Wis.-Mich. Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 197 F.2d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 1952) (stating
that the jurisdiction attaches when the transmission from one state to another and sales in inter-
state commerce occur). The court rejected any notion that energy changed its form or character
for legal purposes when it was stepped down in voltage before reaching the wholesale purchas-
ers. Id. at 474. Instead, the court focused on the character of the transmission transaction—
whether it was wholesale or retail. There is some authority for this in the legislative history. See
H.R. REP. NO. 1318, at 7, 8, 27 (1935). This opinion equates the transmission of electric energy
in interstate commerce with the sale of energy at wholesale in interstate commerce. The FERC
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Where facilities are used only in intrastate distribution, they may
not be regulated by FERC: “matters largely of a local nature, even
though interstate in character, should be handled locally and should
receive the consideration of local [officials] familiar with the local
conditions in the communities involved.”484 Where a regulated utility’s
transmission and distribution system is solely within the borders of
one state and does not directly connect with any out-of-state utility, it
still may be deemed to be transmitting electric energy in interstate
commerce.485
FERC Rule 888 provides seven indicators, but hardly a “bright
line,” to distinguish between federally regulated transmission and lo-
cally regulated distribution of energy. According to FERC, local dis-
tribution facilities normally sit close to retail customers. Power flows
into a local distribution system and rarely, if ever, flows out. Power
entering a local system is used in a relatively small area.
However, even FERC is willing to concede that the transmission
from the utility in closest proximity to the end-user involves some lo-
cal distribution subject to state jurisdiction. This is, in part, because
some of these facilities will have been used for local retail distribu-
tion, regardless of whether legal elements change to make these
transactions wholesale transactions due to the changing nature of
electricity supply options in the future. Here, the technical character-
istics of the historic use of the line, as well as the functional legal re-
would disagree with such a definitional merger. FERC believes that it has separate jurisdiction
over either electricity transmitted in interstate commerce or electricity sold in interstate com-
merce. FERC relies on legislative history that it has jurisdiction over all interstate transmission
lines whether or not there is a sale of energy carried by those lines.
484. Duke Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 401 F.2d 930, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (quoting
testimony of the F.P.C. Commissioner Seavey before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, regarding the Federal Power Act). In this matter, Clemson University used facilities
of Duke Power Company to distribute electricity off-campus to customers in two counties who
were primarily university personnel. This involves seven miles of distribution line and 418 serv-
ice connections. Notwithstanding these retail connections within the service territory of a regu-
lated utility, these were deemed to be local distribution. This is an important decision in estab-
lishing state jurisdiction over local distribution facilities.
485. Fed. Power Comm'n v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 475 (holding that even
the indirect connection makes the transmission facilities of the ultimate utility in interstate
commerce because of the indirect interconnection where a utility connects with another utility
which is connected in interstate commerce). Effectively, power commingles in the bus that in-
terconnects these utilities. See City of Oakland, Cal. v. F.E.R.C., 754 F.2d 1378, 1378-79 (9th Cir.
1985) (stating "there is no dispute that the electricity sold to the Port Department flows inter-
state" where the Port Department purchased its electricity from the Pacific Gas & Electric
Company and resold 69% to airport tenants); Alexander v. F.E.R.C., 609 F.2d 543, 552 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (Wilkey, J., concurring) (suggesting that facilities transmit power for local distribution
only after current is subdivided for individual consumers).
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alities, are given effect. The result is not a “bright line” test; a case-by-
case determination must be made by the utility transmitter.486
B. Preemptive Federal Regulation of Power Sales and Terms
Does FERC jurisdiction preempt state regulation of wholesale
power transactions and prices? Where federal law occupies the field
and there is evidence of a pervasive federal scheme in a given area, by
inference, courts will find state or local legislation preempted.487 The
federal government does not have a pervasive need for national uni-
formity nor does it demonstrate pervasive federal interest in the area
of environmental regulation.488 “A federal decision to forego regula-
tion in a given area may imply an authoritative determination that the
area is best left unregulated, and in that event would have as much
preemptive force as a decision to regulate.”489 Even where there is no
congressional intent evident to federally occupy a field, the conflict
principle requires that a court strike inconsistent state or local law.490
State regulation is not allowed to veto the regulatory scheme of a su-
486. Utilities classify their lines differently. One utility may classify a 69kv line as a transmis-
sion facility, while another may classify it as a distribution facility. This depends on the size of
the utility, the size of its transmission facilities, and the size of traditional end use customers.
FERC would apply the following factors in determining on a case-by-case basis whether the fa-
cilities are transmission or distribution:
Local distribution facilities are normally in close proximity to retail customers;
Local distribution facilities are primarily radial in character;
Power flows into local distribution systems, it rarely, if ever, flows out;
When power enters a local distribution system, it is not reconsigned or transported on to some
other market;
Power entering a local distribution system is consumed in a comparatively limited geographical
area;
Meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface to measure flows into the local
distribution system; and
Local distribution systems will be carrying reduced voltage.
Id. at 285. While there is no bright line test, FERC has noted that facilities operating at greater
than 30kv are typically transmission and that facilities operating at less than 40kv typically are
distribution facilities. Id.
487. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (stating fed-
eral government occupied field of noise regulation for aircraft).
488. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327 (1981) (holding that "nothing in the Act
shall preclude States from adopting and enforcing limitations on the discharge of pollutants
more stringent than those adopted under the Act").
489. Ark. Elect. Coop. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 384 (1983).
490. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that Congress
may, by the choice of selective regulatory measures, have left the police power of the States un-
disturbed except as the state and federal regulations collide); See also Hill v. Florida ex rel. Wat-
son, 325 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1945) (holding that Section 4 of the Florida Act is repugnant to the
National Labor Relations Act regarding collective bargaining).
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perior level of government.491 Correspondingly, courts hold that
where state and federal laws complement each other, there is no pre-
emption.492 
Where the area of regulation is one traditionally reserved for lo-
cal or state police power, courts must exercise a strong presumption
against implied federal preemption in the absence of evidence of a
“clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” The Court will not pre-
sume that merely because Congress regulates in an “intricate and
complex” manner, even where that regulation is broadened repeat-
edly over the years, that preemption is implied by the legislature.
If a utility or independent power producer is subject to FERC ju-
risdiction and regulation, state regulation of the same operational as-
pects is preempted as a matter of federal law.493 Principles of preemp-
tion require a state regulatory agency to accept and pass through in
retail rates all cost items deemed by FERC to be “just and reason-
able,” and which are otherwise allowed.494 Therefore, a FERC deter-
mination regarding any aspect of a wholesale price is universally
binding.
The so-called “filed-rate doctrine” holds that state utility regula-
tory commissions may not second-guess or overrule on any grounds a
wholesale rate determination made pursuant to federal jurisdiction.495
491. See Granite Rock Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1077, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1985)
(holding that an independent state permit system to enforce state environmental standards that
would undermine the Forest Service's own permit authority is preempted).
492. See New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973) (holding
no preemption where complementary state and federal statutes exist); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 140 (1973) (upholding state policy absent conflict
with federal scheme). For some courts, even where the federal act is pervasive, local regulation
is permitted. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 447 (1960)
(holding that the fact that steam vessels were federally licensed to operate in navigable waters
did not preclude the city from enforcing as to such vessels its local smoke abatement ordinance).
493. E.g., Ark. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 368 F.2d 376, 384 (8th Cir. 1966)
(stating that federal regulation of sales for resale under Section 201 of the Federal Power Act
precludes concurrent state jurisdiction); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S.
953, 967 (1986) (holding that the North Carolina Utilities Commission action in allocating more
low-cost "entitlement power" than the amount allocated by the FERC in a wholesale rate-
making proceeding was preempted by federal law); In re New England Power Co., 424 A.2d
807, 812 (N.H. 1980) (stating that "Congress clearly expressed an intention to preempt the field
of regulation of rates charged in the interstate transmission of electricity").
494. In re Sinclair Mach. Prods., Inc., 498 A.2d 696, 699 (N.H. 1985).
495. Fed. Power Comm'n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 216 (1964) (holding that Con-
gress, in enacting the Federal Power Act, intended to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the FERC to
regulate interstate wholesale utility rates);. Narragansett Elec. Co., v. Burke, 381 A.2d 1358,
1361 (R.I. 1977) (recognizing federal preemption of state discretion on retail rate passthrough of
wholesale rated established pursuant to federal jurisdiction); Spence v. Smyth, 686 P.2d 597, 600
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The Supreme Court in 1986 and again in 1988 upheld the filed-rate
doctrine.496 The filed-rate doctrine extends to non-rate matters as
well.497 States, whether regulating QFs, independent power projects,
or public utilities, must defer to any validly exercised FERC regula-
tion.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “a federal agency acting
within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-
empt state regulation” and otherwise negate state and local laws.498
The Federal Power Act precludes all state regulation of interstate de-
termination reserved exclusively to federal authority, as articulated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in FERC v. Mississippi.499
To what degree can state authority control power transactions
and swaps in the deregulated power market? It is clear that the state
can regulate non-price aspects of the power sale market within state
boundaries.500 This discretion covers supply planning and energy con-
servation elements of the resource portfolio. The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that power needs, economies of scale, feasibility determina-
(Wyo. 1984) (relying on N. States Power Co. v. Hagen, 314 N.W.2d 32, 38 (N.D. 1981) (stating
that the North Dakota Public Service Commission has no direct jurisdiction over interstate
wholesale rates)). A state court in Pennsylvania announced the so-called "Pike County" excep-
tion, allowing states to review the prudence of utility wholesale purchases or allocations and
deny passthrough of FERC-approved wholesale costs. Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 465 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa. 1983) (holding that nothing in the federal legislation
preempts the PUC's authority to determine the reasonableness of a utility company's claimed
expenses).
496. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 963 (1986) ("This Court has
held that the filed rate doctrine applies not only to the federal-court review at issue in Montana-
Dakota, but also to decisions of state courts."); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel.
Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371-72 (1988) (holding that filed rate doctrine applies without exception to
state regulation of interstate holding companies). The Mississippi decision casts some doubt on
the vitality of the Pike County exception because it preempts a state prudency determination on
nuclear facility cost allocation to a subsidiary of an integrated multistate holding company, even
though FERC did not engage in such a prudency determination. The Mississippi decision may
be factually limited to the situation of multistate holding companies.
497. N. Natural Gas Co. v. Kan. Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1963) (extending the
filed rate doctrine generally to include most aspects of federal-state utility regulation); Nanta-
hala, 476 U.S. at 966-67 (stating that the filed rate doctrine is not limited to "rates" per se: "our
inquiry is not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms of prices or volumes of pur-
chases.")
498. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
499. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) (holding that it raises no problem
when the two challenged Titles simply condition continued state involvement in a preemptible
area on the consideration of federal proposals).
500. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cal. Energy Res. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983)
("[T]he States retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities
for determining questions of need, reliability, cost and other related state concerns.").
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tions, and services are traditionally areas of state regulation.501 Within
this general authority, states have regulated what can be sited, where
they can be sited, controlling environmental standards of plant opera-
tion, and the mix of demand-side and supply-side resources.
VII.  CONCLUSION
“It took me four days
To hitchhike from Saginaw
I’ve come to look for [Mid]America[n]”502
It is an odd journey to look for MidAmerican. Initially, the Iowa
courts ruled against Iowa, finding that state authority was federally
preempted. Thereafter, FERC ruled against the assertion of its fed-
eral jurisdiction, thereby upholding one of the most important renew-
able energy policies in the country.503 This policy has now swept into
thirty-eight states, and is the most potent renewable energy subsidy in
the nation.504
On the surface, this is a classic battle between federal and state
authority over different aspects of electric power transactions. The
federal government regulates all wholesale power sales, transactions
in interstate commerce, and transmission of power. The states regu-
late retail sales of power and basic terms of provision of retail service.
At what point does net metering and billing involve the sale of
electricity? The amount of power that can be transferred is a function
of state laws and regulations limiting type, size, and generator source.
There is no doubt that power physically is transferred to the local
utility, often at times when it does not wish to take the power, cannot
use the power, and/or must ground or dispose of the power. An actual
physical transfer or exchange of generated electrons and electric cur-
rent from the generator to the utility occurs at the discretion of the
generator. The utility takes title, pays for the electrons (or nets them
against others sold in the opposite direction to the generator), co-
mingles the electrons in its system, and resells them to other third
parties or disposes of them as it can.
Whether one deems electricity to be matter or energy, both a
physical and legal transfer has occurred having all the attributes of a
501. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cal. Energy Res. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983).
502. Paul Simon, America, on BOOKENDS (Columbia Records 1967) (with modification).
503. See supra, Section II.
504. MARK BOLLINGER, ET AL., CLEAN ENERGY FUNDS: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE
SUPPORT FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY vii (April 2001), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/
reports/47705.pdf.
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legal transfer in fee simple. Given that a contract or tariff amount is
required to be paid, netted, or bartered by the utility for such power,
this would seem to resemble a sale of either goods or services (de-
pending upon which a particular state deems electricity to be).505
When physical, legal, and financial transfer occurs, a “sale” occurs
under analogous precedent and definitions of “sale” provided by the
U.C.C., the general common law applied to services, and the Federal
Power Act. There also is no doubt that the transaction in dispute oc-
curs at the wholesale level, although it is netted against a retail sale.
However, FERC took a contrary position in MidAmerican,
holding that no sale technically occurs. Without a wholesale sale,
FERC does not have jurisdiction. In essence, FERC held states could
not recognize as a transaction what occurs on an instantaneous,
hourly, daily, or even weekly physical basis. Rather, it ruled that it is
within state authority only to recognize, through a single or dual me-
ter(s), once per billing period (typically monthly or quarterly), the net
result of the transfer of power to and from a distributed generator
and a local utility as a positive or negative retail sale. In other words,
it is legally permissible to take a snapshot on periodic occasion of the
net transactions between these two entities, and treat these snapshots
as the only point of “sale.” Put in proverbial form, if an electron is
transferred and no one records it, has it really been transferred? The
peculiar element in this holding is that FERC allows states to make
the “netting” decision, which at its core is a determination to rechar-
acterize instantaneous wholesale sales (FERC jurisdiction) as retail
sales (state jurisdiction). If FERC announced this in a generic rule-
making, this would be understandable policy. To do so on the MidA-
merican facts is awkward, at best.
FERC embeds the above proverb in its MidAmerican decision in
a leap of faith from a supposed springboard of precedent that does
not exist. It relies on precedent that does not support the general
propositions for which it is cited, and does not in any fashion address
net metering. Analyzing these decisions upon which FERC directly
relies in MidAmerican, as well as their own respective precedent, lays
even less foundation for the FERC decision. In fact, two decades of
FERC and federal court precedent prior to MidAmerican seems to
prescribe to the contrary; that states cannot cause a utility to take
505. For a discussion of the goods versus services distinction, see FERREY, supra note 53, §
10:76; FERREY, supra note 375, Ch. 12.
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power at the retail rate, which is several times more costly to the util-
ity than the wholesale.
Most of the entities now allowed by the thirty-eight states to en-
gage in net metering, are or could be QFs if they choose to certify
their projects, and are functionally equivalent to QFs in size, technol-
ogy, and sale of output to the utility. FERC has exclusive jurisdiction
over all wholesale transactions, whether by QFs under PURPA, or by
independent power projects under the Federal Power Act. Two dec-
ades of precedent regarding renewable energy projects selling power
to their utilities was created around QFs under the federal PURPA
statute and applied to any entities making a wholesale transaction in a
deregulated setting. The precedent suggests that a “sale” occurs in a
power exchange to a utility.
That said, there are various rationales to support renewable and
decentralized power at the state level. FERC could have taken a
more straightforward position and announced via a generic rulemak-
ing that it was choosing to forge or clarify new metering policy. It has
done this recently in rulemakings that establish a variety of new para-
digms for restructuring and deregulating the electric power industry.506
This would have been a more transparent and less confusing ap-
proach. To the contrary, FERC stretched precedent beyond its obvi-
ous application to support a contrived conclusion. Ultimately, this will
lead to more confusion and less precision, and perhaps reversal in a
case with different facts, undercutting continuity of FERC decisions
in the federal courts.
Net metering and billing policy is the most important of four na-
tional policies supporting the renewable energy industry initiatives in
the United States.507 In addition to net metering and billing, more than
a dozen states, among the approximately twenty states that have de-
regulated their electric power sectors, have elected to establish re-
newable portfolio standards and/or system benefit charges that sup-
port renewable energy trust funds.508 These two programs force retail
electric suppliers to include a proportion of renewable energy in their
supply mixes, and directly subsidize and underwrite renewable energy
projects at the state level, respectively.509 The fourth alternative policy
is the exemption of self-generation and cogeneration from so-called
506. Id.
507. See generally BOLLINGER, supra note 504 (surveying state action on renewable energy
sources).
508. See FERREY, supra note 53 §§ 10:95, 10.96.
509. Id.
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“exit fees” in many of the states.510 This provides a regulatory and fi-
nancial advantage to renewable energy or cogeneration projects that
seek to self-generate power.
However, among these four state-level renewable energy policy
initiatives, net metering and billing is not only the most pervasive
(adopted in thirty-six states) but also provides the most significant fi-
nancial advantage to generators.511 Net metering and billing guaran-
tees total electric output sale or netting and resultant revenue for an
eligible on-site generator, typically at two-to-four times the wholesale
price that it would otherwise receive for output sold to a utility pursu-
ant either to PURPA or the Federal Power Act. This guaranteed net
metered revenue stream trumps the impact of a one-time trust fund
subsidy, the avoidance of a one-time “exit fee,” and the requirement
that a small percentage of renewable power be included in each retail
supplier’s portfolio of power. Net metering and billing immediately
and constantly delivers substantially escalated bottom-line power sale
revenues directly to the eligible project.
Moreover, net metering implementation is achieved not by rais-
ing taxes or creating a new line item charge on the utility bill, but
merely by establishing an accounting practice for power producers
that is invisible to the typical ratepayer, no doubt accounting for its
popularity with state lawmakers. Net metering and billing works by
causing the regulated utility to pay or credit more than the estab-
lished wholesale price for power, even if it does not need power at
that time of day. No retail consumer ever sees this transfer payment
except the individual customer/generator who benefits from it.
If electricity were any other energy form, such as natural gas or
oil, its energy value could be saved and conserved. Oil and gas can be
stored in the system without significant diminution. However, elec-
tricity is a unique energy form: It cannot be stored or conserved with
any efficiency. Therefore, electricity has substantially different value
at different hours of the day, different seasons of the year, and at dif-
ferent places in the utility system.
Contrary to this physical reality, net metering and billing treats
all power as being tangibly storable and having equal value, when in
fact it is not and does not. By ignoring interim actual physical trans-
fers of power occurring at all the minutes and hours of the month, and
recognizing only the net balance of the transactions at the end of the
510. Ferrey, supra note 453, 136-38.
511. BOLLINGER, supra note 504, at 45.
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month or quarter, net metering assumes all electricity generated and
transmitted has equal value. This is not accurate at the wholesale
level, it is not the case with power trading, and it is not the case in
those twenty states where retail competition has been promoted with
deregulated competitive retail markets. In deregulated states, power
is differentially valued and priced each hour of each day of the year.
The market and regulatory reality is contrary to the MidAmerican
premise.
It is possible even to “game” the system with net metering—
selling power to the utility at the netted average retail price in off-
peak late evening hours when the customer/generator has no need for
the power (because the lights are off or the factory is not running a
working shift) and the utility has surplus power. To the extent that
power is taken from the utility at average price during peak hours
when most factories operate and when most residential and commer-
cial consumption occurs, the customer is able to buy below actual
value and sell higher than actual value in the market. Other utility
ratepayers will be left to make up the revenue deficit that occurs.
Having said all of this, significant renewable subsidies are an im-
portant, and many would say critical, bridge to a renewable energy fu-
ture. Only with these subsidies can certain smaller scale technologies
at distributed locations become viable. As long as the fragile MidA-
merican decision prevails against subsequent attack, the net impact on
society may be positive, as America transitions to renewable re-
sources over the next generations. However, FERC has created a
policy by a solitary case decision, relying on precedent that cannot
withstand scrutiny. Such a policy would most appropriately be fos-
tered by a rulemaking, taking notice and comment, and announcing
policy.
